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PRIVATIZATION AS DELEGATION
Gillian E. Metzger*
Recent expansions in privatization of government programs mean that
the constitutional paradigm of a sharp separation between public and pri-
vate is increasingly at odds with the blurred public-private character of mod-
ern governance. While substantial scholarship exists addressing the admin-
istrative and policy impact of expanded privatization, heretofore little effort
has been made to address this disconnect between constitutional law and new
administrative reality. This Article seeks to remedy that deficiency. It argues
that current state action doctrine is fundamentally inadequate to address the
constitutional challenge presented by privatization. Current doctrine is in-
sufficiently keyed to the ways that privatization involves delegation of govern-
ment power, and simultaneously fails to allow governments sufficient flexi-
bility in structuring public-private relationships. This Article proposes
instead a new constitutional analysis of privatization that reformulates state
action in private delegation terms. Under the proposed analysis, the critical
question is whether delegations of authority to private entities are adequately
structured to enforce constitutional constraints on government power. Cen-
tral to this approach is the recognition that mechanisms other than directly
subjecting private entities to constitutional scrutiny can satisfy the demands
of constitutional accountability, and can do so without intruding unduly on
government regulatory prerogatives. Where such mechanisms are lacking,
however, grants of government authority to private entities represent uncon-
stitutional delegations. To implement this approach, the Article advocates a
two-step inquiry that first singles out private delegations creating agency rela-
tionships between private entities and the government for special scrutiny,
and then asks whether adequate alternative accountability mechanisms exist.
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Privatization is now virtually a national obsession. Hardly any domes-
tic policy issue remains untouched by disputes over the scope of private
participation in government, with such disagreements surfacing most re-
cently in proposals for Medicare drug prescription coverage., Privatiza-
tion is also endemic as a matter of administrative practice. Ours is a sys-
tem in which private actors are so deeply embedded in governance that
"the boundaries between the public and private sectors" have become
"pervasive[ly] blurr[ed]. '"2 The lack of a clear divide between public and
private is in one sense not surprising, given modern government's exten-
sive regulation of the "private" sphere. 3 Less acknowledged, however, is
the extent of private involvement in the performance of government ac-
tivities. Private entities provide a vast array of social services for the gov-
ernment; administer core aspects of government programs; and perform
tasks that appear quintessentially governmental, such as promulgating
standards or regulating third-party activities. While this kind of private
involvement is longstanding, more significantly-and here reflecting con-
temporary political debate-it is expanding. Recent privatization efforts,
particularly in health care and welfare programs, public education, and
prisons, reveal a trend of greater discretion and broader responsibilities
being delegated to private hands.
4
Despite privatization's political and practical ubiquity, however, rec-
ognition of the extensive intermixing of public and private has failed to
permeate thinking about U.S. constitutional law. A foundational premise
1. See Robert Pear, Medicare Debate Focuses on Merits of Private Plans, N.Y. Times,
'June 9, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Pear, Medicare Debate] (describing debate over potential
role of private insurers in Medicare prescription drug coverage plans); see also Lizette
Alvarez, From Bipartisan to All Partisan on Air Security, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2001, at Al
(describing congressional battle over whether airport baggage screeners should become
federal employees or remain employees of private contractors); Floyd Norris, Hard Talk,
Softer Plans, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2002, at Al (describing disagreement over whether new
board regulating auditors should be composed of and funded by accountants or should be
independent of accounting industry); P.W. Singer, Have Guns, Will Travel, N.Y. Times,
July 21, 2003, at A15 (discussing privatized military forces); Richard W. Stevenson, Two
Sides Rally to Shape Social Security Discussion, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2001, at A14
(describing debate over President Bush's proposal to add private investment accounts to
social security).
2. Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: "Dream or
Nightmare?", 68 Soc. Serv. Rev. 33, 35 (1994); see also Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals:
Privatization and the Public Good 6-28 (2002) [hereinafter Minow, Partners] (noting use
of private organizations, both religious and secular, in providing government-funded
services); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 547
(2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] ("Virtually any example of service provision or
regulation reveals a deep interdependence among public and private actors in
accomplishing the business of governance.").
3. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 29-30 ("[I]n an environment of pervasive
governmental regulation . . . [t]he very identification of 'the private' involves
governmental acts.").
4. See infra Part I.A.
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of our constitutional order is that public and private are distinct spheres,
with public agencies and employees being subject to constitutional con-
straints while private entities and individuals are not. Private involvement
in government is addressed primarily through the state action doctrine,
which inquires whether, in a particular context, ostensibly private parties
should be considered "state (or federal) actors"'5 and thereby subject to
the Constitution's strictures. The terms and rigor of state action analysis
have varied over the years, but currently the usual linchpin for finding
state action is identifing substantial government involvement in the spe-
cific private acts being challenged. The underlying presumption is that
cases where private actors wield public power are rare and occur mainly
when the government tries to hide behind private surrogates whom it
controls. Current doctrine pays little attention to whether the govern-
ment is, in fact, delegating power to private entities to act on its behalf.
To the extent private delegations are considered, it is under the rubric of
private delegation doctrine, which assesses whether the Constitution's
separation of powers and due process requirements prohibit the govern-
ment from delegating certain types of powers to private hands. But con-
stitutional law makes no attempt to link the constitutionality of a private
delegation to the risk that it will place government power outside of con-
stitutional controls. Private delegations of government power are upheld
without examining whether private actions taken pursuant to such dele-
gations will come within the Constitution's purview.
Privatization can take a variety of forms. In some instances, privatiza-
tion represents government withdrawal from a field of activity or from
responsibility for providing services, as for example when government dis-
bands a program altogether or sells off state-owned businesses. Privatiza-
tion of this type raises few constitutional concerns because the Constitu-
tion rarely imposes affirmative obligations on government. The focus
here, however, is on a different and more common model of privatiza-
tion: government use of private entities to implement government pro-
grams or to provide services to others on the government's behalf.
Rather than constituting government withdrawal, this form of privatiza-
tion is characterized by a sharing of authority between public and private,
with the government giving private entities significant control over and
responsibility for government programs. This form of privatization is far
more constitutionally troubling. By virtue of their role as stand-ins for
the government, private entities often wield powers that I argue should
5. While the "state action" requirement is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's
express textual reference to state governments, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State
shall"; "nor shall any State"), the Court has interpreted other constitutional provisions as
embodying a similar requirement of federal action, see, e.g., San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987)
(noting requirement of "federal action" lies implicit in Fifth Amendment). The term
"state action" is often used to refer to this general requirement of government action in
order for the Constitution to apply, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's specific
requirement of action by state governments, and is so used here.
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be considered governmental in nature. These activities include not sim-
ply physical control over others or control over the content of regulatory
standards, but also control over third parties' access to government re-
sources and benefits.
This Article contends that constitutional law's current approach to
privatization is fundamentally inadequate in an era of increasingly priva-
tized government. Much of this inadequacy results from current doc-
trine's failure to appreciate how privatization can delegate government
power to private hands. Admittedly, distinguishing between instances
where private entities are acting on behalf of government and wielding
government power, as opposed to instances where the government is sim-
ply purchasing private services or sponsoring independent private en-
deavor, is frequently difficult. But the current emphasis on government
involvement in the specific act at issue is a very poor basis on which to rest
such a distinction because-as an examination of recent instances of
privatization and the Supreme Court's state action cases demonstrates-
private entities can wield these powers alongside minimal government
involvement.
Indeed, by assigning determinative weight to the presence vel non of
government involvement in specific challenged acts, current state action
doctrine arguably gets matters exactly backwards. Such a focus denies
constitutional protection against private conduct where the government
has given private actors broad discretion over operation of government
programs. Under the view that control of access to government benefits
and services represents an exercise of government power, however, this is
precisely the point at which constitutional protections are most war-
ranted. At the same time, current doctrine applies such protections
when they are often least needed-that is, when governments exercise
close supervision and thus constitutional norms can be enforced by
targeting government action directly. Worse still, focusing on govern-
ment involvement creates perverse incentives for governments to forego
close oversight of their private partners, even though such oversight is an
important means for ensuring that private actors adhere to constitutional
requirements.
The legal academy increasingly has taken note of the phenomenon
of expanding privatization. 6 But for the most part, that scholarship has
not addressed the lack of fit between existing constitutional law and the
6. For example, a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review was devoted to the subject.
See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1211 (2003)
[hereinafter Symposium, Public Values]; see also The Province of Administrative Law
(Michael Taggart ed., 1997); Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2; Symposium, The
Implications of Privatization on Low-Income People, 35 Clearinghouse Rev. 491 (2002);
Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA
L. Rev. 1687 (2002); Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and
Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1307 (2001). Some instances
of privatization, such as privatization in prisons, education, and welfare programs, have
received particular attention. See sources cited infra Part I.A.
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reality of modern governance, other than to conclude that privatization
often removes government programs and activities from constitutional
scrutiny, or to assess whether particular instances of privatization are con-
stitutional. 7 Little effort is made to rethink the basic terms of constitu-
tional analysis in the face of the disconnect between administrative reality
and constitutional doctrine.8 Instead, the focus is on reforming noncon-
stitutional law to better address accountability concerns raised by priva-
tization, specifically the moral hazard problem: the danger that private
actors will exploit their position in government programs to advance
their own financial or partisan interests at the expense of program par-
ticipants and the public.t ' In response, scholars have proposed reforming
administrative statutes to improve public oversight of privatized pro-
grams, imposing greater regulation and contractual controls on recipi-
ents of government funds, or ensuring program participants' access to
private law remedies.'
7. Numerous articles address the Establishment Clause issues raised by government
efforts to use private religious providers to implement programs and provide services. See
generally David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the
Establishment Clause, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 559 (2002); Symposium, Beyond Separatism:
Church and State, 18J.L. & Pol. 7 (2002); Symposium, Public Values, supra note 6. Several
scholars have also addressed whether private involvement in government violates
separation of powers requirements and due process. See sources cited infra note 225; see
also DavidJ. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 231,
233 (1998) [hereinafter D. Kennedy, Due Process] (arguing that some forms of welfare
privatization violate due process); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine
on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 911, 914-15 (1988) (assessing whether privately
operated prisons violate nondelegation doctrine); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare
Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 83, 105-11 (2003)
[hereinafter Stevenson, Welfare Services] (arguing that welfare privatization may violate
nondelegation doctrine).
8. There is, of course, a substantial body of commentary critiquing state action
doctrine and advocating its demise, but most of this dates back several decades. See
sources cited infra notes 147 and 152. For rare recent efforts to reform state action
doctrine in light of privatization, see Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an
Age of Privatization, 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 1169, 1189-92 (1994); Sheila S. Kennedy, When is
Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11
Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 203, 219-23 (2001) [hereinafter S. Kennedy, Private Public].
9. The question of whether privatization undermines or enhances programmatic
accountability is, of course, a subject of great debate; privatization advocates maintain that,
on the contrary, harnessing the profit motive of private actors and increasing competition
in service provision improves the quality and efficiency of services. See sources cited infra
note 135.
10. See generally infra Part III.B. For proposals to reform administrative statutes and
oversight, see, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in
Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28
Fordhain Urb. L.J. 1477, 1500-05 (2001). For proposals to expand conditions on funding,
see, e.g., Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 112-19, 142-50; Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual
Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts
for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1559, 1608-10 (2001); Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1315-17
(2003) [hereinafter Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms]. For arguments on the
1372 [Vol. 103:1367
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Developing such measures is surely a crucial part of coming to terms
with the new reality of privatized government. Yet reexamining constitu-
tional law's current approach to privatization is at least as essential. A
central premise of U.S. constitutional law is that the Constitution im-
poses limits on the actions that governments can take. Critically, these
limits apply to all exercises of government power, whether wielded by
officially public or nominally private entities; in addition, individuals in-
jured by exercises of government power can enforce these constitutional
limits in court. This central premise is what I refer to in this Article as the
principle of constitutional accountability. As used here, constitutional ac-
countability is not the commonly-invoked idea of political or electoral
accountability, nor the idea of programmatic accountability alluded to
above, but rather the concept of legal accountability that is basic to our
constitutional system. The inadequacies of current state action doctrine
mean that private exercises of government power are largely immune
from constitutional scrutiny, and therefore expanding privatization poses
a serious threat to the principle of constitutionally accountable govern-
ment. Where governments have adopted legislative or regulatory mea-
sures that offer substantial protection against private abuse of power, this
constitutional accountability concern appears less pressing. But govern-
ments may be unwilling to incur the costs associated with such measures,
particularly when the programs being privatized serve politically impo-
tent groups. Addressing the disconnect between constitutional law and
modern administrative reality is essential to ensure that basic constitu-
tional protections exist across the board.
This Article attempts to rectify this deficiency in current scholarship
and propose a new constitutional analysis of privatization. The central
challenge posed by privatization is not just how to enforce the core prin-
ciple of constitutional accountability, but how to do so without transfer-
ring the political branches' regulatory authority to the courts. While en-
forcing constitutional requirements frequently restricts the government's
regulatory role, such a restriction is of particular concern in privatization
contexts. The premise of the public-private divide in constitutional law is
that the rules governing private actors should be politically rather than
constitutionally determined. Moreover, preserving regulatory flexibility
is especially important if governments are to successfully reap privatiza-
tion's potential for greater efficiency and innovation while still guarding
against private misuse of public power.
importance of private law remedies, see, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like
Obligations on Private[lzed] Entities, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1721-24 (2002) (arguing that
existing corporate law doctrines offer means of ensuring accountability); Jody Freeman,
The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155, 201-07 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman,
Contracting State] (discussing ways to use government contracts to enhance accountability
of privatized governance); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of
Privatized Welfare, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 635-39 (2001) (emphasizing potential of




The answer to the constitutional challenge of privatization, I argue,
is to take a middle way: to insist that private exercises of government
power must comport with constitutional requirements, yet recognize that
in the context of private delegations, the method of enforcing these re-
quirements, as well as their substance, may differ from when government
officials act alone. Under the standard model of constitutional adjudica-
tion, a finding of state action means that relief for constitutional viola-
tions often runs directly against the government's private partners. But
direct application of constitutional limits to private actors is not necessary
to achieve constitutional accountability. Such accountability requires that
individuals be able to enforce constitutional requirements against specific
private exercises of government power; it further demands that they ulti-
mately be able to assert their challenges in court. Nothing in our consti-
tutional structure or history, however, mandates that this enforcement
take the form of judicial imposition of constitutional requirements di-
rectly against private actors, as opposed to judicial enforcement of these
requirements through other means.
Under the approach advocated here, the crucial constitutional ques-
tion is whether adequate accountability mechanisms exist by which to en-
sure that private exercises of government power comport with constitu-
tional requirements. If such mechanisms are lacking, the appropriate
judicial response is not subjecting private entities to direct constitutional
scrutiny, but instead requiring that the government create such mecha-
nisms as the constitutionally-imposed price of delegating government
power to private hands. A central advantage of this approach is that it
gives governments an incentive to adopt measures that protect against
potential private abuses. Absent mechanisms that adequately substitute
for direct constitutional review, delegation of government power to pri-
vate entities would now be unconstitutional. Equally important, avoiding
direct constitutional scrutiny of private actors allows the government
greater flexibility because the government can choose among a variety of
accountability mechanisms in structuring instances of privati-zation to
meet constitutional demands.
Part I of this Article begins by presenting a brief overview of recent
expansions of privatization in Medicare and Medicaid, welfare programs,
public education, and prisons. This examination of recent privatization
efforts provides a helpful backdrop for understanding why privatization
poses a challenge for existing constitutional doctrine. These examples
illustrate how privatization can represent a delegation of government
power to private entities, with constitutionally-exempt parties gaining au-
thority over government programs and program participants. Yet they
also demonstrate the potential advantages of privatization and, more im-
portantly, the government's need for flexibility in designing relationships




Part II assesses how well current constitutional law addresses the con-
stitutional challenge of privatization. Examination of the Supreme
Court's state action cases establishes that few instances of privatization are
likely to trigger a finding of state action because current doctrine is
largely unconcerned with the control over third parties that private enti-
ties gain as a result of their roles in government programs. This, in turn,
makes current state action doctrine significantly underinclusive and a
poor vehicle for preserving constitutional accountability under privatized
government. Ironically, current doctrine is also overinclusive, unnecessa-
rily restricting the government's regulatory flexibility by applying consti-
tutional constraints directly to private actors when the exercise of govern-
ment power is otherwise adequately constrained. The net effect is,
perversely, to exacerbate constitutional accountability concerns by creat-
ing incentives for government to grant its private partners broad discre-
tion over government programs and minimize its involvement in their
actions.
Part II ends with a discussion of the other route through which con-
stitutional law addresses privatization: private delegation doctrine. De-
spite occasional calls for a revival of limitations on the types of powers
that government can delegate to private parties, the Court has not done
so, for fear of inappropriately intruding on the regulatory prerogatives of
the political branches. Yet the private delegation cases are instructive be-
cause of their suggestion that how a delegation is structured, and in par-
ticular whether the government retains a formal oversight role, affects its
constitutionality. Equally noteworthy is the Court's failure to link the pri-
vate delegation and state action analyses. Perhaps due to its reluctance to
scrutinize private delegations closely, the Court does not condition a del-
egation's constitutionality on whether the private delegate's exercises of
government power are subject to constitutional scrutiny; instead, this
question is left solely for separate examination under state action
doctrine.
Part III takes a step back from existing doctrine and examines prior
academic commentary on state action doctrine and on privatization more
generally. Over the years, legal scholars have leveled numerous criticisms
at state action doctrine-some arguing for its complete demise, others
advocating more modest internal reforms. While containing merit, both
lines of criticism ultimately fail as realistic solutions to the problems with
current state action doctrine. As noted above, substantial scholarship on
privatization advocates developing nonconstitutional approaches to
guard against private abuse of power. Many of these reforms offer impor-
tant protections. But, in the end, they provide an incomplete solution to
the inadequacies in constitutional law's treatment of privatization, in part
because they depend on the government's willingness to restrict its free-
dom to rely on private partners. This governments may be reluctant to
do, absent legal compulsion rooted in constitutional law.
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Returning to the understanding of privatization as a delegation of
government power, Part IV seeks to develop a new constitutional analysis
of privatization by rethinking state action in private delegation terms.
This Part begins by providing the normative case for a private delegation
approach and then turns to the difficult questions involved in construct-
ing such an analysis. A critical claim is that the analysis should focus
largely on delegations that create an agency relationship between private
entities and the government. This is because delegations that give a pri-
vate entity authority to act on the government's behalf, particularly with
respect to third parties, are the most likely to involve grants of govern-
ment power. But private delegations of this nature should be fully consti-
tutional if they are structured such that individuals have adequate means
of enforcing constitutional limits, even though the private entities in-
volved are exempt from direct constitutional scrutiny. Part IV discusses a
variety of mechanisms that governments can employ to structure their
delegations to meet constitutional accountability concerns. Possibilities
include providing administrative complaint systems through which indi-
viduals can obtain government review of private decisionmaking, or con-
tracting with multiple service providers so that no one provider has mo-
nopolistic control over program participants. Part IV also argues that, in
general, the appropriate remedial response to inadequately structured
delegations will be for a court to invalidate the delegation as
unconstitutional.
The remaining sections of Part IV address the question of whether
the private delegation analysis proposed here is any more likely to have
practical impact than prior efforts at reform. The proposed analysis dif-
fers significantly from current state action doctrine, which no doubt lim-
its its chances ofjudicial adoption. But current doctrine's inability to pre-
serve constitutional accountability in the face of ever-expanding
privatization may make courts increasingly willing to consider new ap-
proaches. Importantly, the proposed private delegation analysis accepts
the constitutional premise of a public-private divide; moreover, it offers a
judicially manageable approach to addressing state action issues that pre-
serves the political branches' regulatory role. The final section of Part IV
provides a more detailed look at what the private delegation analysis
would mean in practice by applying it to the recent privatization initia-
tives discussed in Part I.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF PRIVATIZATION
What is privatization and why does it merit close constitutional atten-
tion at this juncture? To answer this question, this Part begins with a
detailed description of recent initiatives in four areas where privatization
is particularly dominant: Medicare and Medicaid, welfare programs, pub-
lic education, and prisons. These examples reveal that privatization com-
monly entails not a "retraction" in government but rather a different
form of government, one in which private actors wield substantial power
[Vol. 103:13671376
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over government programs and their participants. A central claim I
make here is that as a result, government privatization often effectively
serves to delegate government power to private entities.
Combined with private immunity from constitutional strictures, such
delegations raise the danger that privatization will undermine constitu-
tional accountability by preventing individual enforcement of constitu-
tional constraints on government. Yet reflection shows that simply ex-
tending the constitutional norms applicable to government actors to
cover the government's private partners is also constitutionally problem-
atic. Doing so often simply transfers regulatory authority to the courts,
and this transfer occurs in a context where the government particularly
needs freedom to target the policy concerns and opportunities that priva-
tization presents. The challenge is thus to develop a means of ensuring
constitutional accountability while not impairing the legitimate regula-
tory prerogatives of the political branches.
A. Contemporary Examples of Privatization
Privatization is a word with many different meanings. On a social
and cultural level, it implies an individual's withdrawal from civic life and
reorientation towards the pursuit of self-interest.' In the context of gov-
ernment, the focus here, the term is conventionally understood to signify
a transfer of public responsibilities to private hands. 2 Yet history demon-
strates that increased privatization often goes hand in hand with expan-
sion rather than contraction in public responsibilities. The government
turns to private entities to provide the expertise and personnel it needs to
fulfill its new tasks. 13 Moreover, privatization is not simply a neutral phe-
nomenon; it carries inherent political and ideological implications. Ef-
11. See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 6, 9 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Stuart Butler, Privatization for Public Purposes, in Privatization and Its
Alternatives 17, 17 (William T. Gormly, Jr. ed., 1991) ("Privatization is the shifting of a
function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector."); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1229, 1230 (2003) [hereinafter Minow, Public and Private Partnerships] ("[A] useful
definition encompasses the range of efforts by governments to move public functions into
private hands and to use market-style competition.").
13. See Joel F. Handler, Down from Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and
Empowerment 85-86, 104 (1996) [hereinafter Handler, Down from Bureaucracy];
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 568-69; see also Paul C. Light, The True Size of
Government 1 (1999) (noting number of full-time federal government employees
increases by nearly 11 million if employees of private contractors and grantees are
included). Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this is the War on Poverty, where the
dramatic expansion in the federal government's social welfare role was accompanied by a
similarly dramatic expansion in government contracting with nonprofits to provide
services. See Stephen Rathgeb Smith & Michael Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare
State in the Age of Contracting 50-62 (1993); Kramer, supra note 2, at 34. Similarly, many
of the measures that signaled the move to active federal regulation of the economy in the
New Deal gave private industry groups a prominent role in setting and enforcing
regulatory standards. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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forts to privatize public programs frequently reflect a wish to limit the
government's role and are often tied to particular substantive visions of
government policies. 14 In addition, identifying an area of activity as
purely private implies that it is not an appropriate subject for public regu-
lation or collective responsibility. 
15
Further complicating the definitional challenge is the broad array of
public-private relationships that the term "privatization" encompasses. As
John Donahue has noted, "[t]wo concepts share the same word-priva-
tization. The first concept.., involves removing certain responsibilities,
activities, or assets from the collective realm .... [T]he second ... [in-
volves] retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the pri-
vate sector."' 6 Examples of the first type of privatization are the govern-
ment selling off state-owned businesses or disbanding a government
program altogether. In the United States, however, privatization over-
whelmingly takes the second form. 17 Examples here include instances
when government contracts with private entities to provide goods and
services for itself or others, or provides vouchers or other subsidies that
allow individuals to purchase such private goods or services on their own.
14. See Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs,
49 UCLA L. Rev. 1739, 1742-51, 1754-57 (2002) [hereinafter Diller, Form and Substance]
(arguing that recent privatization in welfare context reflects explicit effort to reduce
welfare rolls); see also Starr, supra note 11, at 38-41 (arguing that privatization
undermines claims for public services and calls into question government's capacity for
collective provision). But see Handler, Down from Bureaucracy, supra note 13, at 8-10
(noting claim that privatization in conjunction with decentralization can enhance
democracy).
15. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 34-35, 111-12 (noting that private provision
of social services may undermine public commitment to such services); Carole Pateman,
The Patriarchal Welfare State, in Democracy and the Welfare State 231, 236-38, 241 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1988) (arguing that seemingly neutral division between public and private
masks patriarchal character of women's exclusion from public sphere).
16. John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means
215 (1989).
17. See id. at 6-7; see also Robert S. Gilmour & Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing
Governmental Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of "State
Action," 58 Pub. Admin. Rev. 247, 247 (1998) ("[Flew government functions in America
are simply abandoned altogether .... Privatization in the United States is ... more likely to
represent a change in form rather than function .... ). Contracting out is the dominant
form of privatization in the United States. See Keon S. Chi & Cindy Jasper, Council of
State Gov'ts, Private Practices: A Review on Privatization in State Government 13 (Michael
J. Scott ed., 1998) (concluding that contracting out was method states used to privatize
program or service in 78% of cases surveyed); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-97-
48, Privatization: Lessons Learned by State and Local Governments 22-23 (1997)
[hereinafter GAO, Privatization] (describing privatization in United States as primarily
contracting out); see also Freeman, Contracting State, supra note 10, at 164 (describing
forms of private government contracts). On the other hand, the sale of state-owned
businesses is a much less common form of privatization in the United States than abroad.
For a discussion of one such divestiture in the United States, see Daniel Guttman, Public
Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the
Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 859, 879-81 (2000) (describing
privatization of United States Enrichment Corporation).
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In some privatization contexts, the government does not provide direct
funding but nonetheless uses private entities to achieve its programmatic
goals-for instance, by chartering private corporations to provide desired
services or relying on private actors for the content and enforcement of
government regulations. 18
Private actors have long played central roles in government pro-
grams.1 9 But, as other commentators have noted, contemporary govern-
ment privatization is in important ways a new phenomenon. Recent years
have witnessed an increase in the roles private actors play in government.
Both the character and quantity of private involvement are changing.
Governments are giving private actors greater discretion over the imple-
mentation of government programs than in the past and utilizing new
types of private partners, particularly for-profit companies and religious
organizations. 20 Privatization seems likely only to expand further in the
near future, fueled by increasing belief in market-based solutions to pub-
lic problems.
21
18. See GAO, Privatization, supra note 17, at 44-47 (defining different forms of
privatization); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 Marq. L. Rev.
449, 456-62 (1998) (describing various forms of private involvement in government);
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 551-55 (same); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 319, 324-29 (2002) (classifying forms of private regulation by
level of government involvement). For detailed descriptions of these different forms of
privatization, see generally The Tools of Government (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
19. See, e.g., Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 10, at 1289; Minow,
Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1236, 1240-41; see also Neil Gilbert,
Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility 99-126
(2002) (describing reliance on private social welfare services and benefits in Europe). For
historical overviews of the roles of nonprofits in social service delivery and government
programs, see Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit
Relations in the Modern Welfare State 69-99 (1995) [hereinafter Salamon, Partners];
Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at 47-57.
20. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 1-26 (arguing that third parties increasingly
are involved in implementing and often managing government services); Freeman,
Contracting State, supra note 10, at 160-64 (describing recent expansions in use of
contracting out); H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan, The Hollow State: Private
Provision of Public Services, in Public Policy for Democracy 222, 223 (Helen Ingram &
Steven Rathgeb Smith eds., 1993) (noting that governments are now contracting for
administration and monitoring); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools
of Public Action: An Introduction, in The Tools of Government, supra note 18, at 1, 1-3
[hereinafter Salamon, The New Governance] (noting government's increased reliance on
third parties to deliver public services).
21. See Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1240. Another
force behind privatization's growth has been loss of faith in the government's ability to
administer programs and solve social problems. See id. After the September 1Ith terrorist
attacks, however, confidence in the government generally and in the military in particular
has increased. See Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, The End of Government as We Know It, in
Market-Based Governance 227, 227-31 (John D. Donahue &Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002);
Robin Toner, Trust in the Military Heightens Among Baby Boomers' Children, N.Y. Times,
May 27, 2003, at Al. Whether this resurgence of faith in government will slow
privatization's progress is unclear.
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While private involvement in government has increased in many ar-
eas of government activity, it is particularly pronounced in social welfare
programs and in government-run institutions. Four areas marked by no-
table expansions of privatization are Medicare and Medicaid, welfare pro-
grams, public education, and prisons. An examination of these areas is
particularly instructive in demonstrating the trend towards greater priva-
tization and how it impacts government programs.
1. Medicare and Medicaid Managed Care. - One example of the trend
towards expanded privatization is Medicare and Medicaid managed care.
Until recently, the basic model for both programs was fee-for-service,
under which the government reimburses a doctor or other medical pro-
vider for each service provided to a beneficiary. By contrast, under man-
aged care the beneficiary enrolls with a managed care organization
(MCO), usually a for-profit enterprise, and the government pays the
MCO a set amount over a given period (the "capitated rate") regardless
of the medical services actually provided. 22 While enrollment in a MCO
is optional for Medicare beneficiaries, it is mandatory for many partici-
pants in Medicaid. 2: The number of beneficiaries enrolled in managed
care in the two programs has increased dramatically since 1990, with
nearly 60% of Medicaid beneficiaries and 12% of Medicare beneficiaries
being treated through MCOs in 2002.24
22. For a description of how managed care operates, see Barry R. Furrow, Regulating
the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and a New System Ethos, 43 Vill. L.
Rev. 361, 372-76 (1998); see also Jennifer E. Gladieux, Medicare+Choice Appeal
Procedures: Reconciling Due Process Rights and Cost Containment, 25 Am. J.L. & Med.
61, 61 nn.5-6, 62 nn.7-11 (1999) (describing different managed care organizational
forms). Both Medicare and Medicaid offer less frequently used forms of managed care
that pay more on a cost basis. See Pi-Yi Mayo, Medicare Health Maintenance
Organizations, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 25, 27 (1997) (describing cost-based MCOs under
Medicare); Maria A. Morrison, The Impact of Grijalva v. Shalala on the Medicare HMO
Appeal Process and the Importance of Enforcing Appeal Process Regulations, 103 Dick. L.
Rev. 735, 737 (1999) (same); Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, HenryJ.
Kaiser Family Found., Key Facts: Medicaid and Managed Care 1 (Dec. 2001), available at
http:// ,ww.kiforg/content/2001/206803 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing non-risk-based forms of Medicaid managed care).
23. See Medicare+Choice Program, 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.50, 422.62 (2002); see also id.
§§ 406.50, 407.10 (setting out eligibility conditions for fee-for-service Medicare). Most of
the participants for whom Medicaid managed care is mandatory qualify for Medicaid on
the basis of low income; states generally have not required that the elderly and disabled
enroll in managed care. See James W. Fossett, Managed Care and Devolution, in Medicaid
and Devolution: A View from the States 106, 111-13 (Frank J. Thompson & John J.
Dilulio,Jr. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Fossett, Managed Care]. However, this might change if
the Bush Administration's proposal for block-granting Medicaid is adopted. See Robert
Pear, Medicaid Proposal Would Give States More Say on Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2003, at
Al [hereinafter Pear, Medicaid Proposal] (detailing Bush Administration's plan to block-
grant Medicaid and "give states the same freedom they got to run their welfare programs in
1996").
24. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2002
Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Report: Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates
by State (June 30, 2002), available at http://cms.hhs.gov/lnedicaid/managedcare/
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Even under fee-for-service, both Medicare and Medicaid rely exten-
sively on the private sector. 2 5 Private doctors, hospitals, nursing homes,
and the like provide medical care; private intermediaries process the
providers' claims for reimbursement; and review of the appropriateness
of treatment decisions and quality of care is undertaken by private medi-
cal professionals sitting on peer review organizations or utilization review
committees, as well as by accreditation organizations such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).26
What distinguishes managed care from these other instances of privatiza-
tion is that the MCO exercises a monopoly over a beneficiary's access to
health care. The MCO controls beneficiaries' access to health services,
rather than their access to payment for already-provided health services,
mmcss02.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (identifying 23.1 million Medicaid
beneficiaries, 57.6% of total beneficiaries, as enrolled in managed care); The Medicare
Policy Project, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicare: Medicare+Choice Fact Sheet I
(Apr. 2003), available at http://www.kff.org/content/2003/2052-06 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Medicare+Choice Fact Sheet] (reporting that 5 million
Medicare beneficiaries, 12% of total beneficiaries, were enrolled in Medicare managed
care in 2002). The number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care has
declined since its high of 16% in 2000, Medicare+Choice Fact Sheet, supra, at 1, a decline
attributed to a significant drop in managed care plans participating in Medicare, as well as
to the fact that those plans remaining in Medicare are reducing benefits and increasing
premiums, see Marsha Gold & John McCoy, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.,
Monitoring Medicare+Choice Fast Facts No. 7: Choice Continues to Erode in 2002, at 2
(Jan. 2002), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/fastfacts7.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). The emphasis on preferred provider plans in recent
Medicare prescription drug coverage proposals may further increase managed care
enrollment. See Pear, Medicare Debate, supra note 1, at A22.
25. This reliance on private entities is not happenstance; on the contrary, such
reliance, in the case of Medicare at least, was essential to overcoming the American
Medical Association's opposition and getting the program implemented. See Timothy
StoltzfusJost, Governing Medicare, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 39, 82-94 (1999) [hereinafter Jost,
Governing Medicare].
26. On the provision of services by private physicians, hospitals, and other eligible
institutions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e), (r) (2000) (defining physicians and hospitals
eligible to provide services under Medicare). On the role of private intermediaries in
claims processing, see Staff of Subcomm. on Health & Env't of the House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., Medicaid Source Book: Background Data and Analysis
440-45 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Health & Env't, Medicaid Source
Book] (noting which states use fiscal intermediaries to process claims under Medicaid);
Jost, Governing Medicare, supra note 25, at 82-88; Eleanor D. Kinney, Behind the Veil
Where the Action Is: Private Policy Making and American Health Care, 51 Admin. L. Rev.
145, 161-62 (1999) [hereinafter Kinney, Behind the Veil]. On the role of peer review
organizations, see Subcomm. on Health & Env't, Medicaid Source Book, supra, at 452-53;
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and
Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and
Recommendations, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 4-9 (1989). On the role of accreditation
organizations and the JCAHO, see Subcomm. on Health & Env't, Medicaid Source Book,
supra, at 446; Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct
Government Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1994, at 47, 52, 55-63 [hereinafter Kinney, Private
Accreditation].
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as in the case of the private intermediaries who process reimbursement
claims. 27 Moreover, beneficiaries enrolled in MCOs generally cannot ob-
tain government payment for services they obtain outside of the MCO's
network, whereas under fee-for-service one provider's refusal to provide
services leaves a beneficiary free to obtain subsidized services from an-
other.28 Beneficiaries are limited in their ability to switch out of an MCO,
and the MCO has the power to deny a desired service or procedure on
the ground that it is not medically necessary or not covered under Medi-
caid or Medicare.
29
The growth of managed care in Medicaid and Medicare, as well as in
the context of private employer-provided health plans, reflects efforts to
cut costs.3 0 The capitated rate approach gives MCOs an incentive to con-
trol expenses and police against unnecessary treatments. Managed care
can also result in improvements in health care quality: MCOs have a fi-
nancial interest in providing preventative services'; they are also better
positioned to ensure service coordination and enforce standards for
27. See Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate
Enrollee Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 359,
369-70 (1998); Kinney, Behind the Veil, supra note 26, at 156 (discussing convergence of
coverage and treatment decisions under managed care as different from fee-for-service).
But see Laurie McGinley, Behind Medicare's Decisions, An Invisible Web of Gatekeepers,
Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 2003, at Al (describing how private intermediaries' ability to set local
policy regarding Medicare coverage for particular treatments and procedures gives
intermediaries significant power over beneficiaries' access to health care).
28. Some coverage for out-of-network expenses is available under preferred provider
plans, but beneficiaries are subject to greater deductibles and copayments than tinder fee-
for-service. See Reed Abelson, Private Plans Again Seen as Aid to Medicare, N.Y. Times,
July 5, 2003, at Al.
29. See John T. Boese, When Angry Patients Become Angry Prosecutors: Medical
Necessity Determinations, Quality of Care, and the Qui Tam Law, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 53, 59
(1999); see also Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-08 (D. Tenn. 1996) (detailing
ways in which individual choice is limited by Tennessee's Medicaid managed care
program), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir.
1998). While Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care were initially allowed to
transfer out of their MCOs at any time, starting in 2001 they are allowed to change plans
only once annually. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.62 (2002).
30. For arguments that managed care is unlikely to yield financial savings for
Medicare, see Barbara S. Cooper & Bruce C. Vladeck, Bringing Competitive Pricing to
Medicare, Health Aft., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 49; see also Abelson, supra note 28 (describing
studies that suggest managed care is unlikely to yield financial savings for Medicare).
31. Debate exists over the extent to which MCOs' interest in avoiding future costs of
treatment leads them to provide better access to preventative services. See Robert A.
Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional Medicare-Should
We? Could We?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2002, at 139, 143-44 (noting some
MCOs have adopted disease management programs); see also Lyle Nelson et al., Access to
Care in Medicare HMOs, 1996, in Contemporary Managed Care 163, 167-68 (Marsha
Gold ed., 1998) (reporting some groups of enrollees in Medicare managed care had
greater access to preventative services). But see Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie,
Managed Care and Public Health: Conflict and Collaboration, 30J.L. Med. & Ethics 191,
193 (2002) (stating that managed care rarely covers significant preventative services).
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care. 32 In the Medicare context, managed care allows beneficiaries the
power to choose additional coverage or lower out-of-pocket expenses in
exchange for restrictions on their choice of provider.3 3 But there are also
obvious hazards attached to the use of managed care, most significantly
that MCOs also have strong financial incentives to deny coverage for
medically needed but expensive treatments. 34 Concerns over such MCO
abuse have led many states to enact legislation requiring independent
review of MCO denials of treatment among other measures, 35 while the
federal government has a detailed procedure providing for similar review
of service denials by Medicare MCOs.
36
2. Welfare Privatization. - Even more dramatic expansion in priva-
tization is evident in the welfare context, which is also characterized by
extensive and longstanding private involvement. Private organizations
run homeless shelters and food banks; provide treatment services; oper-
ate Head Start programs; and work closely with child welfare agencies.3 7
32. See James W. Fossett et al., Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't, Managing
Accountability in Medicaid Managed Care: The Politics of Public Management 1 (1999)
(noting potential for Medicaid managed care to enhance accountability over fee-for-service
because managed care creates central organization responsible for providing care to
beneficiaries); Boese, supra note 29, at 57 (arguing that fee-for-service creates incentives to
overtreat that managed care avoids); Furrow, supra note 22, at 369-71 (arguing that
integrated delivery of medical services can significantly benefit the chronically ill and that
such integration is easier to achieve with managed care); see also Rosenbaum & Kamoie,
supra note 31, at 196-97 (noting managed care treatment guidelines allow public health
authorities to disseminate scientific standards quickly).
33. See Mayo, supra note 22, at 37 (noting that Medicare requires MCOs to provide
additional services to beneficiaries); Christopher G. Gegwich, Note, Medicare Managed
Care: A New Constitutional Right to Due Process for Denials of Care Under Grijalva v.
Shalala, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 185, 191-93 (1999) (arguing Medicare MCOs provide broader
services than traditional fee-for-service, save beneficiaries the cost of Medigap insurance,
and impose less administrative burden on federal government). But see Medicare+Choice
Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1-2 (noting that most Medicare+Choice plans have reduced
availability and scope of key supplemental benefits).
34. Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap
Between Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. Contemp.
Health L. & Pol'y 135, 169-70 (2000) (arguing that MCOs have financial incentive to
refuse authorization where care exceeds fixed rate of compensation per enrollee);
Bonnyman &Johnson, supra note 27, at 376-79 (contending that MCOs have the ability to
deny beneficiaries needed medical treatment); Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving
Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 Am. J.L. & Med. 335, 344-46 (2000) (same).
35. See, e.g., Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1473-75 (2003)
(upholding Kentucky statute limiting ability of health benefit plans to discriminate against
qualified providers); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 361, 373-75
(2002) (upholding Illinois statute requiring independent review of HMO determinations
that conflict with those of primary care physicians).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(f)-(g) (2000); Medicare+Choice Program, 42 C.F.R.
§ 422.560-422.626 (2002). Federal legislation and regulations also provide procedures for
review of care denials by Medicaid MCOs, but do not offer as extensive protections. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (3), 1396u-2(b); 42 C.F.R. § 438.100, 438.400-438.424; infra note 227.
37. See Arnold Gurin, Governmental Responsibility and Privatization: Examples from
Four Social Services, in Privatization and the Welfare State 179, 184-95 (Sheila B.
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The 1996 welfare legislation, which replaced Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary Aid to Needy Families
(TANF) program, paved the way for greater privatization by expressly
permitting private administration of state TANF programs."8 Moreover,
TANF's mandate that certain percentages of a state's caseload must be
engaged in a work activity means that many more welfare recipients are
participating in privately run work programs or receiving services from
private entities.3' 9 According to a recent report, state and local govern-
ments spent more than $1.5 billion in 2001 on contracts with private enti-
ties for TANF-related services. 40 The 1996 legislation also altered the na-
ture of private involvement in welfare by authorizing states to provide
welfare services through pervasively sectarian organizations and prohibit-
Kamerman & AlfredJ. Kahn eds., 1989); Salamon, Partners, supra note 19, at 75-99; Smith
& Lipsky, supra note 13, at 3-5, 46-71. Moreover, programs such as Food Stamps and
Section 8 housing assistance are privately implemented, in that the government makes
subsidies available and sets overall eligibility requirements but leaves specific decisions
regarding what food or housing is purchased to private decisions of beneficiaries, retailers,
and landlords. For discussions of the structure of these programs, see Robert A. Moffitt,
Lessons from the Food Stamp Program, in Vouchers and the Provision of Public Services
119, 120-23 (C. Eugene Steuerle et al. eds., 2000); George E. Peterson, Housing Vouchers:
The U.S. Experience, in Vouchers and the Provision of Public Services, supra, at 139,
143-51. On the lengthy private involvement in public welfare programs, see Michael B.
Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America 45-47,
68-87, 112-13, 124, 160-63 (10th anniv. ed. 1996); see also Gilman, supra note 10, at
581-91 (providing historical overview of private involvement in welfare);John Fabian Witt,
The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of
American Law, ch. 3 (forthcoming 2003) (discussing the way in which local private and
quasi-private workingmen's mutual aid societies are critical building blocks of the early
social insurance systems in Western democracies).
38. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(])(A) (2000) (authorizing implementation of
welfare programs "through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations").
For descriptions of how PRWORA has led to increased privatization in welfare, see Pamela
Winston et al., Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature 3-6
(Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8834-002, May 2002), available at
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/privatization.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also M. Bryna Sanger, The Welfare Marketplace: Privatization and Welfare
Reform 2, 28-29 (2003) (tracing expanded privatization to the 1998 Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) as well as PRWORA).
39. See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti et al., The Role of Intermediaries in Linking TANF
Recipients with Jobs, at v (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8543-400,
Feb. 10, 2000), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/intermediaries.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Sang,:r, supra note 38, at 2, 15, 34-39; see also
Demetra Smith Nightingale, Program Structure and Service Delivery in Eleven Welfare-to-
Work Grant Programs 48-54 (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8550-121,
Jan. 2001), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/wtwstructure.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that most Welfare-to-Work services, aimed at
hard-to-place TANF recipients, were provided by nonprofit, community-based
organizations).
40. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-02-245, Welfare Reform: Interim Report on
Potential Ways to Strengthen Federal Oversight of State and Local Contracting 8 (2002)
[hereinafter GAO, Welfare Reform].
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ing governments from discriminating against religious providers, popu-
larly referred to as "charitable choice."
'4 1
Wisconsin provides the prime example of a government putting op-
eration of its welfare system in private hands. Private contractors adminis-
ter Wisconsin's welfare program-known as Wisconsin Works or W-2-in
Milwaukee, which has approximately 75% of the state's welfare recipi-
ents. 4 2 In this role, private contractors remain responsible for substantial
aspects of program administration, such as determining applicants' eligi-
bility for benefits, 43 assessing their ability to work, developing employ-
ment plans, and sanctioning beneficiaries for noncompliance with pro-
gram requirements. 44 Only a few counties have followed Wisconsin's
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a; see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum,
179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 967-78, 982 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that direct funding for drug
treatment services through pervasively sectarian provider violates Establishment Clause,
but declining to assess constitutionality of charitable choice provision of TANF). For
analyses of the constitutional and policy issues involved in charitable choice, see sources
cited supra note 6.
42. See Sheena McConnell et al., Privatization in Practice: Case Studies of
Contracting for TANF Case Management 16 tbl.II.1, appx. at A23-A25 (Mathematica
Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8834-008, Mar. 2003), available at http://www.mathe
matica-mpr.com/PDFs/privatize.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Thomas Kaplan, Wisconsin's W-2 Program: Welfare as We Might Come to Know It?, in
Learning from Leaders: Welfare Reform Politics and Policy in Five Midwestern States 77,
85 (Carol S. Weissert ed., 2000) (discussing use of private contractors under W-2). See
generally David Dodenhoff, Privatizing Welfare in Wisconsin: Ending Administrative
Entitlements-W-2's Untold Story 3 (Wis. Policy Research Inst. Report No. 11:1, Jan.
1998), available at http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume Il/Vol I Inol.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing creation of W-2 and privatized programs in
Milwaukee).
43. Some disagreement exists as to whether private W-2 employees determine
applicants' initial eligibility for W-2 benefits. Compare McConnell et al., supra note 42, at
43, appx. at A24 (describing private contractors as performing initial eligibility and
assessment functions in May 2002), with Sanger, supra note 38, at 43, 57 (stating that initial
intake functions recently have been transferred back to public employees). According to
Maximus, one of the private agencies implementing W-2 in Milwaukee, private employees
continue to determine applicants' eligibility for W-2 benefits and have done so since the
program's inception; however, public employees determine eligibility for food stamps and
Medicaid, as required by federal law. Telephone Interview by Gillian E. Metzger, Associate
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law with Jerry Stepaniak, Vice-President,
Maximus (Sept. 4, 2003). On the other hand, the state agency responsible for overseeing
W-2's implementation maintains that because the state uses the same computer system to
process applications or W-2, Medicaid, and food stamps, only public employees are allowed
to open an electronic application for W-2 benefits. See E-mail from Roger Kautz, Bureau
of Partner Services, Milwaukee Regional Office of the Division of Workforce Solutions,
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, to Gillian E. Metzger, Associate
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (July 31, 2003) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
44. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 49.143-51 (2003); Wis. Legislative Audit Bureau, Rep. 01-7,
An Evaluation: Wisconsin Works (W-2) Program: Department of Workforce Development
3-9, 21-23 (2001) (noting discretion of W-2 agencies regarding placements, sanctions, and
time limit extensions); Susan Gooden et al., Matching Applicants with Services: Initial
Assessments in the Milwaukee County W-2 Program 3-6, 11-15 (MDRC, Nov. 2001),
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initial lead and engaged in such wholesale privatization of welfare pro-
grams. 45 Increasingly, however, other governments are similarly con-
tracting out case management functions, 46 as well as particular aspects of
program administration, such as benefits delivery47 and child support col-
lection.48 Workforce development, job training, and job placement ser-
vices are especially likely to be privatized.
49
available at http://www.mdrc.org/pnblications/95/ftll.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (focusing on case manager's control over where applicants are placed in W-2's
tiered structure, which determines requirements applicants must meet and services they
will be provided by W-2 agency); McConnell et al., supra note 42, at 14-17, appx. at
A23-A26 (describing private contractors' responsibilities under W-2).
45. Winston et al., supra note 38, at 11 (identifying counties in Arizona and Florida
that have contracted out administration of all aspects of TANF); see also GAO, Welfare
Reform, supra note 40, at 15 (reporting that private contractors determine eligibility for
TANF cash assistance in four states and for other TANF-funded services in eighteen states).
In addition, Florida has given responsibility for all TANF services other than eligibility
determinations to a public/private corporation. See Robert E. Crew, Jr. & Belinda Creel
Davis, Florida Welfare Reform: Cash Assistance as the Least Desirable Resource for Poor
Families, in Managing Welfare Reform in Five States 25, 38-39 (Sarah F. Liebschutz ed.,
2000). The lack of more widespread privatization of all TANF administration is in part due
to the federal government's conclusion that public employees must perform Medicaid and
Food Stamp eligibility determinations. Winston et al., supra note 38, at 5; Sam Howe
Verhovek, Clinton Reining in Role for Business in Welfare Effort, N.Y. Times, May 10,
1997, at Al.
46. See McConnell et al., supra note 42, at 2 (reporting that forty states have
privatized some aspect of TANF case management); Richard W. Roper, A Shifting
Landscape: Contracting for Welfare Services in NewJersey, Rockefeller Reps. (Nelson A.
Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't, Albany, N.Y.), Dec. 23, 1998, at 5-11 (describing New Jersey's
increasing reliance on private providers for welfare-related services). But see David Breaux
et al., To Privatization and Back: Welfare Reform Implementation in Mississippi, in
Managing Welfare Reform in Five States, supra note 45, at 43, 46-50, 53-54 (detailing
initial rise of privatization and later return of case management and job placement
functions to public hands).
47. See Henry Freedman et al., Uncharted Terrain: The Intersection of Privatization
and Welfare, 35 Clearinghouse Rev. 557, 561 (2002) (reporting that Citigroup subsidiary
has contracts to run electronic benefit systems in more than thirty states); see also David
Barstow, A.T.M. Cards Fail to Live Up to Promises Made to the Poor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,
1999, at Al (discussing problems with implementation of electronic benefit systems).
48. See Winston et. al, supra note 38, at 9-10; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/
HEHS-97-4, Child Support Enforcement: Early Results on Comparability of Privatized and
Public Offices 4 (1996) (noting that fifteen states have fully privatized child support
enforcement).
49. See Pavetti et al., supra note 39, at 1-3, 12-24 (describing predominant use of
nonprofits in the provision of TANF employment services); GAO, Welfare Reform, supra
note 40, at 14 ("Government entities contract out most often for services to facilitate
employment."). Under the WIA, all workforce development activities are now overseen by
boards dominated by representatives of the private sector and are run through one-stop
career centers that are often privately operated. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2821 (b), 2832(b) (2000)
(mandating that majority of state and local workforce investment board members come
from business community); Winston, et al., supra note 38, at 9 (noting that offices
coordinating workforce development services-"one-stop career centers"-are often




As in the Medicare and Medicaid managed care context, privatiza-
tion of welfare administration means that private contractors wield broad
authority over welfare program participants. This is true even where ba-
sic eligibility and sanctioning decisions continue to be made by govern-
ment officials; for example, a private contractor's policies as to whether
beneficiaries are required to take any job offered, regardless of level of
pay or work hours, can determine whether beneficiaries are referred to
government agencies for sanctioning. 50 Two developments further en-
hance the power of private welfare contractors. One is a trend towards
consolidating responsibility for managing programs and selecting provid-
ers in a few large contractors. 5 1 The other is increasing use of "perform-
ance management," under which the government sets performance goals
and allows private entities broad discretion regarding how to achieve
them. 52 These two developments have led, in turn, to increased reliance
on for-profit contractors, as nonprofits often lack the capacity and finan-
cial resources to undertake such large-scale contracts, where payment is
often significantly delayed and contingent on program outcomes.
5 3
Not surprisingly, the same concern that private contractors will use
their broad powers to advance their own interests at the expense of Medi-
care/Medicaid beneficiaries and the public also surfaces in the welfare
context. For instance, under a performance-based system providing fi-
nancial rewards for the number of successful job placements, private con-
tractors have a visible incentive to try to serve only the most employable
50. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion,
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1145-63 (2000) [hereinafter
Diller, Revolution]; see also Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion
and Accountability in State Welfare Administration, 71 Soc. Serv. Rev. 1, 5 (1997) ("How
does a caseworker determine whether a recipient has 'good cause' to miss a day of work, or
has made a good-faith effort to find suitable child care, or must accept the first available
training position rather than wait?").
51. See Sanger, supra note 38, at 40, 55-69 (describing use of large contracts in New
York City and elsewhere); Janet Quint et al., Big Cities and Welfare Reform: Early
Implementation and Ethnographic Findings from the Project on Devolution and Urban
Change 127-29 (MDRC ES-14, Apr. 1999) (reporting that Lockheed Martin received large
contracts to supply employment services to TANF recipients in Miami-Dade County and
then subcontracted with community-based organizations for services); William P. Ryan,
The New Landscape for Nonprofits, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 127, 131-34
(identifying large size and access to capital as advantages that for-profit entities have over
their nonprofit counterparts).
52. See Harry P. Hatry, Urban Inst., Performance Measurement: Getting Results 3-10
(1999); McConnell et al., supra note 42, at 39-51 (discussing use of performance measures
in six case studies of welfare privatization). While notable examples of performance-based
contracting exist, most welfare contracts are still structured for cost reimbursement. See
GAO, Welfare Reform, supra note 40, at 16-18, 53; see also Sanger, supra note 38, at 19-23
(discussing issues raised by performance-based contracting and its frequency); Diller,
Revolution, supra note 50, at 1178-80 (discussing effects of increased emphasis on
performance measurement under PRWORA).




beneficiaries, or to dissuade hard-to-employ individuals from continuing
in programs by means of onerous participation requirements and sanc-
tions. 54 But focusing solely on the potential for abuse from welfare priva-
tization is again too one-sided. Government-run welfare programs are
often characterized by abusive procedures designed simply to keep indi-
viduals off the rolls,55 whereas privatization may mean services are pro-
vided by nonprofits with ideological commitments more allied with bene-
ficiaries' interests. 56  In addition, the operational flexibility of private
providers can make them better able to improve staff performance and
tailor their programs to meet the needs of particular participants or
employers.
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3. Privatization of Public Education. - Public education is a third area
characterized by recent moves to greater privatization, with an accompa-
nying shift of core educational responsibilities to private hands. Charter
schools, private management of public schools by educational manage-
ment organizations (EMOs), and voucher programs provide the main
examples.
58
54. See Sanger, supra note 38, at 21-22, 42-43, 68-69, 104-06; Gilman, supra note
10, at 600-01 & 601 n.202; see also Stevenson, Welfare Services, supra note 7, at 105-11
(discussing financial incentives created under other contract approaches). For a
discussion of concerns about such abuses in Wisconsin, see Wis. Legislative Audit Bureau,
supra note 44, at 8-9 (reporting private agencies in Milwaukee had higher sanction rates
and reversals of agency determinations than other W-2 agencies and were less likely to seek
extensions of time limits for beneficiaries); see also Karyn Rotker et al., Wisconsin Works-
for Private Contractors, That Is, 35 Clearinghouse Rev. 530, 530-39 (2002) (criticizing
performance of private agencies running W-2 in Milwaukee County).
55. See Diller, Revolution, supra note 50, at 1145-80; see also Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1258 (arguing that public failures support
experimentation with privatization).
56. See Sanger, supra note 38, at 14-15, 65-71, 82-83 (describing potential benefits
of nonprofits, although arguing that welfare privatization threatens nonprofits' distinctive
character). For skepticism that nonprofit status will have a curbing effect on private
welfare contractors, see Diller, Form and Substance, supra note 14, at 1748-49; Stevenson,
Welfare Services, supra note 7, at 111-15. For discussions of the impact that government
contracting may have on nonprofits, see infra note 132.
57. See Jason DeParle, For Caseworker, Helping Is a Frustrating Struggle, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 10, 1999, at Al (describing experiences of caseworker in private W-2 agency); see also
Alice Lipowicz, Job Trainers Forge Close Ties to Firms to Aid Job Seekers, Crain's N.Y.
Bus., Apr. 5, 1999, at 4 (describing nonprofit program that specifically tailors training to
jobs at Salomon Smith Barney).
58. Private entities also offer discrete services, such as maintenance or transportation,
to public schools. See Amy Stuart Wells &Janelle Scott, Privatization and Charter School
Reform: Economic, Political and Social Dimensions, in Privatizing Education 234, 235-36
(Henry M. Levin ed., 2001); Henry M. Levin, The Public-Private Nexus in Education 8-9
(Nat'l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ.,
Occasional Paper No. 1, Mar. 2000), available at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-files/
31_OP01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Levin, Nexus].
[Vol. 103:13671388
2003] PRIVATIZATION AS DELEGATION 1389
Charter schools-the most significant of these initiatives to date59-
are publicly-funded schools allowed to operate free from many of the
rules governing traditional public schools. They are also least clearly an
instance of privatization; in addition to being publicly funded, they are
officially denominated public schools, come into existence as a result of
government authorization (the grant of a charter), and are subject to the
open admissions requirement applicable to traditional public schools.60
Yet charter schools also embody substantial private involvement: private
individuals or groups initiate the creation of the school; the schools are
headed by private boards; and a significant number are managed by
EMOs, usually for-profit entities. 6 1 EMOs also occasionally have won con-
tracts to operate traditional public schools, in some cases managing all or
many of a district's schools. 62 Under voucher plans, the government pro-
59. From 1992 to 2002, the number of charter schools grew from two to nearly 2,500,
and thirty-eight states now authorize their creation. Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J.
Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of Charter Schools, in Privatizing
Education, supra note 58, at 203, 203; Joe Nathan, A Charter School Decade, Educ. Wk.,
May 29, 2002, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/newstory.cfm?slug=38nathan.h21
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Yet the import of charter schools should not be
exaggerated. Even with recent expansion, in the 2000-2001 school year, they still enrolled
less than 1% of all school children. Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama,
Approving Charter Schools: The Gatekeeper Function, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 869, 871 (2001).
60. See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 59, at 873-76, 896. Further, most charter
schools are state-created entities, in that they either did not exist prior to the grant of a
charter or formerly were public schools. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., The State of Charter
Schools 2000: Fourth Year Report 14-15 (2000) [hereinafter State of Charter Schools
2000] (noting that, by 1999, 72% of charter schools were newly created, 18% were
preexisting public schools, and 10% were preexisting private schools). For descriptions of
the chartering process and particular states' approaches, see Kane & Lauricella, supra note
59, at 210-21; Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 59, at 880-902; State of Charter Schools
2000, supra, at 12-13, 46-48.
61. See Kane & Lauricella, supra note 59, at 219-20 (describing responsibilities and
composition of charter school boards); Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 59, at 875,
896-97 (noting that private groups can manage charter schools and that some states allow
EMOs to apply directly for a charter). Estimates of the number of charter schools
operated by EMOs vary, but appear to be on the order of 10-20% of all charter schools.
See Alex Molnar, Calculating the Benefits and Costs of For-Profit Education, 9 Educ. Pol'y
Analysis Archives 15, 1 9, at 3 (Apr. 24, 2001), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n15.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter,
What Does Private Management Offer Public Education?, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 271, 272
(2000) (reporting that EMOs operated nearly 13% of charter schools in 1999-2000).
62. See Henry M. Levin, Studying Privatization in Education, in Privatizing Education,
supra note 58, at 3, 3-5, 6-7 [hereinafter Levin, Studying Privatization]. But see Abby
Goodnough, Scope of Loss for Privatizing by Edison Stuns Officials, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
2001, at B4 (detailing rejection of NYC Board of Education's plan to contract with Edison
Schools to manage five schools). The largest EMO, Edison Schools, currently has a
contract to manage twenty schools in Philadelphia. See Diana B. Henriques, Administrator
of Schools Predicts Profit by LateJune, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2003, at C4. In the early 1990s,
nine Baltimore schools and all of Hartford's schools were privately managed. See Nelson
& Van Meter, supra note 61, at 271. Often, however, concerns regarding for-profit EMOs'
performance have led school districts to cancel or not renew contracts. See Nelson & Van
Meter, supra note 61, at 271-72; see also Carol Ascher et al., Hard Lessons: Public Schools
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vides a set amount of public funding per student to help cover tuition at
private or out-of-district public schools. Overwhelmingly, students ob-
taining vouchers enroll in sectarian schools. 63 Until recently, only a few
publicly-funded voucher plans had been implemented. 64 But voucher
use seems likely to increase in light of the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld Cleveland's voucher plan
against an Establishment Clause challenge.
65
In all three instances, private entities wield broad control over state-
funded education. Charter school boards and EMOs operating charter
schools possess considerable latitude over curriculum, discipline policies,
and most aspects of school operation-indeed, providing this autonomy
is the underlying rationale of the charter school movement.66 EMOs
often exercise similarly broad powers when they manage public schools.
6 7
and Privatization 43-59, 76-82 (1996) (offering critical assessment of the Baltimore and
Hartford contracts).
63. In part, this is a reflection of the religious character of most private schools and,
but it is also explained by the low subsidies provided under these plans, which generally are
only sufficient to cover tuition at religious schools. See Stephen P. Broughman & Lenore
A. Colaciello, Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., NCES 2001-330, Private
School Universe Survey: 1999-2000, at 5 tbl.1 (Aug. 2001) (reporting that only 22% of
private schools were nonsectarian); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 704-05 & 705
n.15 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting tuition discrepancies); see also Milton
Friedman, The Market Can Transform Our Schools, N.Y. Times, July 2, 2002, at A21
(calling for increase in voucher amounts as means of increasing number of non-religious
schools participating in voucher programs).
64. The contemporary voucher movement dates back to the 1950s, when Milton
Friedman advocated vouchers as a means of encouraging competition in public education.
See Isabel V. Sawhill & Shannon L. Smith, Vouchers for Elementary and Secondary
Education, in Vouchers and the Provision of Public Services, supra note 37, at 251, 253-60,
282 (providing a history of voucher proposals since 1950s); Levin, Nexus, supra note 58, at
12-13 (noting publicly-funded voucher programs exist in Cleveland and Milwaukee and
privately funded plans have operated in San Antonio, New York, and Indianapolis).
65. 536 U.S. at 639. However, political and state law obstacles to vouchers remain.
See, e.g., Frank R. Kemerer, The Legal Status of Privatization and Vouchers in Education,
in Privatizing Education, supra note 58, at 39, 49-52 [hereinafter Kemerer, Legal Status]
(describing state constitutional prohibitions on funding private and religious schools); see
also James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale L.J.
2043, 2050, 2078-85 (2002) (arguing that voucher plans will be limited by suburban
unwillingness to open suburban schools).
66. See Kane & Lauricella, supra note 59, at 219-20; Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra
note 59, at 875-77.
67. See Levin, Studying Privatization, supra note 62, at 7 ("EMOs are given authority
to staff and manage the school, set curriculum and instructional strategies, sponsor
professional development, establish school policies, and, in some cases, determine pay
scales and working conditions as well as performance incentives."). This control often
means mandating adherence to company-scripted lesson plans and strict disciplinary
procedures. See Henry M. Levin, Potential of For-Profit Schools for Educational Reform
1-2 (Nat'l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ.,
Occasional Paper No. 47, June 2002), available at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-
files/179_OP47.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Jacques Steinberg, Buying in to
the Company School: Edison's Reach Extends as Districts Try to Save Poor Performers,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2002, at A24.
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Schools participating in voucher programs often are subject to only mini-
mal qualifying requirements, and few regular mechanisms for public
oversight exist.68 Further enhancing the power of these private entities
are the significant practical obstacles that limit students' ability to transfer
schools, particularly during the school year.69 Moreover, here too exist
concerns that the schools' interests may not align with those of students;
for example, schools receive a set amount per student, thus creating in-
centives for them to avoid or expel students who require more expensive
educational services.7t An additional danger, particularly with regard to
charter schools and voucher programs, is that the schools' general free-
dom from oversight may lead to public funds being used to foster educa-
tional agendas that the public has refused to support.
7 1
Complicating the picture, however, is the factor of choice. Enroll-
ment in charter and voucher schools is voluntary, and students have the
option of remaining in their regular neighborhood or district school or
perhaps attending public school in another district. Moreover, students
usually are given the ability to transfer to another public school if their
school becomes privately managed, as are teachers. 72 The main effect of
68. The Cleveland voucher program, for example, is open to any private school
located in the district that meets educational standards and agrees to the program's
nondiscrimination requirements, with accountability largely ensured through the private
decisions of parents. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-46, 653 (describing requirements for
private schools participating in Cleveland's program). Accreditation by private
organizations offers an additional form of oversight of private schools. See Sawhill &
Smith, supra note 64, at 263.
69. See Amy Wells et al., UCLA Charter School Study: Beyond the Rhetoric of
Charter School Reform 6, 44-47 (1998), at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/docs/charter.pdf
(last modified Nov. 19, 1998) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Without
transportation, faced with sometimes demanding parent contracts, and with limited access
to information about the practices of charter schools, some parents face serious constraints
on any choice they might make."); Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of
Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in Law and School
Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity 88, 123-25 (Jay P. Heubert ed.,
1999) (noting limited supply of high quality public and private schools); Minow, Public
and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1251 (noting importance of convenience and
familiarity to parents in choosing schools and that good schools do not expand easily).
70. See State of Charter Schools 2000, supra note 60, at 36-37 (reporting that charter
schools serve lower percentage of disabled students than ordinary public schools); Kane &
Lauricella, supra note 59, at 223 (discussing concerns that charter schools may engage in
discriminatory practices); Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 Fordham L. Rev.
257, 267, 283, 287 (1999) [hereinafter Minow, Reforming School Reform] (discussing
incentives to screen for most talented, least costly students); Note, The Hazards of Making
Private Schooling a Public Business, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 695, 700-702 (1999) (discussing
concerns that EMOs counsel out problem students).
71. See Bruce Fuller, The Public Square, Big or Small? Charter Schools in Political
Context, in Inside Charter Schools: The Paradox of Radical Decentralization 12, 33-34
(Bruce Fuller ed., 2000) (noting anecdotal examples of abuses in Michigan and
Washington, D.C.); Timothy Egan, Failures Raise Questions for Charter Schools, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 5, 2002, at A15 (detailing same in Arizona, California, and Texas).
72. See Paul T. Hill & Robin J. Lake, Charter Schools and Accountability in Public
Education 4-5 (2002). However, this option may become unavailable in practice when the
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these privatization initiatives, from another perspective, is to empower
parents and students, particularly given the prevalence of charter schools
and voucher programs in urban areas with perennially failing public
schools. 73 Interestingly, however, parental choice also represents yet a
further way in which these measures privatize public education; decisions
about educational content and quality become a personal rather than col-
lective responsibility, thereby creating schools that, in essence, are private
communities of like-minded families.
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4. Private Prisons. - My fourth example, private prisons, is one of
the most remarked-upon examples of government privatization. 75 Exten-
sive privatization characterized incarceration in the nineteenth century,
with private entrepreneurs and companies managing prisons and indeed
"leasing" convicts from the state. By 1940, however, this sort of private
involvement had all but disappeared, largely in response to exposure of
the extremely harsh conditions under which inmates were being held by
their private jailors. 76 Over the last two decades, pressures on govern-
ments to house expanding prison populations and improve prison condi-
EMO manages many schools in a district. See Ascher, supra note 62, at 76-81 (discussing
privatization of entire Hartford school district).
73. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 65, at 2076-85 (detailing prevalence of charter
schools and voucher programs in urban school districts). Indeed, these moves to greater
privatization in public education arise out of the school choice movement, which argues
that private decisions by parents, rather than democratic accountability, should determine
the shape of public education and that market competition is needed to improve public
schools. See John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools
32-33 (1990); see also Minow, Reforming School Reform, supra note 70, at 263-72
(discussing assumptions behind school choice movement); Howard Gardner, Paroxyms of
Choice, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Oct. 19, 2000, at 44-45 (describing roots of charter schools in
school choice). See generally Hill & Lake, supra note 72, at 24-46, 63-84 (discussing
external and internal dimensions of charter school accountability). For cautions regarding
extent of choice and impact on accountability, see Minow, Public and Private Partnerships,
supra note 12, at 1249-50; see also Mark Schneider, Information and Choice in
Educational Privatization, in Privatizing Education, supra note 58, at 72, 78 (arguing that
information on schools may not be accessible to all parents).
74. See Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1253-55; Fuller,
supra note 71, at 59-65. Notwithstanding statutory requirements of open admission,
schools can in practice select their students to some extent by imposing parent volunteer
requirements, pre-admission interviews, and publicizing the school's operation in a
targeted fashion. See Fuller, supra note 71, at 30; Wells & Scott, supra note 58, at 250-54;
Wells, supra note 69, at 44.
75. For a thorough overview of the extensive literature on prison privatization, see
Sharon Dolovich, The Ethics of Private Prisons (Nov. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Cohmbia Law Review).
76. See David Shichor, Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/Public Concerns 34-44
(1995); David M. Oshinsky, "Worse than Slavery": Parchman Farm and the Ordeal ofJim
Crow Justice 35-37, 40-42, 55-84 (1996) (noting reprehensible treatment of African
American prisoners in convict leasing programs after Civil War); Alexis M. Durham Ill,
Origins of Interest in the Privatization of Punishment: The Nineteenth and Twentieth
Century American Experience, 27 Criminology 107, 108-09 & 109 n.2 (1989). See
generally Matthew j. Mancini, One Dies, Get Another: Convict Leasing in the American
South, 1866-1928 (1996) (describing history of convict leasing in several southern states).
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dons without substantially increasing costs kindled a rebirth of interest in
private prisons. Governments turned to private entities not only to build
prison facilities but to operate them. In 2001, 12.3% of all federal prison-
ers and 5.8% of all state prisoners, approximately 92,000 inmates, were
housed in private prison facilities. 77 Private prisons tend to be medium
and low security facilities, and many community-based facilities (such as
group juvenile homes and halfway houses) are also privately run.
78
Private prison operators exercise enormous coercive powers over the
inmates in their custody.7 9 While their contracts with public prison au-
thorities set out detailed requirements regarding prison conditions and
operation, incarceration by its nature entails exercise of substantial dis-
cretion in closed environments with little public visibility.80 Given their
extreme dependence and vulnerability, prisoners face a particularly acute
77. See Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bulletin NCJ195189, Prisoners in 2001, at 1 (July 2002); see also Douglas
McDonald et al., Abt Assocs. Inc., Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of
Current Practice 4-7 (1998), available at h ttp://nicic.org/pubs/1998/014789.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter McDonald et al., Private Prisons] (describing
recent history of prison privatization and noting number of inmates in privately operated
prison facilities increased from 3,000 in 1987 to more than 85,000 in 1996); Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States at 2-5, Malesko (No. 00-860) (discussing Federal Bureau of
Prisons' reliance on private entities to run community corrections centers).
78. See James Austin & Garry Coventry, Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bulletin NCJ 181249, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons 40-43 (2001)
[hereinafter BJA]; McDonald et al., Private Prisons, supra note 77, at 4-5, 23-24. Private
entities play numerous other roles in prison operation: private companies supply a variety
of goods and services to publicly run prisons, such as food or medical care; private firms
employ prison labor; and private groups set standards for prison operation through
accreditation. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 627-29 (documenting
examples); Dolovich, supra note 75, at 25-34.
79. For arguments that these coercive powers and the nature of punishment make
private prisons morally inappropriate, see John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A
Critical Perspective on the Private Management of Prisons and jails, in Private Prisons and
the Public Interest 155, 172-77 (Douglas C. MacDonald ed., 1990); Dolovich, supra note
75, at 97-116.
80. See Dilulio, supra note 79, at 176; David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of
Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 Yale L.J. 815, 821-22 (1987). While this
closed atmosphere is also present with regard to public prisons, the opportunities for
general public oversight of private prisons are even more restricted. Private prison
corporations are not generally subject to open government laws or other measures
designed to prevent and expose government malfeasance, such as civil service and conflict
of interest rules, or inspector general oversight. See Brief for the Legal Aid Society as
Amicus Curiae at 18-22, Malesko (No. 00-860) (describing differences in oversight
mechanisms and legal requirements applicable to private and public prisons); Nicole
Cisarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The
Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 249, 268-291 (1995)
(arguing that courts will likely hold that disclosure requirements of federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) disclosure requirements do not apply to private prisons or to
records generated by private prisons); see alsoJ. Michael Keating,Jr., Public Over Private:
Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated Prisons andJails, in Private Prisons and
the Public Interest, supra note 79, at 130, 132-54 (describing mechanisms for oversight of
private prisons).
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potential for harm from abuse of these powers. Moreover, most private
prisons are run or owned by for-profit corporations, which have a finan-
cial incentive to cut costs-for example, by hiring inexperienced and
therefore cheaper personnel, understaffing, or failing to provide ade-
quate medical care and other services. Such practices can lead to viola-
tion of inmates' rights.8 1 But the case against private prisons is easy to
overstate, given the widespread problems and deficiencies in many public
prisons. 82 Indeed, factors such as private prisons' greater exposure to
damage awards and contractual obligations arguably make them in some
ways more accountable than public prisons.
8 3
B. Privatization as Delegation of Government Power
The foregoing examples demonstrate that privatization is poorly
characterized as government withdrawal or disinvolvement from an area
of activity. 84 That description fails not only because privatization so often
accompanies an expansion in government responsibilities, but more im-
81. See Shichor, supra note 76, at 189-208; Dolovich, supra note 75, at 48-54.
Anecdotal evidence of such abuses certainly exists. See Brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 14 n.6, Malesko (No. 00-860) (listing newspaper
articles documenting abuse at some private prisons). An analysis of studies and data on
private prisons by the Bureau ofJustice Assistance concluded that while in general, "private
facilities do not differ substantially from publicly operated facilities," private facilities on
average have a staff-to-inmate ratio 15% below public prisons, private prisons lack
comparable management information system capabilities, and private prisons have a
higher rate of major incidents. See BJA, supra note 78, at 52.
82. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1868,
1870-71 (2002). There are few reliable studies comparing costs and quality of private and
public prisons. For overviews of existing studies, see BJA, supra note 78, at 2-38. For
contrasting assessments of existing data, compare U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/
GGD-96-158, Public and Private Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or
Quality of Service 3-4, 7-10 (1996) (claiming little reliable evidence exists regarding cost
savings or improvements in quality due to private management), and McDonald et al.,
Private Prisons, supra note 77, at appx. 2 (same), with Geoffrey F. Segal & Adrian T.
Moore, Weighing the Watchmen: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Outsourcing
Correctional Services Part II: Reviewing the Literature on Cost and Quality Comparisons
9-14 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst. Policy Study No. 290, Jan. 2002), available at http://www.
rppi.org/privsl.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing studies indicate cost
savings without quality decline), and Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, supra,
at 1870 (stating evidence "give[s] reason to be cautiously pleased with private prison
performance").
83. For arguments that greater liability may foster accountability, see Developments in
the Law: The Law of Prisons, supra note 82, at 1879-86 (offering liability argument as
reason why private prisons may be more accountable than public prisons); see also
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405-13 (1997) (denying private prison guards
qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 (denying
Bivens action against private prison corporation operating federal prison facility). For the
argument that contracts can provide greater accountability and that privatization may lead
to innovation, see Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 630, 634-36. But see Dilulio,
supra note 79, at 162-63, 171-72 (discussing limitations of contractual mechanisms and
expressing skepticism at innovation claims).
84. For such a definition of privatization, see Cass, supra note 18, at 451.
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portantly because it misses privatization's core dynamic. In many in-
stances of privatization, the overall context remains one of significant
government endeavor; as in the examples above, the government pro-
vides the funds, sets programmatic goals and requirements, or enacts the
regulatory scheme into which private decisionmaking is incorporated.
But the government relies on private actors for actual implementation.
Rather than government withdrawal, the result is a system of public-pri-
vate collaboration, a "regime of 'mixed administration"' in which both
public and private actors share responsibilities.
8 5
Viewing privatization in this way highlights how it serves to delegate
power over government programs and regulation to private actors. In-
deed, "in many cases the major share ... of the discretion over the opera-
tion of public programs routinely comes to rest not with the responsible
governmental agencies, but with the third-party actors that actually carry
the programs out."8 6 The recent move to expanded privatization, with
grants of even greater discretionary authority to the government's private
partners, enhances the extent of delegated authority. More importantly
perhaps, these delegations of discretion are unavoidable because the
power to implement and apply rules is inseparable from the power to set
policy. While some contend that government can privatize implementa-
tion while retaining control over governance and policy management,
8 7
in practice such a divide rarely exists. "Executive action that has utterly
no policymaking component is rare .... ,"88 Close government oversight
or specification of policies and procedures can limit the extent of discre-
tionary authority delegated to private actors, but cannot eliminate it.89
85. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law,
52 Admin. L. Rev. 813, 816 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Parties] (quoting Mark
Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing, in The Province
of Administrative Law, supra note 6, at 40, 52); see Donahue, supra note 16, at 7 (arguing
that in the United States, privatization means "enlisting private energies to improve the
performance of tasks that would remain in some sense public").
86. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in The Tools of Government, supra note 18, at 1, 2; see also Handler, Down
from Bureaucracy, supra note 13, at 6-7 (maintaining that privatization represents
delegation of authority over government programs); Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at 11,
13 ("Contracting gives away responsibility for important authoritative decisions about
vulnerable people .... [Nonprofit agencies] 'deliver' public policy to citizens, and their
private coping behaviors, invented to make often impossible jobs manageable, may be said
to 'add up' to be, in effect, whatever policy is actually put into the field.").
87. See David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector 26-48 (1992) (distinguishing
between "steering" and "rowing," and arguing that government can retain control over
former while contracting out responsibility for latter). But see Guttman, supra note 17, at
892-93 (criticizing Osborne & Gaebler's distinction between steering and rowing).
88. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).
89. As Michael Lipsky detailed in his classic work, Street-Level Bureaucracy, "in
important ways [public policy] is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters
of street-level workers." Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy xii (1980); see also
Freeman, Private Parties, supra note 85, at 824 ("Even where agencies retain the authority
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Moreover, if anything there seems to be a move towards expanding the
discretionary powers of front-line workers, both public and private, with
many scholars condemning the rule-bound and centralized character of
contemporary regulatory regimes and urging greater flexibility in
implementation.911
Through their control over government programs, private actors
necessarily obtain control over program participants. As the examples
above illustrate, this control is enhanced when private entities have a mo-
nopoly or quasi-monopoly over access to government-subsidized services
or broad powers over how government institutions operate. Another fac-
tor enhancing private power over participants is that privatization fre-
quently occurs in contexts marked by relations of dependence, in particu-
lar social welfare and human service programs. Those implementing
such programs, whether public or private, gain power over program par-
ticipants by virtue of their control over vital resources, as well as their
greater knowledge and expertise.9' Dependency in turn reinforces the
discretionary powers of service providers, as often the services provided in
dependent contexts defy easy or clear specification92
2
A central claim underlying this Article is that the powers exercised by
private entities as a result of privatization often represent forms of gov-
ernment authority, and that a core dynamic of privatization is the way
that it can delegate government power to private hands. Identifying what
constitutes government power is a notoriously hazardous enterprise, and
to accept or reject rules proposed by the private provider, the provider interprets and puts
into operation those rules, giving them their practical meaning and blurring the line
between the policy making and implementing functions.").
90. See Diller, Revolution, supra note 50, at 1145-63 (describing return to
administrative systems emphasizing discretionary decisionmaking under TANF programs);
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 267, 371-88 (1998) (describing increased use of self-regulation in
environmental programs); see also Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:
Transcending the Deregulation Debate 4-6 (1992) (advocating expansion of grassroots
discretion in regulatory enforcement). For a discussion of possible pitfalls with increased
ground-level discretion, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory
Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405,
413-15 (1996) (raising concerns regarding loss of legal and political control that
expanded ground-level discretion entails).
91. See Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Power in Social Work Practice, in Human Services as
Complex Organizations 259, 260-64 (Yeheskel Hasenfeld ed., 1992); see also Joel F.
Handler, Dependency and Discretion, in Human Services as Complex Organizations,
supra, at 276, 276-84; Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 97, 99 (arguing that individuals in
desperate need of benefits will likely be willing to accept constraints on their religious
freedom).
92. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 999, 1020 (1988) [hereinafter
Handler, Dependent People] (observing that "relationships between dependent people
and bureaucratic systems are, for the most part, not governed by tight or closely drawn
rules"); see also Brodkin, supra note 50, at 24-25 (arguing that welfare recipients' ability to
force states to provide assistance "will be suboptimal in a context in which rights are
uncertain, 'voice' is risky and 'exit' means forgoing basic income support.").
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little agreement exists on where the boundaries of government power as
opposed to private power lie.9 3 Interestingly, however, the powers at is-
sue in many instances of privatization are those we conventionally think
of as governmental. Few deny that private prisons are wielding govern-
ment power, given that the right to physically constrain and coerce others
is ordinarily reserved for the state. 94 When private regulators determine
the content and enforcement of standards governing a field of activity,
their decisions similarly represent government power in the form of non-
consensual exercises of authority over others.95 The claim that privatiza-
tion leads to private exercises of government power also seems relatively
noncontentious when private entities function much like government
employees, merely applying government-generated policies and require-
ments over which they exercise little or no independent judgment.9 ,
93. Or, indeed, whether such boundaries exist at all. See infra Part III.A.1.
94. See, e.g., Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
operation of prison to be a public function); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d
1245, 1248-50 (D.N.M. 1998) (same); see also Dilulio, supra note 79, at 175-76 (arguing
that operating a prison is so intrinsically tied to the government and the collective that it
can only be legitimately undertaken by government). But see George v. Pacific-CSC Work
Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230-32 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding private corrections facility not a
state actor with regard to its personnel decisions). Seemingly in contrast, courts have
uniformly held that involuntary committal to a mental hospital is not a public function
sufficient to transform private doctors and hospitals into state actors for constitutional
purposes, see, e.g., Okunieff v. Rosenberg, 996 F. Stipp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(collecting cases), affd, 166 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999), notwithstanding that such committals
involve subjecting individuals to physical coercion and that the Supreme Court has
characterized commitment to a mental hospital as "a massive curtailment of liberty ...
[that] requires due process protection," Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980)
(internal citations omitted). This tension is probably best explained by the fact that states
impose mandatory procedures on both private and public committals and courts subject
involuntary committal statutes to close due process analysis. See, e.g., Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding New York's mental health law against
facial challenge).
95. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind. LJ. 647,
647-48 (1986) (arguing that "we do recognize certain powers as essentially governmental:
rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, licensing and taxation"
and tracing such characterizations to the exercise of coercion over others, not grounded in
property or contract); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17, 94-105, 141-42
(2000) (arguing that private corporation charged with responsibility for internet domain
name registration pursuant to a contract with federal government exercises substantial
control over third parties and is performing a policymaking function). But see D.L.
Cromwell lnvs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding NASD's control over securities traders does not transform its investigatory
hearings into state action).
96. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (stating
that Fourth Amendment applies if "private party act[s] as an instrument or agent of the
Government"). Examples include private intermediaries who process claims for Medicare
and Medicaid. See 42 C.F.R. § 421.5 (2002) (allowing fiscal intermediaries under
Medicare to act on behalf of federal government); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 190
(1982) (assessing whether procedures used by intermediaries comport with due process
without analyzing whether federal action sufficient to trigger the Constitution was
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On the other hand, it is less evident that government power is in-
volved where private entities are undertaking tasks they traditionally have
performed and over which the government allows them substantial dis-
cretion. 9 7 Instead, private entities' ability to shape government programs
in such contexts seems just an indirect side-effect of their autonomous
determinations, often made pursuant to independent professional stan-
dards. 98 One argument as to why private actors are wielding government
power even in these contexts is that their positions in government pro-
grams give them control over program participants. Yet private actors
often wield similar powers when they act independently of government;
for example, MCOs exercise the same control over access to health care
for participants whose coverage comes privately, through employers or
individually purchased health insurance, as they do for those whose cov-
erage is publicly subsidized.99 Thus, the fact that private actors exercise
power over vulnerable third parties, absent more, would be insufficient to
distinguish the powers being exercised in these contexts as uniquely
governmental.
In many instances of privatization, however, something more is in-
volved. Private providers and regulators do not simply wield power over
others, but they also control third parties' access to government benefits
and resources.'10  By virtue of their role in government programs, there-
fore, private entities gain a distinct "mantle of authority" that enhances
their ability to cause harm. 10' This control over access to government
benefits is sometimes clear and direct; for example, when private actors
present); see also Downey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 266 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that private insurance companies issuing and administering flood risk
policies under National Flood Insurance Program are acting essentially as government
proxies), reh'g denied, 276 F.3d 243 (7th Cir. 2001).
97. The Supreme Court has so concluded. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004-05 (1982); see also Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817
F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that "privately made decisions which affect
individuals' eligibility for government benefits" are not state action under Blum).
98. See, e.g., Healey v. Thompson, 186 F. Supp. 2d 105, 117-21 (D. Conn. 2001)
(distinguishing between home health agency's determination of eligibility for services
under Medicaid and Medicare and its treatment decisions in providing those services, and
holding that constitutional protections only apply to the former).
99. The argument that private entities often wield coercive power over others was
famously made by the Legal Realists. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 472-74 (1923); see also Logiodice v.
Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The reality is that we are all
dependent on private entities for crucial services and, in certain key areas, competition
may not furnish protection."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003).
100. See Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at 14 ("In short, private workers now play
roles of social control with respect to public rights and claims of citizenship."); Salamon,
The New Governance, supra note 86, at 2 (describing new forms of privatization as
"involv[ing] the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function:
the exercise of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public
funds").
101. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
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determine whether an individual is eligible for government-funded ser-
vices. More commonly, however, this control is exercised indirectly,
through the private entities' policies regarding the substance of the ser-
vices they provide or their decisions with respect to a particular partici-
pant's needs. Whether private actors are applying government-specified
criteria or instead making independent determinations affects the direct
or indirect character of their control, but does not alter the underlying
dynamic. Thus, denials of medical services by Medicare and Medicaid
MCOs control beneficiaries' access to government-subsidized health care
even where these denials rest on professional medical standards rather
than government rules regarding covered procedures. Private contrac-
tors similarly exercise control over access to publicly funded services
when they assess a welfare participant as not needing additional job train-
ing, as do private schools in voucher programs when they suspend partici-
pating students for disciplinary infractions.
When exercised by public actors, control over government resources
is commonly thought of as government authority, and transfer of such
control to private individuals and entities does not inherently change the
nature of the power at issue. Of course, in some instances the transition
from public to private performance does impact the nature of the power
being exercised. It seems intuitively implausible that decisions by job
placement counselors at a nonprofit organization are exercises of govern-
ment authority simply because the organization's job placement services
are funded by a government grant. Instead, whether such private coun-
selors wield government authority turns on their relationship to the gov-
ernment. Public-private relationships range across a wide continuum, to
use Martha Minow's helpful image.10 2 Insofar as the government funds
the nonprofit simply to foster provision of job placement services in a
community, then the private counselors' activities appear genuinely inde-
pendent and nongovernmental. But if the government uses the non-
profit to implement its welfare program-for instance, requiring that wel-
fare beneficiaries participate in the nonprofit'sjob placement program as
a condition for receipt of income assistance-then the distinction be-
tween the private counselors and their public counterparts in the state
welfare department begins to disappear. Another way to put this point is
that in the former case, the government is not using the nonprofit to
control third parties' access to government benefits; instead, the non-
profit itself is the direct ahd intended recipient of government aid.
The expanding privatization documented above means that govern-
ment increasingly is using private actors to operate government programs
in its stead, and, as a result, private entities are wielding even greater
power over participants' access to government resources. Simultane-
ously, however, the broad discretion granted to private entities also sup-
ports seeing the underlying program as being one where the government
102. Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1255-56.
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seeks to foster independent private action. Line-drawing is thus very diffi-
cult. One point to emphasize, however, is that individuals' entitlement to
government benefits or to participate in a particular program has no de-
terminative significance on the question of whether privatization involves
a delegation of government power. For example, the conclusion that a
hospital has no entitlement to participate in Medicare does not, in and of
itself, preclude finding that the government has delegated government
power if it makes JCAHO accreditation decisions determinative of the
hospital's eligibility to participate."""3 Such entitlements are relevant, to
be sure, but primarily in terms of what they demonstrate about the gov-
ernment's intent in engaging in privatization; the absence of an entitle-
ment is one factor that may suggest the government is seeking to foster
purely independent private action rather than rely on private entities to
more directly serve its own programmatic goals. But it is the use the gov-
ernment makes of the private entities involved, rather than the rights or
status of beneficiaries and other program participants, that is the ultimate
focus.
C. Preserving Constitutional Accountability and Regulatory Flexibility in
Privatized Government
Modern privatized government does not fit easily within the para-
digms of U.S. constitutional law. A fundamental tenet of constitutional
law posits an "essential dichotomy" between public and private, with only
public or government actors being subject to constitutional restraints.1
0 4
With rare exception, the Constitution "erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 1 1 5 The reigning
constitutional paradigm thus strictly compartmentalizes society into pub-
lic and private spheres, and does not acknowledge any substantial blur-
ring between the two.
As a result, the move to greater government privatization poses a se-
rious threat to the principle of constitutional accountability. Although
not often articulated, this principle also lies at the bedrock of U.S. consti-
tutional law. To begin with, it embodies the core idea of constitutional
supremacy and constitutional government, namely that the Constitution
imposes restrictions on government that the political branches lack abil-
ity to alter."" Crucially, these restrictions apply not only when the formal
organs of government act, but also whenever government power is exer-
103. Cf. Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 79-82, 86-89 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that
patients generally have no protectable property interest in being able to obtain
government benefits through particular facility, yet proceeding to assess patients' separate
claim that Medicare statute unconstitutionally delegated government power to private
accrediting organization).
104. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (quoting Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)).
105. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
106. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
1400 [Vol. 103:1367
PRIVATIZA TION AS DELEGATION
cised. This broad scope of application reflects the proposition that the
Constitution encompasses all "actions of the political body denominated
a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be
taken," coupled with the recognition that "the abstract thing denomi-
nated a State" can exert its powers only through the actions of persons.1 17
Restricting the Constitution's ambit to apply only when the government
formally acts would avoid the difficulties in determining whether a private
entity is wielding government power; doing so might also yield program-
matic benefits, in that private entities and government could pursue the
most efficient and effective forms of program operation unconcerned
with constitutional requirements. But such an approach would signifi-
cantly eviscerate the concept of a constitutionally constrained govern-
ment. 108 Adequately guarding against abuse of public power requires ap-
plication of constitutional protections to every exercise of state authority,
regardless of the formal public or private status of the actor involved: "It
surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the
most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting
to the corporate form" and thereby transferring operation of government
programs to private hands.10 9
Constitutional accountability's second dimension centers on how
these restrictions are enforced. Accountability is often defined in politi-
cal terms, as the accountability of officials to the electorate. Political ac-
countability is certainly one way of enforcing constitutional limitations,
with those who ignore fundamental constitutional constraints being
ejected from office."10 But there is also legal accountability, the focus
here, which is concerned with individual enforcement of constitutional
restrictions in court through judicial review. I t A defining characteristic
of the U.S. constitutional order is the authority it gives to judges to en-
107. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879); see also The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11, 13 (1883) (asserting that purely private action is exempt from constitutional
requirements but these requirements apply to "acts done under State authority" and "State
action of every kind").
108. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) ("If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced .... its ambit cannot be a
simple line between States and people operating outside formally governmental
organizations .... ").
109. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995); see also Bd. of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679 (1996) (stating that "[determining
constitutional claims on the basis of ... formal distinctions, which can be manipulated
largely at the will of the government agencies concerned,... is an enterprise that we have
consistently eschewed" in holding that independent government contractors, like public
employees, enjoy First Amendment protections).
110. See, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 534-35 (1998) (describing accountability, defined solely in such
political terms, as "a structural feature of the constitutional architecture").
111. See Gilmour & Jensen, supra note 17, at 248 (similarly distinguishing between
political and legal accountability); see also Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra
note 12, at 1267-69 (discussing different models of accountability).
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force constitutional constraints against other government officials at the
instance of private individuals claiming injury from unconstitutional ac-
tion. 112 As famously stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury....
... [I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded. I "'
To say that individual enforceability is basic to our constitutional system,
however, is not to say that full remediation is. Immunity doctrines and
the Court's growing reluctance to imply Bivens actions make obtaining
damages for constitutional violations increasingly difficult.' 1 4 These bar-
riers to damages may lead to underenforcement of constitutional norms,
but the principle of effective constitutional accountability is preserved by
the availability of injunctive and declaratory relief.
115
112. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Interestingly, while
there is increasing criticism of the courts' role as the "sovereign" enforcers of
constitutional requirements, only a few deny that an individual should be able to obtain
judicial redress for a violation of her constitutional rights; instead, the complaint is with
the Supreme Court's monopolization of constitutional interpretation at the expense of
other branches of government. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 7-8 (2001).
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (citation omitted).
114. See John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J.
87, 87-90 (1999).
115. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1736, 1787-91 (1991) (proposing that "a
general structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the
bounds of law" is more important than individual redress); Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Comment: The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 102, 126-32 (1996) (arguing that continuing availability of prospective injunctive
relief preserves state accountability in federal court for violations of federal law); see also
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645-46 (2002) (reasserting
availability of injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials under Ex Parte Young
doctrine). But see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 884-89 (1999) (arguing that rights and remedies are inseparable
because range of available remedies determines scope and existence of constitutional
rights).
A more significant threat to constitutional accountability is presented by the most
difficult conundrum of federal courts: the extent to which Congress may withdraw all
federal and state jurisdiction over certain classes of claims. See Richard H. Fallon,Jr. et al.,
Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 330-61 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler's]. More striking for purposes of establishing the
fundamental nature of the constitutional accountability principle, however, is the courts'
deep reluctance to read congressional statutes as doing so. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 298-300, 314 (2001) (emphasizing "strong presumption" in favor of preserving
judicial review and allowing challenges of permanent resident alien removal orders
through habeas petitions); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 461-63 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
potential limitation of courts' ability to remedy constitutional violations that would
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The danger is that handing over government programs to private
entities will operate to place these programs outside the ambit of consti-
tutional constraints, given the Constitution's inapplicability to "private"
actors. The four examples of contemporary privatization help explain
what this could mean in practice. The administrative agency that handles
Medicare claims is subject to constitutional due process requirements; ac-
cordingly, it cannot deny requested services without providing some mini-
mum opportunity to be heard. 116 Theoretically, a private MCO is free
from such constraints." 17 Similarly, government welfare offices are
strictly limited in their ability to consider a welfare recipient's race or
religion, and cannot drug-test program participants without basis to sus-
pect drug use.' 18 However, private welfare contractors theoretically are
not so circumscribed by the Constitution.' 19 While public schools must
respect the First Amendment rights of teachers and students, 120 private
schools theoretically can fire employees and expel students who question
how the school is run. 12 1 Public prisons are bound by the Eighth Amend-
ment to provide adequate medical care to those in their custody,122 but
theoretically private prisons are free to refuse to provide medical care at
all.
123
otherwise exist in reading § 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act as preserving
access to injunctive and declaratory relief, notwithstanding its limits on money damages).
116. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
117. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-05, 1012 (1982) (holding due process
requirements do not apply to care determinations by private nursing homes).
118. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337-38 (2003) (holding
government use of race subject to strict scrutiny and only constitutional if narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46
(1982) (holding that denominational preferences trigger strict scrutiny); Marchwinski v.
Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139-41 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that government's
groundless drug testing of welfare beneficiaries violates Fourth Amendment), aff'd by an
equally divided en banc court, 60 Fed. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
119. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that government-chartered corporation overseeing
all amateur sports is not subject to Fifth Amendment equal protection guarantees); United
States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1984) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches and seizures by private individuals); see also Nina Bernstein, The Lost
Children of Wilder 41-60, 112-13 (2000) (describing history of not-for-profit foster care
agencies in New York City providing assistance only to children of particular races and
faiths).
120. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-73 (1968) (holding that speech by
public school teacher on matter of public concern that does not affect teacher's job
performance or school's operation falls within protections of First Amendment).
121. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-843 (1982) (rejecting application of
First Amendment to private school that received substantial public funds and provided
services pursuant to contracts with local school communities).
122. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
123. Cf. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that private
security guard at public housing complex is not subject to constitutional protections
against use of excessive force). But see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-57 (1988) (holding
that Eighth Amendment protections apply to private doctor providing medical care to state
prison inmates).
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"Theoretically" is an important qualification here. On rare occa-
sions, courts may hold that such nominally private action in fact consti-
tutes state action for constitutional purposes. 124 More frequently, the ac-
tions described may run afoul of legislative, regulatory, or contractual
requirements, and the government may itself police the conduct of its
private partners to ensure they adhere to constitutional prohibitions.
Tort law also may provide a basis for recourse against some private ac-
tions. 125 In light of such alternative protections, some might contend
that constitutional accountability fears regarding privatization are mis-
placed. On this view, preserving a private actor's nongovernmental status
arguably better ensures accountability because it offers more opportuni-
ties for individuals to recover money damages, from which public entities
and employees are frequently immune.12 J Yet caution is needed so as not
to exaggerate the extent to which private law offers equivalent or greater
protection of individuals' rights than is available through constitutional
means.' 2 7 Statutory and regulatory measures or contractual provisions
may offer more extensive protections, but these protections exist as a
124. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-16 (1989)
(holding that although Fourth Amendment does not ordinarily apply to private entities,
the government's strong encouragement of drug testing by private railroads transformed
such testing into state action for constitutional purposes); West, 487 U.S. at 55-57 (holding
that treatment decisions by private doctor providing medical care to state prison inmates
constitute state action, trigger constitutional protections, and thus are subject to Eighth
Amendment requirements). The likelihood that private entities will be found to be state
actors for constitutional purposes irs the focus of Part II.A.
125. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1183-87
(1999) (noting that private police typically lack tort and criminal immunity enjoyed by
public officials, although noting practical obstacles to recovery when private defendant acts
in good faith).
126. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 71 & n.10 (1989)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment prevents award of money damages against state officer
sued in official capacity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (finding that
executive officials are in general entitled to qualified immunity).
127. Common law tort equivalents for constitutional rights may not exist: for
example, as a post-deprivation remedy, a tort action is by definition unable to offer notice
and opportunity to be heard before injury occurs, and thus cannot substitute for a due
process claim where such pre-deprivation procedures are constitutionally mandated.
Similarly, courts may be unwilling to impute third-party enforcement rights into
government contracts if such rights are not expressly provided, as they rarely are. See
Freeman, Contracting State, supra note 10, at 176; see also infra note 230 (discussing
availability of third-party beneficiary enforcement of government contracts). Moreover, as
a practical matter, finding private entities to be state actors for constitutional purposes
does not automatically translate into restrictions on access to money damages. While
private actors subject to constitutional scrutiny are in theory eligible for the same
immunities as public employees, the Court so far has refused to extend such protections.
See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (denying private prison guards
qualified immunity); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161-63, 167-69 (1992) (reftsing to
provide qualified immunity to private defendants who invoke state replevin, garnishment,
or attachment statutes); see also Sklansky, supra note 125, at 1186 (noting that private
police typically lack tort and criminal immunity enjoyed by public officials, although
noting practical obstacles to recovery when private defendant acts in good faith).
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matter of legislative or executive grace, and thus largely can be rescinded
or limited where governments see fit. As a result, these forms of protec-
tion standing alone do not substitute for constitutional constraints, in the
way that constitutional constraints function in U.S. constitutional law, as
requirements beyond the power of government to alter and which indi-
viduals have the power to enforce.
A second objection to viewing the absence of constitutional con-
straints on privatization as problematic emphasizes the voluntary status of
many privatized government programs. Generally speaking, the Constitu-
tion does not impose affirmative duties on government. Or to put the
point more starkly: Those "who wrote the Bill of Rights were not con-
cerned that government might do too little for the people but that it
might do too much to them," and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was similarly to "protect Americans from oppression by... govern-
ment, not to secure them basic governmental services."' 28 Why should it
matter whether government programs become exempt from constitu-
tional constraints as a by-product of the government transferring these
programs to private hands? Is this situation so constitutionally different
from one in which the government remained uninvolved from the outset,
presuming that private charity would meet social needs? Arguably, pro-
viding a blanket constitutional exemption for inaction while simultane-
ously holding that privatization raises constitutional concerns simply pe-
nalizes the government for affirmatively addressing social problems. This
is not an attractive postulate for a sensible system of constitutional law.
This objection has force, especially when joined with the idea that
government should have a freer hand when spending public resources
than when regulating. 129 Notably, however, the lack of an affirmative
128. Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (holding that while government may not erect
obstacles in the path of individuals seeking to exercise their constitutional rights, "it need
not remove those not of its own creation"). The two principles-that the Constitution
does not impose affirmative duties and that it applies only to public action-are linked.
See Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 Const. Comment. 379, 396-97
(1993) [hereinafter Seidman, State Action] (describing link as being that state action
requirement "identifies a discretionary realm where governments are free to act or not as
they choose"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 886-90 (1987)
(arguing that state action doctrine and lack of affirmative constitutional duties rest on
similar baseline common-law assumptions regarding natural and desirable functions of
government). The legal reality is more nuanced than a bald rejection of affirmative
constitutional obligations suggests, in that a variety of constitutional protections have been
read as imposing such positive duties on government in particular contexts. See, e.g.,
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864, 872-86
(1986) (discussing instances in which existing constitutional doctrine imposes affirmative
duties on government); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1233-38 (2002) (arguing that criminal provisions
of the Constitution impose numerous "quasi-affirmative rights: affirmative constitutional
conditions on actions that, realistically, the government cannot entirely forego").
129. This idea is one that constitutional law has increasingly embraced. See, e.g.,
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2307-09 (2003). Compare, e.g., Rust v.
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government obligation to act has not meant that when the government
does act, it can do so outside of the Constitution's purview. This distinc-
tion merits emphasis, for as discussed above, most instances of privatiza-
tion are poorly described as simply a return to government inaction. Far
from it. Instead, they usually represent a change in the form of govern-
ment action, with discretionary authority over government resources and
programs being transferred to private hands. That private entities play a
central role in a program's implementation may well counsel for applica-
tion of different constitutional requirements, but the danger is that priva-
tization will remove what are essentially government programs from all
judicial constitutional review. The question thus becomes whether it is
possible to preserve both the principle of constitutionally constrained, ac-
countable government and constitutional law's public-private divide in
the face of the move to privatized governance.
1 30
Yet the threat to constitutional accountability represents only part of
the constitutional equation. Applying constitutional norms to the gov-
ernment's private partners could solve this problem, but at a significant
cost. One effect would be to intrude on private autonomy, as constitu-
tional constraints limit the ability of private entities to operate as they see
fit. These autonomy concerns might seem less pressing in privatization
contexts, given that private entities are reaching out to interact with the
state and take on roles in government programs. But the concern is not
with preserving a particular entity's freedom so much as ensuring the in-
dependence and vitality of a private civic sphere writ large. Such a sphere
not only provides a needed space for individuals to define their own iden-
tities, but also fosters development of institutions that offer a potent
check against overreaching government. 13 1 At a minimum, autonomy
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94, 196 (1991) (sanctioning content and viewpoint
discrimination regarding speech when government is spending its funds to achieve public
goals), with Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115-17 (1991) (holding First Amendment precludes government from imposing
content-based financial burdens on speech through regulation).
130. See Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1063,
1081 (2000) (remarking that "[tihe pressures of massive privatization ... might cause ...
some or much of [what is now thought of as society and not the state to come within] ...
reach of the Bill of Rights," but "with equal logic ... [might] result . . . in a practical
contraction" of the Bill of Rights' application).
131. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 30-31 (arguing that "abandoning a distinct
private sphere would diminish, not strengthen, human freedom and dignity" and would
destroy "a vibrant, pluralist society"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of
Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 144, 178-88 (2003); Louis Michael Seidman,
Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance
Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006, 1019-26 (1987) [hereinafter Seidman,
Public Principle]; see also Steven Rathgeb Smith, The New Politics of Contracting:
Citizenship and the Nonprofit Role, in Public Policy for Democracy 198, 213-16 (Helen
Ingram & Steven Rathgeb Smith eds., 1993) (describing effect that government
contracting has on both citizen democratic participation and citizenship rights as
nonprofits' mediating role is narrowed).
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concerns counsel for caution so as not to apply constitutional constraints
where constitutional accountability concerns are otherwise addressed.
Of course, governments could-and do-impose significant restric-
tions on private entities, particularly as a condition for receipt of govern-
ment funds.1 32 Thus, perhaps more telling than individual autonomy
concerns is the effect that extending constitutional requirements to pri-
vate actors has on the government's regulatory prerogatives. "Constitu-
tionalizing" the government's private partners effectively transfers the
power to decide what rules should bind these private actors from the po-
litical branches of government to the federal courts. 133 This separation
of powers concern with expansion of the judiciary's regulatory role is a
central justification for retaining the public-private divide in constitu-
132. See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms
to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1537,
1548-49 (1998) (arguing that political branches' broad regulatory powers undermine
individual autonomy as justification for constitutional public-private divide); see also Am.
Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2998 ("Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the
receipt of federal assistance to further its policy objectives .... (citations omitted)). Some
commentators express concern about the effect that dependence on government funds
has already had on the independence of private organizations. For example, Steven Smith
and Michael Lipsky maintain that "[t]he rise of contract income in the support of
nonprofit organizations has transformed nonprofit organizations, literally, into agents of
the state. Most nonprofits today expect to conform their operations to public purposes
and priorities and to come under the partial control of public officials." Smith & Lipsky,
supra note 13, at 72. But see Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-
Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State 104-06 (1995) (arguing that "the
preponderance of empirical evidence casts doubt" on view that government contracts
significantly undermine nonprofits' independence); Freeman, Extending Public Law
Norms, supra note 10, at 1314-17 (arguing for greater use of conditions on government
grants and contracts as one means of extending public law norms to private entities
participating in government programs). Concerns about the effect that collaboration with
government may have on private autonomy have surfaced with particular strength in
debates on charitable choice. See Charles L. Glenn, The Ambiguous Embrace:
Government and Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies 39-41 (2000) (noting ways in
which participation in government programs may undermine service providers' religious
character); Melissa Rogers, The Wrong Way to Do Right: Charitable Choice and
Churches, in Welfare Reform and Faith Based Organizations 61, 70-75 (Derek Davis &
Barry Hankins eds., 1999) (opposing charitable choice because of similar concerns).
133. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and
the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 Const. Comment. 329, 340 (1993) (arguing
that abolishing state action doctrine threatens our understanding of constitutional law as
distinct and limited body of law and would involve "a very substantial transfer of power
from the ordinary law-making agencies to the constitutional decision-making procedure of
the courts"); Seidman, State Action, supra note 128, at 397-99 ("[A] state action
requirement is essential to prevent every policy question from becoming an issue for
constitutional interpretation."). In addition, the potential of being held responsible for
private conduct forces the government to take an active role in overseeing the private
actors or assuming their responsibilities, and thus denies the government the option of
inaction. See Seidman, State Action, supra note 128, at 399.
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tional law,134 and it applies no less strongly in the government privatiza-
tion contexts.
Indeed, the four examples discussed above indicate that preserving
the political branches' regulatory flexibility in privatization contexts is
particularly important. Privatization holds the potential to yield more ef-
ficient and innovative government programs, by allowing the government
to harness private expertise, flexibility, and market competition to its ad-
vantage.'13 5 Yet privatization can also lead to abuse and exploitation, be-
cause the financial incentives of private companies and organizations
often run counter to the public interest and the interests of program par-
ticipants.13" Difficult policy choices are involved in deciding whether to
impose particular requirements on how private providers and regulators
operate; for example, procedural protections for program participants
may guard against private exploitation, but also may translate into higher
costs and lessened flexibility, thereby undermining the programmatic
benefits obtained from privatization. 13 7 The government's ability to tai-
lor regulatory structures to address identified abuses while exploiting pri-
vate strengths is likely to be pivotal to successful reliance on privatiza-
tion.' 3" Equally important will be allowing governments room to
experiment with different approaches to privatization, so that practical
134. See infra Part IlI.A.l.
135. Deep disagreement exists among scholars and advocates over whether in fact
privatization will have this result. For useful overviews of the dominant arguments for and
against privatization, see Diller, Form and Substance, supra note 14, at 1743-51; Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 10, at 1291-1314. For contrasting economic
arguments on privatization, compare E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better
Government 288-91 (1987) (characterizing privatization as effective tool for improving
productivity in delivery of public services), and Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M.
lacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1422-24, 1435-43
(2003) (asserting that public choice and agency problems are worse in public sector), with
Donahue, supra note 16, at 217-23 (discussing reasons why benefits of privatization may be
minimal and emphasizing need to carefully select which areas to privatize). See also
Donald F. Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets 37-40, 193-97
(1993) (arguing that privatization threatens accountability tnless government invests in
capacity to evaluate private contractor performance); Elliott D. Sclar, You Don't Always Get
What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization 9-11, 18-19, 92-93, 155 (2000)
(arguing that privatization often fails to yield economic benefits because of lack of
competition, government need for difficult-to-specify services, and costs of supervision).
136. In addition to these conflict of interest concerns, problems may arise because of
limited competition-for example, due to few contractors with sufficient capacity or the
need for continuing relationships in service delivery-and because the services at issue
defy easy measurement, making informed choices among private providers difficult. See
Kettl, supra note 135, at 29-37; Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at
1248-53.
137. See Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 135, at 1448-51.
138. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 594-664 (describing ways in which
government could exploit benefits of privatization but also guard against potential abuses
in several program contexts); Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 117-19 (describing
potential approaches to preserving constitutional accountability under charitable choice).
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experience can inform regulatory choices and governments can address
new problems as they emerge.
139
Federalism concerns are also at stake here. As the examples above
suggest, much of the turn to privatization is happening at the state and
local level or in programs (such as Medicaid or TANF) that are joint fed-
eral-state endeavors. 140  Extending constitutional requirements to the
government's private partners thus portends significant federal court in-
trusion into the administrative decisions of state and local govern-
ments. 14  Again, the federal government's ability to impose require-
ments on state governments, particularly as a condition of federal
funding, somewhat limits the force of this federalism objection. 142 But
federalism concerns may counsel against judicial imposition of constitu-
tional commands on private actors notwithstanding congressional and ex-
ecutive powers to regulate state and local governments.' 43
139. On the importance of experimentation with service delivery, see Dorf & Sabel,
supra note 90, at 283-89, 314-23.
140. See, e.g., GAO, Welfare Reform, supra note 40, at 8-14 (describing state and
local contracts for TANF services); Sanger, supra note 38, at 23-27 (discussing increases in
privatization at state and local levels); Harrison & Beck, supra note 77, at tbl.9 (reporting
that approximately 73,000 state prisoners were held in private facilities in 2001); see also
Freeman, Contracting State, supra note 10, at 161-62 (noting how devolution of
responsibilities from federal to state governments has contributed to expansions in
privatization).
141. See Seidman, State Action, supra note 128, at 395-96 (describing the Court's
initial imposition of state action requirement in the Civil Rights Cases as turning on
federalism concerns); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)
(describing state action requirement as protecting states against unfair ascriptions of
responsibility for constitutional violations). The federalism basis of the state action
doctrine might seem to call into question the Court's failure to distinguish between "state"
and "federal" action analyses, see supra note 5. On the other hand, this failure accords
with the Court's increasing emphasis on the state action doctrine as resting less on general
federalism concerns and more on specific federalism and separation of powers concerns
regarding the appropriate role of the federal courts. See Seidman, State Action, supra
note 128, at 395-98.
142. See Eule & Varat, supra note 132, at 1547-48; see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 543-47 (1985) (arguing that federalism
arguments for state action doctrine rest on outdated dual sovereignty presumptions). On
the government's power to impose conditions on state and local governments as
conditions of federal funding, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987).
143. Such a distinction between federalism controls on the courts versus the political
branches accords with the political safeguards argument used to justify federal court
abstention from federalism disputes in San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Garcia, 469
U.S. 528, 550-56 (1985); Eule & Varat, supra note 132, at 1548 n.32; see also Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev.
661, 667-81 (1978) (arguing that separation of powers and federalism are interrelated
concepts that both limit federal courts' powers to remedy constitutional violations by state
governments). Notably, while the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence interpreting
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests greater equating of federalism limits on
the courts and Congress, the Court continues to cite restrictions on the appropriate role of
the courts as cautioning against broad expansion of U.S. constitutional requirements to
private actors. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-22, 625-27 (2000)
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Some might argue that adherence to a constitutional system requires
that primacy be given to preserving constitutional limits on government
power, regardless of the policy tradeoffs involved. This argument is
plainly too facile, however, as the individual autonomy, separation of
powers, and federalism concerns articulated above also stand as constitu-
tional limits on government power. The argument also errs to the extent
that it ignores the way that privatization can enhance constitutional ac-
countability by improving government functioning. If private prisons
lead to improved prison conditions and services, that is hardly irrelevant
from an Eighth Amendment standpoint.144 Private professional norms
and independent judgment can offer individuals important assurances of
fair treatment that meet due process requirements. 45 More simply put,
constitutionally-embedded values lie on both sides of the balance. The
constitutional challenge posed by privatization is devising a means to pre-
serve constitutional accountability without sacrificing government regula-
tory flexibility and its associated benefits.
II. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw ON PRIVATI7ATION
The threat to constitutional accountability from the public-private
divide is not new, and the judicial response has been to develop the state
action doctrine as a means of holding ostensibly private actors to constitu-
tional requirements. A finding of state action is, in essence, a judicial
determination that a challenged action either could not be truly priva-
tized for constitutional purposes, because of the power or function it rep-
resents, or was insufficiently privatized, because of the government's con-
tinuing involvement.
State action doctrine remains the primary tool courts use to ensure
that private actors do not wield government power outside of constitu-
tional constraints. Thus, a central question is how well current state ac-
tion doctrine succeeds in ensuring constitutional accountability in a
(emphasizing need to preserve "the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power between
the States and the National Government" in holding that provision subjecting private
individuals to damages was outside of Congress' section 5 power).
144. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons 162-71, 371-72 (1998)
(noting that federal courts' efforts at reforming prisons to cure constitutional violations
led to widespread reliance on standards set in part by private accrediting bodies and
associations, such as the American Correctional Association). See also supra notes 79-83
and accompanying text (discussing question of whether private prisons offer better or
worse facilities than public prisons).
145. See, e.g., Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979) (holding that due process
requires only independent professional medical assessment before a child is involuntarily
committed, not a judicial or administrative hearing); Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating
Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341, 380




world of privatized government. In what follows, I argue that current
doctrine is fundamentally ill-suited to this task, because it ignores the way
that privatization gives private actors control over government programs
and resources, focusing instead on identifying government involvement
in specific private acts. As a result, current doctrine is a very poor mea-
sure of when government power is being exercised. Moreover, this em-
phasis on government involvement both unnecessarily restricts regulatory
flexibility and creates perverse incentives for government to privatize
without adequate supervision.
I close this section with a brief examination of another constitutional
route to dealing with the concerns raised by privatization-private dele-
gation doctrine-which addresses whether and when it is constitutionally
permissible for government to delegate certain powers to private actors.
In terms of federal constitutional law, private delegation doctrine repre-
sents the road not taken. While there have been occasional hints of con-
stitutional restrictions on private delegations, the nature and scope of
such potential restrictions remain largely unexplored. 1 46 In the end, per-
haps the most interesting aspect of the private delegation cases is not
their lack of development, but rather their failure to link issues relating
to the constitutionality of private delegations to the question of whether a
private delegation allows the government to evade constitutional
constraints.
A. The Absence of State Action Under Privatization
State action doctrine, once at the fore of academic commentary,
14 7
now rarely provokes sustained interest. This is not because the Supreme
Court developed a coherent and persuasive approach to state action
questions. On the contrary, despite general agreement on the terms of
the state action inquiry, the Court's application of that inquiry continues
to be beset by inconsistency and disagreement.
148
146. Indeed, the paucity of cases on point makes it difficult to claim that anything so
established as a private delegation doctrine exists. A similar question arises in the state
action context, with seemingly inconsistent Supreme Court decisions supporting the view
that state action "doctrine" is simply an accumulation of fact-specific and at times
conflicting decisions. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-1, at
1690 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that state action cases do not demonstrate "a body of state
action 'doctrine,' a set of rules for determining whether governmental or private actors are
to be deemed responsible for an asserted constitutional violation"). But see Mark Tushnet,
Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 383, 406 (1988) (claiming
"persistence of the state action doctrine can be explained because it is a doctrine, that is,
an expression of the understanding of the social order held by certain agents of the
government").
147. So much so that Charles Black began his famous Foreword with "'State action
again?'" The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 69 (1967).
148. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) ("It is
fair to say that our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state
have not been a model of consistency." (internal quotations omitted)). But see Laurence
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The Court frequently describes state action analysis as having two
prongs: first, whether "the [challenged] deprivation ... [was] caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is re-
sponsible"; and second, whether "the party charged with the deprivation
... [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."'1 49 The nub of
the inquiry is at this second step, often alternatively characterized as de-
termining whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action."1 5 1' The Court also considers a consistent set
of criteria in assessing whether this nexus exists: whether the private
party is performing a public or government function; whether the gov-
ernment compelled or significantly encouraged the challenged action;
whether the government jointly participated in the action; and whether
there is symbiotic interdependence between the government and the pri-
vate party.15 ' At times, however, the Court adopts a highly restrictive and
formalistic stance in applying these criteria, treating them as distinct
"tests" that represent the exclusive grounds for finding state action. On
other occasions, the Court applies a flexible, fact-sensitive, and pragmatic
approach, identifying these criteria as factors to consider in reaching an
overall gestalt sense of whether the private actor should be viewed as
government.
Placing the Court's state action jurisprudence in historical perspec-
tive certainly reduces some of the inconsistency in state action doctrine.
The flexible approach epitomized state action decisions occurring at the
height of the civil rights struggle. Faced with concerted efforts to pre-
serve racial segregation by transferring responsibilities to private hands,
the Court took an expansive view of when private acts triggered constitu-
H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 248 (1985) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitutional Choices]
(asserting that claims of inconsistency in state action doctrine are greatly exaggerated).
149. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). As a practical matter, Lugar's first prong
usually is easily satisfied-for example, the fact that the private party acted "with
knowledge and or pursuant to" a state statute will suffice. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50 (internal
quotations omitted).
150. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52 (internal quotations omitted). Earlier cases treat the
question of whether such a "close nexus" exists as one of the factors or tests to be applied
in determining if a private party is a state actor, rather than as a description for the entire
inquiry. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
151. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52-58; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 621-22 (1991); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939; see also Ronald]. Krotoszynski,Jr., Back to the
Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action
Determinations, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 302, 314-21 (1995) (dividing the Court's frequent
combination of the criteria into three tests: exclusive state function test, symbiotic
relationship test, and nexus or compulsion test). Although the Court initially identified
joint participation with interdependence in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 725 (1961),joint participation now signifies significant government involvement
in the challenged action. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942; see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection
Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988). There is an obvious overlap among these criteria;
government compulsion, for example, is really a particular instance ofjoint participation.
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tional protections. 152 But as state action issues began to surface in admin-
istrative contexts and involve procedural due process claims, the Court
became significantly more unwilling to find state action and hold private
individuals to constitutional requirements. 53 Correspondingly, it began
to engage in a far more formalistic analysis.
Historical retrenchment is an incomplete explanation, however, as a
survey of results in the Court's more recent state action decisions sug-
gests. Private nursing homes providing long-term care to Medicaid bene-
ficiaries are not state actors, even though they too operate under contract
with the government and make need determinations authorized by stat-
ute. 1 54 Nor are private schools with which the government contracted to
fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special needs stu-
dents. 15 5 Yet a private doctor treating prisoners pursuant to a contract
with a prison is a state actor, as are private employers implementing gov-
ernment rules authorizing drug testing of transportation employees.1
56
Similarly, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), a corporation
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the
Olympics as well as exclusive oversight of private amateur sports organiza-
tions participating in international competition, is not a state actor, and
neither is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). 57 But a
private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school
152. See Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action
Doctrine, 28 St. Louis U. L.J. 683, 732-34 (1984); Ronna Greff Schneider, State Action-
Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37 Fla. L. Rev. 737, 739-43 (1985).
For examples of the Court's expansive approach, see, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
301-02 (1966) (arguing that operation of a park is a public function); Burton, 365 U.S. at
723-25 (holding racial discrimination by private restaurant constituted state action where
restaurant leased space in public building). The Court's expansive approach to state
action appears motivated in part by the difficulty involved in showing that the states were
intentionally seeking to avoid application of the Fourteenth Amendment by delegating
responsibilities to private actors. See, e.g., Evans, 382 U.S. at 300 n.3 (holding that the
Court need not reach question of whether state facilitated establishment of racially
segregated parks).
153. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974). Another
factor, emphasized by Schneider, is the reemergence of federalism concerns. See
Schneider, supra note 152, at 743. As Laurence Tribe has argued, some of the
inconsistency in the Court's approach to state action can be explained by plaintiffs' failures
to properly target the state action involved, by erroneously suing private defendants in
federal court when they should instead have sued government officials or stied in state
court. See Tribe, Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at 248, 255-57. But this does not
adequately explain decisions like Blum v. Yaretsky, where the Court rejected state action
claims even where plaintiffs sued only government officials and challenged the
government's practice of terminating public benefits based on private decisions. See 457
U.S. 991, 996, 1005 (1982).
154. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008.
155. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982).
156. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989).
157. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988).
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athletic events is, according to the Supreme Court's decision two terms
ago in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n. 158
These decisions demonstrate that the line of division separating state
and private action remains far from straight. The continuing disagree-
ment regarding how to conduct state action analysis is starkly apparent in
a comparison of the Court's two most recent state action decisions, Ameri-
can Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan and Brentwood Academy.
In Sullivan, the Court held that private insurance companies providing
workers' compensation benefits were not state actors. 159 Obviously, the
two cases differ in their underlying facts and particularly in the relation-
ship of the private entities involved with the government. While the gov-
ernment created and closely regulated the workers' compensation sys-
tem, the duty to provide benefits lay by statute with employers; the
government did not participate in the private insurers' refusals to pay
benefits other than to authorize such refusal prior to a hearing.16(l By
contrast, the Court emphasized the numerous connections between the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association and the state in finding
the Association to be a state actor, in particular the fact that a substantial
majority of Association members were Tennessee public schools and that
public school officials "overwhelmingly perform all but the purely minis-
terial acts by which the Association exists and functions."' 6 1
Even so, a striking difference in analytic style exists between the two
decisions. Sullivan is in many ways the apogee of a formalistic state action
inquiry, with the Court insisting upon state involvement in "the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complains" and not just background con-
nections to the private entity. 162 The Court also reiterated other limiting
rules and maxims developed in earlier cases that significantly narrow the
scope of the state action inquiry, such as that "[t] he mere fact that a busi-
ness is subject to state regulation" or "the mere approval or acquiescence
of the State" in a private entity's actions do not create state action. 6 3 In
Brentwood Academy, by contrast, the majority opinion took an avowedly
flexible, pragmatic, and situation-specific approach, focusing on the
"practical certainty .. . that public officials will control operation of the
Association";164 the Court stated that "[w] hat is fairly attributable [to the
state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid sim-
158. 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
159. 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999).
160. The Court expressly distinguished West on this ground, noting that under
Pennsylvania law, employers, not the state, bore the obligation to provide medical
treatment and benefits. See id. at 55-56.
161. 531 U.S. at 298-302; see also id. at 296-97 (identifying other cases where
constitutional constraints were applied because private entity was controlled by public
officials).
162. 526 U.S. at 51.
163. Id. at 52 (alteration in original, citation omitted).
164. 531 U.S. at 298, 301 n.4.
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plicity."1 65 Moreover, it was precisely the background connections be-
tween the Association and the state-in the Court's words, "pervasive
entwinement"-rather than state involvement in specific Association de-
cisions that formed the basis for the Court's finding of state action. 166
Quite clearly, such differing approaches make hazardous any confi-
dent prediction of the effect of ever-increasing privatization on state ac-
tion doctrine. Yet notwithstanding the seeming trend toward a more flex-
ible and perhaps expansive state action inquiry in Brentwood Academy, the
pervasive thrust of the Court's recent decisions strongly suggests that
privatization is likely to result in a denial of state action. Nor is this out-
come surprising when the rules of current state action doctrine are com-
pared to the practical realities of privatization.
One key factor leading to denials of state action is the Court's restric-
tion of what satisfies the public function test to functions that are tradi-
tionally and exclusively performed by government. 16 7 Taken literally, this
formulation excludes most of the tasks commonly performed by govern-
ment today. Private organizations played a central role in distributing
assistance to the poor prior to the New Deal, 168 while private prisons and
165. Id. at 295. This flexible approach was the target of Justice Thomas' dissent,
which underscored the absence of formal ties between the state and the Association and
criticized the Court for deviating from existing "tests" for state action. See id. at 306-08,
312-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). A flexible approach to state action is also evident in
Edmonson, where the Court emphasized that a finding of state action turned on
examination of factors such as "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits," "whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental
function," and "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22
(1991).
166. 531 U.S. at 291. Indeed, in accepting background involvement to be sufficient
for finding state action, Brentwood Academy seems more of a piece with the 1961 decision in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)-once described as "the
high-water mark in a tide of state action doctrine that has since been almost constantly at
ebb," Tribe, Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at 251-than recent state action
decisions.
167. See Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at 1184. Significantly, Brentwood Academy appeared
quite willing to adopt this narrow understanding of what constitutes a public function. 531
U.S. at 302-03 (referring to requirement that function must be "exclusively and
traditionally public" to qualify). The Court's acceptance of this narrow formulation of the
public function test in Brentwood Academy is particularly noteworthy given that it appeared
to be relaxing the requirements for a public function in Edmonson, there stating that
performance of a "traditional governmental function" was sufficient. 500 U.S. at 621; see
also id. at 640 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing looser standard). But see UAW v.
Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 907 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e do not believe the
Supreme Court would have attempted to change radically the government function
standard . . . through the transparent puerilism of simple omission.").
168. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 37, at 66-80 (discussing scientific charity movement
and efforts to end most public forms of poor relief); Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at
47-57 (discussing role of nonprofit organizations and private charities in provision of
social welfare services from eighteenth century onward).
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private police similarly have a longstanding pedigree. 1 9 More impor-
tantly, the Court has relied on this narrow formulation to reject the claim
that private entities are performing a public function for state action pur-
poses when they are fulfilling duties ultimately borne by the government.
Instead, private provision of services on the government's behalf only
constitutes a public function if the services are ones that the government
is required to provide directly. 1
70
The overall effect of this approach is to remove one of the strongest
arguments for finding state action in contexts of government privatiza-
tion. Admittedly, instances exist where the government itself must re-
main directly responsible for the duties involved. West v. Atkins appears
to be such a case; there, the private doctor held to be a state actor was
fulfilling the state's Eighth Amendment obligation to provide adequate
medical care to prisoners, an obligation that by virtue of the public-pri-
vate divide runs only against the government. 171 But governments rarely
are subject to such direct provision requirements. Instead, it is expected
that governments will often meet their obligations to provide services by
relying on private providers, and the activities involved are frequently far
removed from historically core government functions.
As a consequence, the only grounds generally available for finding
state action will be the government's connections or interaction with the
private entity. Here, the obstacle to finding state action in government
privatization contexts is the requirement, reiterated in Sullivan, that gov-
169. See Sklansky, supra note 125, at 1171-83, 1193-1221, 1229-30 (describing
current practice and history of private policing and noting that private security guards are
not held to be state actors unless deputized); supra text accompanying note 76; see also
Andrea Elliot, In Stores, Private Handcuffs for Sticky Fingers, N.Y. TimesJune 17, 2003, at
Al (describing claims that department store security guards are using coercive practices
against accused shoplifters). The restrictive effects of the current public function test are
particularly evident in the civil commitment context, where courts have relied on a history
of substantial private involvement to reject the claim that involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill is a public function. See Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258-60 (1st
Cir. 1994); see also Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 234 F. Supp. 2d 140,
166-67 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that involuntary commitment is not a public function
under Supreme Court's current test and criticizing test's emphasis on tradition of
government control of activity).
170. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (rejecting claim that nursing
homes were performing a public function in providing services that states were required to
provide under Medicaid because statute did not require states to provide the services
themselves and "decisions made in the day-to-day administration of a nursing home are
[not] the kind of decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the sovereign for and on
behalf of the public"); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (rejecting claim
that private schools were performing a public function in providing education to special
needs students on behalf of school districts because public funding "in no way makes these
services the exclusive province of the State").
171. 487 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1988) (expressing concern that not finding state action
would allow states to avoid constitutional duties simply by dint of contracting out). In
addition, the doctor's actions were integrally tied to the state's exercise of its power to
incarcerate, a core government function that satisfies the traditional and exclusive
function requirements. See id. at 55 (noting connection to incarceration power).
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ernment participation must be present in the specific action being chal-
lenged; absent such participation, only government compulsion or for-
mal control of the private actor will suffice. 172 Public control of a private
entity or participation in specific actions is unlikely to be present in a
great many instances of privatization. As decisions such as West demon-
strate, situations will arise where a private actor operates within and is an
integral part of an institution controlled by the government. 173 But more
often privatization means handing over program implementation in its
entirety to separate private entities or, increasingly, giving private actors
responsibility for running what formerly were public institutions, such as
a prisons, schools, or hospitals. This is particularly true in social welfare
programs, where the government relies on private entities to provide ser-
vices to large numbers of beneficiaries. Private providers regularly make
day-to-day decisions on their own; public involvement is limited to issuing
general requirements that providers must meet (through regulations or
contractual terms) and conducting periodic reviews. 17 4 Indeed, taking
advantage of private freedom from public control-identified as exemp-
tion from civil service provisions, bureaucratic rules, or substantive
programmatic requirements-is often the main impetus behind efforts to
privatize. 1
75
The question then becomes to what extent Brentwood Academy has
altered the Court's prime insistence on government involvement in spe-
cific challenged acts. Clearly, background involvement that reaches the
172. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-55 (1999); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) ("Whether a private party should be
deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes
necessarily turns on the degree of the Govtrnment's participation in the private party's
activities. ... ). The Court's frequent failure to consider the cumulative effect of
connections between the state and the private entity is further evidence of the reluctance
to find state action based on background involvement. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at
848 n.1 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for "analyzing the various indicia of
state action separately, without considering their cumulative impact"); see also Blum, 457
U.S. at 1013-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for engaging in "a
pigeonhole approach to the question of state action"). Such a cumulative assessment was
part of state action doctrine under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,
721-26 (1961), and seems to have been somewhat revived by Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298-302 (2001). On the importance of
cumulative assessment, see Krotoszynski, supra note 151, at 335-46.
173. 487 U.S. at 55-56 (noting that physician worked at hospital within prison and
underscoring that state officials controlled inmates' access to other physicians); see also
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-24 (1991) (emphasizing close
government involvement in private litigant's use of peremptory challenges).
174. See supra Part L.A (using specific examples to illustrate the way in which
privatization delegates responsibility for program implementation to private hands); see
also Blum, 457 U.S. at 993-95 & 1006 n.15, 1007 n.16 (describing Medicaid scheme under
which federal and state governments specify factors relevant to determining need for long-
term care but leave assessment of particular beneficiary's needs to private nursing homes
and physicians).




level of "pervasive entwinement" is now a potential ground for finding
state action. However, in holding that such pervasive entwinement was
present, the Court placed particular weight on the participation of public
officials in the Association, noting that these officials "do not merely con-
trol but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely ministerial acts by
which the Association exists and functions . "... ,176 Again, instances
where government officials control or constitute private entities are
hardly the norm; moreover, Brentwood Academy went out of its way to indi-
cate that less extreme forms of government involvement might not suf-
fice, stating that government purchases of contract services "do not con-
vert the service providers into public actors."'177 Notably, in making this
point Brentwood Academy cited Rendell-Baker v. Kohn with approval. In
Rendell-Baker, the Court held that a private school was not a state actor,
notwithstanding that the school received nearly all of its students through
contracts with local or state authorities, was heavily regulated by the state,
and relied on state payments for the vast majority of its operating
budget.1 78 If such extensive government involvement does not suffice to
create state action, claims of pervasive entanglement will rarely succeed.
What frequently is present in instances of privatization is a formal
delegation of authority from the state to the private entity, whether by
contract 179 or by governing statutes and regulations.1 8 0 However, these
delegations have little significance under current state action doctrine.' 8 '
176. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 300; see also id. at 300-01 (noting that State
Education Board members served as ex officio members of key Association committees,
and Association rules, including no recruitment rule at issue, had been reviewed and
approved by State Board). This involvement was important because it served to distinguish
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), and made the Association akin to Amtrak, a
private corporation which the Court nonetheless held was subject to constitutional
requirements in part because the President appointed a majority of its directors. See
Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296-98; see also Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S.
374, 400 (1995) (holding that corporation is part of government where "[g]overnment
creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and
retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors").
177. 531 U.S. at 299.
178. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 831-33, 840 (1982). Brentwood Academy's
citation to Rendell-Baker for the point that public contracting does not create state action is
also significant because in Rendell-Baker the Court broadly rejected the proposition that a
finding of state action could rest on a private entity's status as a government contractor.
457 U.S. at 840-41.
179. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 44 & n.1 (1988); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at
832 n.l.
180. See, e.g., BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 300-01; San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 994-95, 1007-10, 1008 n.18 (1982).
181. For example, in Blum, the Court gave little weight to the way that the
government had delegated responsibility to nursing homes to ensure that Medicaid
beneficiaries received the appropriate level of care. See 457 U.S. at 1006-08 (noting that
government required nursing homes to assess extent of beneficiaries' needs for care but
concluding homes' discretion over individual assessments precluded finding state action
on this basis). Similarly, the only reference to the way that local school committees had
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Brentwood Academy is again a good example. There, the majority noted
that for twenty-five years Tennessee maintained a regulation expressly
designating the Association as the entity responsible for supervising all
high school athletics in the state.1 8 2 Interestingly, however, the Court
treated this designation as further evidence of the state's entwinement
and close relationship with the Association, instead of suggesting that del-
egation of authority may on its own form a basis for finding state action.
To the extent that consideration of whether the government has dele-
gated authority exists, it usually arises in determining whether the public
function test is satisfied. But in this context, the analysis focuses on the
nature of the task being delegated rather than on the act of delegation,
with little consideration given to how the delegation may affect the pri-
vate delegate's powers. Indeed, if anything, the Court's decisions indi-
cate that a broad delegation of power actually serves as a basis for denying
the existence of state action, because a private delegate's exercise of inde-
pendent judgment and discretion is taken as strong evidence that signifi-
cant government control and involvement is lacking.18 3
Hence, it seems quite unlikely that state action will be found in most
instances of government privatization, at least under current state action
doctrine.'8 4 A survey of lower court decisions addressing a variety of
privatization contexts supports this conclusion, as overwhelmingly these
delegated their statutory responsibilities to the private school in Rendell-Baker came in a
footnote stating there was no evidence that the committees had done so to avoid
constitutional constraints. 457 U.S. at 842 n.7. The one occasion on which the Court
emphasized the significance of delegation per se is NCAA v. Tarkanian, where the Court
stated that the ultimate question in state action analysis is "whether the State provided a
mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor." 488
U.S. at 192; see also id. at 195 (acknowledging that "a State may delegate authority to a
private party and thereby make that party a state actor"). But the Court ultimately found
no state action in Tarkanian, id. at 199, and it has not developed this suggestion that
delegation matters in subsequent cases.
182. 531 U.S. at 292; see also id. at 301 (characterizing State's repeal of regulation as
meaning that the State "once freely acknowledged the Association's official character but
now does it by winks and nods"). The Court also noted that public schools who were
members of the Association delegated their authority to charge admission at athletic events
to the organization. Id. at 299.
183. See, e.g., SFAA, 483 U.S. at 545-46 & 544 n.27 (emphasizing government's lack
of control over USOC in denying state action); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008-09 (underscoring
private actors' reliance on independent professional standards in denying state action);
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841-42 (stressing lack of government involvement in school
personnel decisions in concluding state action not present).
184. For similar conclusions, see Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at 1183; Freeman, Private
Role, supra note 2, at 575-80; Gilman, supra note 10, at 623. For suggestions that the
Court may respond to privatization by expanding state action analysis, see Clayton P.
Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 Am. J. Comp.
L. 481, 487 (Supp. 1998); see also Michelman, supra note 130, at 1081 (suggesting that
privatization will either expand state action analysis or restrict scope of constitutional
oversight of government activities).
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decisions reject state action claims. 18 5 No doubt, the Supreme Court will
clamp down when it perceives an effort by government to evade its consti-
tutional obligations.' 8 6 But privatization decisions rarely exhibit clear evi-
dence of constitutional bad faith. Is privatizing to avoid the cumbersome,
bureaucratic processes that come with government an illegitimate effort
to bypass procedural due process, or is it instead an admirable attempt to
inject innovation and beneficial flexibility into government programs? 1
87
185. See, e.g., Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26-30 (1st Cir. 2002)
(private school operating in lieu of public high school for town residents is not a state
actor), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003); D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation,
Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (private self-regulatory organization not a state
actor notwithstanding role in enforcing federal securities regulation); Dowe v. Total Action
Against Poverty, 145 F.3d 653, 658-60 (4th Cir. 1998) (private organization administering
Head Start program is not a state actor); McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for
Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 524-26 (3d Cir. 1994) (private organization that
accredited medical training programs not a state actor even though state based its
licensing determinations on organization's reviews); Spencer v. Lee, 864 F.2d 1376,
1378-79 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (private medical providers not state actors when
involuntarily committing individuals under state statute).
One interesting deviation from this pattern is in regard to the provision of
government-subsidized medical services, where several courts have found state action. See
Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) (private MCOs participating in
Mcdicare are state actors in making coverage decisions because federal governmentjointly
participated in such decisions by requiring MCOs to follow certain procedures in denying
coverage and by providing broad appeal rights from such denials), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (private agencies are
state actors when their decisions or ,vhether to provide home health care services in short-
term situations were not reviewed by state officials and were not purely medical judgments
made pursuant to professional standards); Healey v. Thompson, 186 F. Supp. 2d 105,
117-21 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding home health care agencies operating under Medicare
are state actors in making eligibility decisions but not treatment decisions); Daniels v.
Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (private MCOs participating in
Medicaid are state actors), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d
1330 (6th Cir. 1998).
186. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 & n. 14 (1988) (expressing concern that states
not be able to evade their constitutional duties to prisoners by contracting out prison
medical care); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 n.7 (noting, in course of rejecting state action
claims, absence of evidence suggesting "the State has attempted to avoid its constitutional
duties by a sham arrangement which attempts to disguise provision of public services as
acts of private parties"). The Court has been willing to play this policing role in the past, as
it did when southern states attempted to preserve the white primary through resort to
private Democratic clubs. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); see also supra text
accompanying notes 151-152.
187. Similar difficulties with identifying illegitimate efforts to bypass procedural
constraints are evident in several administrative law contexts. See, e.g., Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1983) (noting that rulemaking helps ensure uniformity
and avoids unnecessary administrative burdens and concluding agency legitimately used
rulemaking, notwithstanding statutory hearing requirement); Peter L. Strauss et al.,
Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative Law: Cases and Comments 710-11 (10th rev. ed.
2003) (noting that agencies' use of interpretative rules and policy statements could be seen




Additional support for the conclusion that state action will rarely be
found comes from the transformation over the last two decades in the
animating concerns of state action doctrine. Brentwood Academy aside, few
of the Court's state action decisions even identify-let alone emphasize-
the importance of ensuring that exercises of government power do not
escape constitutional constraints as an underlying imperative of state ac-
tion doctrine. Far more common of late is for cases to underscore the
values at stake in not finding state action, expressing concern that state
action holdings threaten individual autonomy, federalism, and the regu-
latory prerogatives of elected government.""' Particularly given the cur-
rent Court's emphasis on protecting these values in other jurisprudential
areas, 189 it seems unlikely that it will adopt a more expansive approach to
state action in response to increased privatization.
B. The Inadequacies of Current State Action Doctrine
In our system of constitutional government, the absence of state ac-
tion in most instances of privatization should cause alarm. This absence
results not because privatization removes respo! isibilities from the sphere
of government endeavor, but because current state action doctrine is sig-
nificantly underinclusive and ill-equipped to identify and thereby control
private exercises of government power. Simultaneously, however, current
doctrine is also overinclusive, because it makes private actors directly sub-
ject to constitutional constraints even when an instance of privatization
does not raise the specter of unaccountable government power. These
flaws combine to create perverse incentives for governments to delegate
greater discretionary power over government programs to private actors,
188. One frequently quoted version states: "Careful adherence to the 'state action'
requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law
and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials,
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed." Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S, 598, 620 (2000)
(insisting that state action doctrine serves "to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from
obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the
National Government"); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)
("Faithful application of the state-action requirement ... ensures that the prerogative of
regulating private business remains with the States and the representative branches, not
the courts.").
189. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (emphasizing
restrictions on federal judicial role in refusing to imply private right of action); Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-59 (2000) (holding that application of state's public
accommodation law to require private association to accept openly gay scout leader
violated constitutional protections of associational freedom); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602
(invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act as an attempted exercise of
legislative power reserved to states); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the
Second Rehnquist Court, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 569 574-76, 584-87 (2003) (describing and




which ultimately worsen the threat to constitutional accountability posed
by privatization.
1. Inadequate Tests of Government Power. - One important standard
against which to measure the success of current state action doctrine is
the extent to which it preserves constitutional controls on the exercise of
government power. After all, the only reason to consider applying the
Constitution outside of formal government institutions is to prevent the
public-private divide from eviscerating the fundamental requirement of
constitutional accountability. On this measure, current state action doc-
trine comes up short.
The complaint that current doctrine represents a very poor gauge of
government power necessarily goes beyond an internal critique of cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine, in that it presupposes an understanding of
what constitutes the exercise of such power that differs from the view
evidenced in the Court's state action decisions. Yet, it does not require a
very robust or expansive understanding of government power in order to
make the point that current state action doctrine is underinclusive. In-
stead, all that is needed is acceptance of the claim that control over third
parties' access to government resources, specifically government benefits
and government-subsidized services, represents government power.19 0
The Court's state action decisions demonstrate that current doctrine is
largely unconcerned with government power in this form or, more gener-
ally, with the control over third parties that private entities gain as a result
of their roles in government programs. 19 '
Blum v. Yaretsky provides perhaps the starkest example of this lack of
concern. 19 2 The case arose out of private nursing homes' provision of
long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries. The government required the
homes to ensure that beneficiaries received an appropriate level of care.
Upon notification from a skilled nursing facility that a beneficiary no
longer needed intensive services, the government would inform the bene-
ficiary that she must transfer to a less-skilled facility or lose her Medicaid
benefits. In short, the nursing home's determination served to control
the beneficiary's eligibility for skilled nursing services under Medicaid.
The Court acknowledged the effect that the nursing homes' care deter-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
191. The one occasion where the Court did stress a private actor's control over
individuals' access to government services is West, where it emphasized that a state prisoner
could not obtain medical care except through the private doctor who had contracted to
provide medical care for the prison. But again, West is distinguishable from most
privatization contexts both because of its institutional setting-the doctor worked at the
state prison-and because the constitutional duties the doctor fulfilled are exceptional in
attaching directly to the state. See supra notes 171 and 173 and accompanying text; see
also Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that
in West, plaintiff was "a captive to whatever doctor the state provided" and "the state had an
affirmative constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care to its prisoners"),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003).
192. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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minations had on beneficiaries' access to such services. But it denied that
this effect made a difference to the state action inquiry: "That the State
responds to [the homes' decisions to discharge or transfer patients to
lower levels of care] by adjusting benefits does not render it responsible for
those actions."'193 The critical factor for the Court was not that the gov-
ernment allowed the private homes' decisions to have this effect on pro-
gram beneficiaries, but rather that the transfer decisions "ultimately
turn [ed] on medical judgments made by private parties according to pro-
fessional standards that are not established by the State."
19 4
Blum is by no means an outlier. In Rendell-Baker, the Court recog-
nized that local school committees were using a private school to provide
benefits that the state government was required to provide, in this case a
free education for students with special needs. 195 Yet in holding that the
school was not subject to constitutional constraints in making employ-
ment decisions, the Court never considered the impact that the school's
resultant freedom might have on the services students received. Instead,
the Court analogized the school to other "private corporations whose bus-
iness depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships,
or submarines for the government," thereby making clear that the fact
that the school was charged with providing services to others played no
role in its analysis.' 96 The same inattention to the powers that private
entities exercise over third parties is evident in state action decisions ad-
dressing private regulation. For example, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. (SFAA) v. United States Olympic Committee (USOC), the Court rejected
the claim that the USOC was a state actor, holding that oversight of ama-
teur sports was not a public function and that the government's involve-
ment in chartering, authorizing, and funding the USOC did not suffice
to create state action.' 97 Notably, in reaching this conclusion the Court
ignored the way that Congress' grant to the USOC of exclusive oversight
powers significantly enhanced the USOC's authority over all individuals
and organizations participating in amateur sports and enabled it to per-
form a coordination role that prior consensual arrangements had failed
to achieve.' 9 8
193. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
194. Id. at 1008.
195. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 n.1, 842 (1982); see also id. at 849
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that under Massachusetts law, "the State is required
to provide a free education to all children, including those with special needs").
196. Id. at 840-41.
197. See 483 U.S. 522, 543-45 (1987).
198. Id. at 553-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This lack of attention to the authority
that private regulators wield over others is also evident in cases addressing the state actor
status of self-regulatory organizations in the securities industry, such as NYSE and NASD.
Notwithstanding that these organizations are given a significant role in federal securities
regulation-they are required by statute to enforce compliance with federal securities laws
by their members and their rules and enforcement proceedings are subject to approval by
the Securities and Exchange Commission-several courts have held that rulemaking and
enforcement decisions by the organizations do not represent state action. See, e.g., D.L.
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More generally, the Court's treatment of close government involve-
ment as essentially a prerequisite for finding state action is fundamentally
misguided, because such involvement is a very poor litmus test for deter-
mining when a private entity should be viewed as wielding government
power. This emphasis surfaces both in Sullivan's requirement of govern-
ment involvement in specific challenged acts and in Brentwood Academy's
concern with involvement so extensive that it amounts to pervasive entan-
glement. Focusing on government involvement seems logical enough;
where the government is closely involved in the actions of its private part-
ners, it is more likely that the private actors are serving as conduits for
government decisions and policies rather than as independent deci-
sionmakers.' 9 " As a result, these are appropriately viewed as instances of
private exercise of government power. But this gets at only part of the
state action concern that which addresses whether the government is try-
ing to hide behind private action. 2" ° It omits any inquiry into the nature
of the powers exercised by private entities, as well as into whether the
government is responsible for enhancing the authority these entities
wield over others.20 1 Such an inquiry is essential given the way that priva-
tization often not only enhances private actors' power over others, but
provides them with forms of authority conventionally understood to con-
stitute government power-such as control over government resources,
programs, and regulation.
Once the focus shifts to assessing the powers wielded by private enti-
ties and away from identifying surreptitious government action, the inad-
equacy of tying the state action inquiry to identifying close government
involvement becomes apparent. The extent of government power exer-
cised by private actors is likely to vary inversely rather than directly with
government involvement. Some minimal government involvement in the
form of delegation of responsibilities to private actors is needed; but be-
yond that, the less the government is involved, the more discretion and
power private entities have. This inverse relationship is evident in a re-
cent First Circuit decision, Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute,
which held that a private school serving as the high school for a school
district was not a state actor in a suit by a student who claimed that his
suspension violated due process.2 112 In reaching this conclusion, the
Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that NASD investigatory hearings are not state action); Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that rules of private
organizations controlling security exchanges are not state action at least insofar as
compliance with rules is not required by federal law). See generally Richard L. Stone &
Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory Organizations as State Actors
When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 453.
199. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1009-10.
200. See supra note 186 (providing instances where the Court has focused on
"smoking out" illegitimate uses of privatization to evade constitutional constraints).
201. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
202. 296 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002).
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court emphasized that the school district was neither generally involved
in running the school nor involved in the specific activity at issue, imposi-
tion of discipline. Writing for the majority,Judge Boudin noted that "the
school district could have framed the contract to dictate in detail the dis-
ciplinary procedures to be followed or could have insisted on participat-
ing in such decisions." But, "wisely or not," the school district had not
done so, and instead "day-to-day operations, including discipline, are in
the hands of [the private school] .-"03
The inverse relationship between the extent of government involve-
ment and private authority means that current doctrine has it nearly ex-
actly backwards. Private actors given broader discretion in their exercise
of government power are less likely to be subject to constitutional con-
straints than those who operate under close government supervision and
whose potential for abusive action is thus more curtailed. Indeed, this ill
fit suggests that the Supreme Court has refocused state action doctrine
away from ensuring constitutional accountability of government power
and towards ensuring constitutional accountability of government
proper. That is, the Court uses state action doctrine to police against
intentional evasion and bad faith by those who are indisputably govern-
ment actors, but it does not view the doctrine as a safeguard against pri-
vate actors wielding government power outside of constitutional
constraints.
Notably, however, government involvement is also an inadequate
metric even from the perspective of policing government. Government
need not be closely involved in the specific decisions of a private entity in
order to wield substantial influence over its actions. Instead, government
can impose performance incentives or general requirements that as a
practical matter mean that its private partners will follow particular
courses of action, even though they remain free in theory to do other-
wise. 20 4  Government may also informally influence private actors
through its power to award contracts and grants. 20 5 To the extent that
current state action doctrine requires government involvement in the
specific acts being challenged and ignores background involvement un-
203. Id. at 28. To the Logiodice court's credit, it recognized that the real issue was the
school's control over students' access to "the only free secondary education in town," id. at
29, and therefore assessed whether use of private contract schools posed a serious threat to
Maine school children's access to education. See id. at 30-31 (concluding that no
evidence existed "that contract schools in Maine are disciplining students in an outrageous
fashion and leaving Maine children without an education" and that "state law provides
protection against serious abuse"). However, as discussed, this concern with the extent to
which private schools controlled students' access to government benefits is at odds with
current doctrine-a point Judge Boudin acknowledged, noting that holding a private
school to be a state actor because of its control over free education would create a new "ad
hoc" exception to current state action analysis. Id. at 29-30.
204. See Diller, Revolution, supra note 50, at 1178-85 (describing impact of
performance incentives on both publicly administered and privatized welfare programs).
205. See Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at 72-73, 103-11, 144-46 (arguing that
government contracts have significantly altered how nonprofits operate).
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less it rises to the level of pervasive entanglement, the doctrine allows
governments to exercise broad authority over a private entity's actions
without triggering constitutional protections.2 °16
2. Unnecessary Intrusion on Government Regulatory Prerogatives. - At
the same time, however, current state action doctrine is also overinclu-
sive. Under standard analysis, private entities are held fully subject to
constitutional constraints if they are found to be state actors, even when
imposing such liability on private actors is not needed to preserve consti-
tutional accountability.
A good example of this overinclusivity comes from a vacated 1998
Ninth Circuit decision, Grijalva v. Shalala.2 07 There, MCOs' decisions de-
nying Medicare beneficiaries' requests for medical services were found to
constitute government action. According to the appeals court, detailed
federal requirements for the procedures MCOs must use and the services
they must cover, along with the presence of a government appeals pro-
cess for service denials, meant that the MCOs and the federal govern-
ment were joint participants in implementing Medicare.20 8 From a con-
stitutional accountability perspective, holding the MCOs to be state actors
seems unnecessary and purely the result of doctrinal rules. The plaintiffs
sued only the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), not the
MCOs, their goal being to force the Secretary to do a better job at polic-
ing the procedures used by MCOs in making coverage decisions. The
Secretary, in turn, had disclaimed responsibility for the MCOs' actions,
arguing that they were unrelated private entities. State action doctrine
thus served as a bridge that allowed the federal government to be
charged with responsibility for the MCOs' actions even though the gov-
ernment did not directly participate in specific coverage denials until the
appeals level. Surely, however, making the leap from private to public
responsibility in this type of situation should not be difficult, given that
the government had given the MCOs responsibility for providing services
under Medicare notwithstanding the MCOs' inadequate procedures.
206. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005-10 (1982) (denying state action
where government inspected nursing homes, imposed financial penalties for providing
deficient care to Medicaid beneficiaries, required homes to inform government of their
care determinations regarding beneficiaries' needs for nursing services, and mandated use
of government-devised form in assessing beneficiaries' needs). The extreme approach of
Blum in this regard was not followed in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, where the
Court held that statutes encouraging and removing obstacles to drug testing of railroad
employees sufficed to turn the drug tests into state action. 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989).
But continuing citations to Blum as governing authority suggest that the Court views the
cases as distinguishable. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51-52
(1999).
207. 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999).
208. The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for
consideration of new regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services
and the intervening decision in Sullivan. However, several other lower court decisions,
pre- and post-dating Gfnjalva, share its reasoning and conclusion. See cases cited supra
note 185.
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More importantly, once that leap is made and the government is lia-
ble for private acts, constitutional accountability is assured. Extending
constitutional constraints to the private entities or individuals involved
gives plaintiffs additional defendants, but not additional substantive pro-
tection against constitutional violations.209 Such an extension, however,
severely intrudes upon the government's ability to tailor relationships
with private partners so as to maximize the benefits of privatization. In-
stead, as Grijalva demonstrates, regulatory control is transferred to the
courts. The district court's order contained detailed requirements gov-
erning MCO coverage denials as well as the government's appeal pro-
cess. 210 Such a judicially prescribed procedural code is a fairly standard
consequence of finding a due process violation. 21 ' Yet the net effect was
to prevent the government from determining how best to achieve the
constitutional demands of due process without undermining the feasibil-
ity and benefits of MCO participation in Medicare. 2 12 Given the federal
209. It is true, however, that applying constitutional constraints directly to private
actors is more likely to result in payment of money damages for constitutional violations,
which may translate into greater enforcement of constitutional norms, because private
entities are less likely to enjoy the protections of qualified immunity, see infra note 220.
But see supra text accompanying notes 114-115 (discussing why constitutional
accountability does not demand full remediation for constitutional violations).
210. See Grijalva v. Shalala, No. CIV 93-711, 1997 WL 155392, at *1-*3 (D. Ariz. Mar.
3, 1997). This specification was affirmed on appeal. See Grijalva, 152 F.3d at 1123 n.4
(rejecting government's claim that appropriate remedy was remand to government to
produce new regulations that comport with due process); see also infra text accompanying
notes 414-416 (discussing the substance of the district court's due process analysis).
211. To be sure, courts often are hesitant to impose detailed procedural mandates on
government, but this hesitancy generally takes the form of a refusal to hold that the
government has violated due process rather than an effort to defer to the government's
regulatory role in remedying identified violations. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 339-49 (1976) (finding due process does not require oral hearing prior to
termination of disability benefits); see also Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 60-61 (denying property
interest in workers' compensation benefits for medical treatment if treatment not yet
deemed reasonable and necessary); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 322-26 (1985) (emphasizing that legislatures are to be allowed "considerable leeway"
and not "forced to conform to a rigid constitutional code of procedural necessities" in
upholding limitation on attorneys' fees in veterans' benefits applications against due
process challenge); Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism
189, 221 (1991) (noting that current due process doctrine defers to government's view
regarding which interests should trigger due process protections, but not with regard to
"the process appropriate to implement those interests"). Similarly, while a court may stay
its judgment for a period to allow the government to rectify constitutional violations, see,
e.g., Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88-89
(1982), such equitable deference is rarely invoked.
212. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 758-59 (detailing concerns that Gijalva holding
would "pressure [the government] to micromanage every aspect of an HMO's operation");
see also James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid
Managed Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and Paradigm, 53 Vand. L. Rev.
125, 219 (2000) (arguing that finding MCOs to be state actors would impose "complexity,
red tape, and inflexibility," expose MCOs to financial liability, and deter entry of MCOs
into Medicaid MCO market). In recent years, large numbers of MCOs have exited
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courts' lack of expertise in the complex policy issues presented by man-
aged care, responsibility for designing constitutionally adequate MCO
procedures seems best left in the first instance to HHS, subject to judicial
review. 21
3
A particularly notable point about Grijalva is that the very features
used by the Ninth Circuit in finding the MCOs to be state actors also
served to limit the potential that MCOs would abuse their powers. Both
the government's detailed regulations and the appeals process (which in-
volved independent review of coverage denials and the option of a hear-
ing before an administrative lawjudge if that review affirmed the MCOs'
decision) limited MCOs' ability to make self-interested coverage denials.
From a constitutional accountability perspective, what matters is that the
overall combination of MCO decisionmaking procedures and the govern-
ment's review system satisfy due process, not that MCO procedures do so
standing alone.2 1 4 But the court never considered whether these alterna-
Medicare, limiting the availability of the managed care option for Medicare beneficiaries.
See Gold & McCoy, supra note 24, at 1. Some commentators contended that Grijalva
would encourage others to leave the program to avoid having to provide costly appeals
procedures. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 759 (reporting arguments); see also Gladieux,
supra note 22, at 101-02 (noting danger that costly regulatory standards will cause MCOs
to leave Medicare, but arguing that MCOs also have a vested interest in ensuring adequate
grievance and appeals procedures are provided); Gegwich, supra note 33, at 214-15
(arguing that Grijalva decision may be a "double-edged sword" for beneficiaries as it may
force HHS to drop noncompliant HMOs, thereby leaving some beneficiaries without
access to their established physicians).
213. The difficulties in determining appropriate procedures are evident in the
aftermath of the Grijalva litigation, which was eventually settled after the Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision. Grijalva, 152 F.3d at 1115, vacated, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999). The district court had required that all beneficiaries receive detailed notices
describing: the basis for the MCO's decision; the type of additional evidence that would
support the beneficiary's claims; regular and expedited appeal procedures; and informal
reconsideration mechanisms. Grijalva, 1997 WL 155392, at *1. In its recent rulemaking
on Medicare managed care notice and appeals procedures, initiated as part of the
settlement agreement, HHS refused to require that MCOs provide such detailed notice for
every reduction or termination in services, arguing that detailed notices are burdensome
for MCOs. Moreover, consumer surveys had revealed that Medicare beneficiaries
preferred to receive information specific to their needs at a given time. Instead, HHS
opted for a two-track system under which beneficiaries would receive largely generic
notices of appeal rights on reduction or termination of services, with additional detailed
and personalized notices being sent to beneficiaries who choose to appeal. Medicare
Program; Improvements to the Medicare+Choice Appeal and Grievance Procedures, 68
Fed. Reg. 16,652, 16,656-57 (Apr. 4, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422, 489)
[hereinafter Medicare Program, Improvements].
214. Grijalva specifically targeted the government's oversight of MCOs, and the
decision therefore indicates that the Ninth Circuit found such adequate overall constraints
lacking. 152 F.3d at 1122. But the court dismissed out of hand the suggestion that
constitutional accountability might not require the same procedures in a privatized
context as when the government acts directly. Id. at 1121. It also rejected the option of
putting greater responsibility on government to ensure accountability if the government
chooses to privatize by upholding the district court's decision to decide what procedures
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tive controls on MCOs should preclude rather than produce a finding of
state action.
In its disregard for the effect that alternative accountability mecha-
nisms might have on state action determinations, Grijalva is on a par with
other decisions.21 5 In Brentwood Academy, the Court rejected the Associa-
tion's claim that alternative protections obviated the need to subject the
Association to constitutional scrutiny, without examining whether the
mechanisms identified by the Association offered adequate protection.
According to the Court, the availability of alternative routes for redress
was simply irrelevant given the strength of the case for the Association's
state actor status. 2 16 The Court is equally indifferent to whether adequate
nonconstitutional controls exist in cases where it fails to find state action.
In Blum, for instance, the Court stressed that the nursing homes' care
determinations were based on independent professional standards in or-
der to demonstrate the absence of state involvement; it did not consider
whether such standards were sufficient to obviate the need for constitu-
tional protections.
2 17
Another major culprit causing state action's overinclusivity, as
Grijalva indicates, is the use of government involvement as the linchpin
for state action determinations. When the government is intimately in-
volved with a private entity or the challenged private action, constitu-
tional constraints can be enforced directly against the responsible govern-
ment officials. Accordingly, applying constitutional constraints directly to
the private entity as well is unnecessary to ensure constitutional accounta-
bility. Moreover, targeting government alone in such situations seems
particularly appropriate because close government involvement limits the
extent of authority wielded by private actors and thus in turn limits their
culpability for constitutional violations. This point holds even more
strongly when the government is not simply "involved," but in fact
Medicare MCOs must employ in handling coverage requests, rather than leaving that
remedial question to the agency to address in the first instance. See id. at 1123-24.
215. One recent exception is Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute, where the
First Circuit put great weight on the fact that students expelled from private contract
schools had "alternative means of redress"-specifically, the ability to enforce their rights
to free education against their school districts in state court-in finding the private schools
were not state actors. 296 F.3d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1107 (2003).
216. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
304-05 (2001).
217. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 (1982). Subsequently in West v. Atkins, the
Court made clear that acting in accordance with professional discretion and judgment is
irrelevant to the state action inquiry except insofar as it demonstrates that the government
was not involved in the actions at issue, 487 U.S. 42, 51-52 & 52 n.10 (1988). Similarly, in
SFAA, the Court did not mention the procedural requirements imposed by statute on the
USOC in rejecting the claim that the USOC was a state actor. See San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543-45 (1987); see also 36
C.F.R. §§ 220,509, 220,527-29 (2000) (setting out procedures USOC must follow in
reviewing complaints and resolvii ,, disputes).
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strongly encourages or compels the challenged action. 2 18 For example, if
the government insists on quick placement or specifically dictates the
procedures that private job trainers must follow in providing services to
welfare beneficiaries, it seems unfair to hold the providers monetarily lia-
ble if these procedures are declared unconstitutional. 2 19 The impact on
private actors is made more severe by existing immunity doctrines which
make private entities and individuals particularly desirable defendants in
actions for damages based on constitutional violations. 220
218. Other commentators have made this point with regard to cases in which private
individuals are held to be state actors because they relied on unconstitutional statutes, the
implementation of which involved joint participation or compulsion by state officials. The
blame for the constitutional violation in such cases is primarily-if not wholly-the state's;
nonetheless, private individuals find themselves constitutionally liable for invocation of
state statutes. See, e.g., Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the
Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 Cornell L. Rev.
1053, 1067-69, 1076 (1990). For this reason, in Sutton v. Providence St.Joseph Medical Center,
the Ninth Circuit held that government compulsion, absent more, is insufficient to
transform a private entity into a state actor. See 192 F.3d 826, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1999)
(arguing that effect of opposite conclusion "would be to convert every [private actor] ...
into a governmental actor every time it complies with a presumptively valid, generally
applicable law"). Whatever its analytic appeal, the Ninth Circuit's argument in Sutton is at
odds with the Court's repeated statements that government compulsion creates state
action. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 ("A challenged activity may be state
action when it results from the State's exercise of 'coercive power."' (quoting Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004)); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (holding
that where private entity complies with regulation "by compulsion of sovereign authority,
... the lawfulness of its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment"). Sutton also conflicts
with the Court's reluctance to separate the question of government responsibility for
private actions from the private entity's state actor status. See infra text accompanying
notes 221-223.
219. Subjecting private providers to injunctive relief in this context is less disturbing,
given the likelihood that government officials would intervene to defend a challenged
measure's constitutionality. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000) (providing that where
constitutionality of a federal or state statute is brought into question in private lawsuit,
federal courts must inform relevant government's attorney general and allow attorney
general to intervene). But if government officials are participating in the case, requiring
even nominal participation by private entities is difficult to justify. More importantly,
injunctive relief that goes beyond enjoining a challenged measure to stipulating the
procedures or requirements private entities must follow, as in Grijalva, is arguably more
intrusive than simply granting damages and leaving it to the private entities and the
government to determine how best to ensure constitutional rights are protected. See Peter
H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 14-16 (1983).
220. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking damages from the government or
government officials in their official capacity in federal court, while rules of qualified
immunity protect such officials in their individual capacity except for violations of clearly
established constitutional and statutory rights. U.S. Const. amend. Xl; see, e.g., Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Private individuals have no such blanket exemption
from liability, although they may be protected by grants of immunity or good faith
exceptions in particular contexts. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412-14
(1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992). While contractual clauses may allow
private actors to pass along the cost ofjudgments against them to government, they still
face the burden of defending against suit. More to the point, these are damage recoveries
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A solution to this problem of overkill would be to separate the ques-
tion of government responsibility for private acts from a private entity's
direct liability for constitutional violations. 2 1 Thus, Medicare MCOs
would be state actors in a suit against the Secretary, but not if sued di-
rectly, even if the identical conduct, coverage denials, were involved in
both suits. But this proposed solution runs up against another trait of
current doctrine, namely the all-or-nothing character of state action de-
terminations. Judicial decisions treat private liability for constitutional vi-
olations as following inexorably from state actor status: If state action is
found, constitutional requirements directly apply in full force to the pri-
vate entity. Occasionally, courts do limit their state action determinations
by noting that such determinations do not subject the private entities in-
volved to constitutional requirements in all contexts. 222 But they rarely
distinguish between private and government liability for constitutional vi-
olations by private actors.
223
The all-or-nothing approach makes state action doctrine a very blunt
instrument with which to address the constitutional problems associated
with privatization. At the same time that it leads to overinclusiveness in
the ways described above, the all-or-nothing approach also reinforces the
underinclusiveness of current doctrine by creating a bright-line distinc-
tion between instances where private actors are wielding government
power and those where they are not. The effect is to increase the harm
done by inadequate tests for government power, since failure to recog-
nize the roles played by private actors and the ways that government can
influence their behavior serves to put many instances of privatization
that plaintiffs might well not be able to obtain, in federal or state court, were it not for the
serendipitous presence of a private actor alongside the government official.
221. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution
Command? 115 (1988) (noting that nonstate actor status of the nursing homes in Blum
and the private school in Rendell-Baker does not preclude possibility that states acted
unconstitutionally by funding these private entities "and then permitting them to
discharge employees and patients without hearings and for opinions voiced"). Michelle
Gilman suggests a different solution: separating government responsibility for
unconstitutional statutes and regulations, as well as for private conduct attributable to
these authorizations, from private entities' responsibility for harms caused by their own
acts. But this approach would not adequately address state action's overinclusiveness, as it
retains private liability for constitutional violations in many contexts, including Grijalva.
See Gilman, supra note 10, at 617-18, 622-23.
222. See, e.g., George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir.
1996); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1150 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that private
school providing government-funded services pursuant to government contracts that fulfill
government's statutory responsibilities was a state actor in suit by students, even though
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn forestalled such a result in suit by teachers). But see Robert S. v.
Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that Rendell-Baker's rejection
of state action applies as well to suits by students).
223. For the rare exception, see Sutton, 192 F.3d at 836-41 (distinguishing between




wholly outside of constitutional controls. The all-or-nothing approach
also leads to underprotection of constitutional rights by ramping up the
import of finding state action. Courts are more relu, ant to make such a
finding when doing so serves to make private actors fully and directly
liable for constitutional violations.
3. The Perverse Incentives of Current State Action Doctrine. - That cur-
rent doctrine ignores the way government power is exercised in the mod-
ern administrative state and leads to the unnecessary "constitutionaliza-
tion" of private actors is perhaps indictment enough. Yet an additional
basis for concern exists. The combination of these two features means
that current doctrine creates perverse incentives that encourage govern-
ments to privatize and to do so in a fashion that allows private entities to
exercise government-enhanced power with very little accountability.
At present, state action analysis gives the government the following
choices: It can directly implement a program, providing both services
and regulatory oversight itself, in which case constitutional constraints
are fully applicable. It can also hand over implementation to private enti-
ties but remain closely involved in supervising service provision and in
program management. As Grijalva demonstrates, the latter choice will
mean not only that the government's own actions and oversight decisions
are subject to constitutional constraints, but also that its private partners
may be drawn into the Constitution's orbit. Alternatively, the govern-
ment can cede direct implementation to private entities and eschew close
supervision. Pursuing this route makes it less likely that the government
will be held responsible for failing to ensure that its private partners ad-
here to constitutional constraints or that these partners will be held sub-
ject to such constraints if sued independently. Moreover, avoiding consti-
tutional liability under this third option does not require the government
to surrender all control over programs. Instead, the privatization cases
suggest that the government need only forego involvement in specific
day-to-day decisions as well as formal institutional control over the private
entities to whom implementation responsibilities are given. The govern-
ment can still "safely" employ general oversight measures and indepen-
dent accountability mechanisms to ensure that private providers and reg-
ulators deliver promised services and serve the public interest.
Current doctrine clearly creates an incentive for government to take
this third option, to privatize and police private providers and regulators
from afar. The actual operational power of this incentive will, of course,
vary greatly across different program areas. Where government programs
are popular and perceived abuses readily trigger public outcry, the incen-
tive effects of current state action doctrine likely will be minimal. The
government can exercise more certain control by keeping programs in-
house or-as in Grijalva-creating a detailed regulatory structure to
guide implementation decisions by private parties. It may also view the
potential inapplicability of constitutional restraints as a detriment, for ex-
ample out of a fear that this would make program participants vulnerable
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and private contractors less accountable. But at times, freedom from con-
stitutional scrutiny may well prove a powerful consideration. Much of the
impetus of privatization comes from a desire to minimize costs and to
enhance efficiency and flexibility-goals that are threatened if the gov-
ernment's private partners are found to be state actors. Such a finding
exposes governments to passed-on liability for private constitutional viola-
tions, to the need to devote resources and personnel to supervision, and
to significant limitations on private entities' procedural and operational
autonomy; it may also deter private entities from contracting with the
government, thereby undermining competition in privatized pro-
grams.2 24 The 1996 federal welfare legislation, which explicitly provided
that welfare benefits are not an entitlement in an effort to avoid trigger-
ing due process protections, is evidence that governments occasionally try
to inoculate their programs against constitutional restraints. 225 The wel-
fare law is also instructive because it suggests that the government may be
particularly inclined to delegate without oversight when programs are un-
popular and participants lack the ability to defend their interests politi-
cally. 226 Further evidence to this effect is the fact that managed care is
often mandatory for low-income individuals receiving benefits through
Medicaid, a means-tested program, but remains optional under Medi-
care, a more universal, contributions-based program whose participants
wield substantial political clout.
22 7
224. See Sclar, supra note 135, at 11-13 (noting costs attached to government
supervision of private contractors and emphasizing importance of competition to
successful privatization); Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 587-88 (noting that
expanding procedural protections to private entities will impose bureaucratic burdens);
Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 135, at 1451 ("[lit is fundamental to acknowledge that
the imposition of legal accountability or other constraints on the private sector may entail
costs in terms of reduced competition, innovation, and flexibility .. "; see also supra note
212 (discussing arguments regarding effect of Grijalva's finding Medicare MCOs to be state
actors). As the First Circuit put the point in Logiodice, "There are costs (rigidities, law
suits), and not just benefits in inflicting constitutional standards wholesale upon privately
governed institutions." Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003).
225. PRWORA, 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000); see RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1973, 1990-91 (1996) [hereinafter
Pierce, Due Process]. But see Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform":
Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 591, 618-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Farina, On Misusing Revolution] (stating that 1996 Act prevents due process
challenges to substantive state policies that restrict benefits, but does not remove welfare
receipt from all procedural due process protections).
226. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 552, 582-91, 594-611
(1999) (arguing that middle class suburban interests are likely to dominate over those of
urban poor when control of welfare policy is devolved to states).
227. See, e.g., Fossett, Managed Care, supra note 23, at 111-13, 125-29 (noting
individuals most likely to be required to enroll in MCOs under Medicaid are low-income
individuals who lack political influence); Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States:
Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective 250-74 (1995) (arguing that programs not
targeted to the poor have greater political power). Federal law also grants Medicaid
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Moreover, the incentive effects of current state action doctrine may
be amplified by the fact that privatization can take the operation of gov-
ernment programs outside of most established mechanisms for ensuring
judicial scrutiny of government action. Basic statutes, such as administra-
tive procedure acts and freedom of information laws, are limited to
"agency action" or "agency records," terms usually interpreted not to
cover private organizations implementing government programs. 228 In-
stead, the main administrative regime applicable to privatization contexts
is public contracting rules, which are focused on preventing fraud rather
than providing a means for challenging administrative action. 229 Fur-
ther, the courts are increasingly unlikely to find implied private rights of
action in federal statutes, 2 "1 and recent efforts to block-grant federal so-
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care fewer procedural protections than are granted to
Medicare beneficiaries similarly enrolled. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(f)-(g), with id.
§§ 1396a(a) (3), 1396u-2(b). For example, under current regulations, Medicare MCOs are
ordinarily accorded fourteen days to process appeals and beneficiaries have a right to
request fast-track independent review, whereas Medicaid MCOs ordinarily are allowed up
to forty-five days to process appeals; moreover, Medicare MCOs generally must continue
coverage during fast-track review of a decision to terminate services. Compare Medicare
Program, Improvements, supra note 213, at 16,653-55 with Medicaid Program; Medicaid
Managed Care: New Provisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,989, 40,991-92 (June 14, 2002) (to be
codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.). These differences reflect not just the relative
political impotency of low-income Medicaid beneficiaries, but in addition the fact that
Medicare is administered solely by the federal government, whereas Medicaid is a joint
federal-state program. Thus in the Medicaid context the federal government is also
concerned with preserving state flexibility.
228. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 184-86 (1980) (holding that "agency
record" refers only to records within government's custody and control, and does not
cover records generated by private grantee that were never reviewed by the government);
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 586-87. One exception is New York's Freedom of
Information Law, which the New York Court of Appeals has held extends to records in a
private entity's possession, provided the records are kept or held for a government agency.
Encore Coll. Bookstores, Inc. v. Auxiliary Serv. Corp., 663 N.E.2d 302, 306 (N.Y. 1995).
229. See Bezdek, supra note 10, at 1569-72.
230. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (refusing to find
private right of action to enforce agency regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). On a number of occasions, courts have allowed
participants in government programs to enforce government contracts with private entities
on third-party beneficiary grounds, even when an implied right of action under the
governing statute is lacking. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 1358, 1406-12 (1992); AnthonyJon Waters, The Property in the Promise,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1176-92 (1985). Such third-party beneficiary claims are hard to
square with current administrative law doctrines-not just the current refusal to imply
private rights of action, but in addition the reluctance to interfere with administrative
enforcement discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (holding
that agency enforcement decisions are presumptively unreviewable); see also Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1381-82 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(arguing that Chaney forecloses suit by union to enforce labor provisions in contract
between government and private contractor). This disconnect between the rules that
apply to government-as-regulator and government-as-contractor has arisen in other
contexts, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1996) (holding that federal
government was liable for damages incurred by savings and loans institutions resulting
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cial welfare programs remove another major source of constraint on pro-
gram operation. 23' In short, by avoiding application of constitutional re-
quirements, governments may be able to remove one of the few
remaining bases for judicial review of implementation decisions.2 32
from new regulatory scheme), and perhaps the courts will view the government's exposure
to such private law suits as a legitimate effect of the government's decision to privatize its
programs. See Gilman, supra note 10, at 635-39 (arguing that third-party beneficiary suits
hold promise as means of enforcing accountability in privatized welfare programs). But a
more likely result would seem to be a retraction in the Court's willingness to allow such
third-party claims, at least outside commercial contexts, given the separation of powers and
federalism concerns that animate recent decisions refusing to imply private rights of
action. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87, 291 (emphasizing that power to create private
remedy lies with Congress, not federal courts or administrative agencies); see also Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (emphasizing need for clear statement of individual
entitlements in spending legislation as basis for finding such rights enforceable under
§ 1983). In any event, courts often impose restrictive conditions that substantially limit the
availability of third-party beneficiary claims in practice, such as requiring proof that the
government intended to allow for third-party enforcement. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §§ 302, 313 (1981) (requiring either express provision for third-party
enforcement or evidence of intent to allow for third-party enforcement); Lori A. Alvino,
Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by
Enforcing Promises, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 893, 916-17 (2003) (discussing use of sections 302
and 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in limiting third-party beneficiary
rights); see also Gilman, supra note 10, at 637-38 (noting difficulties that Section 8
participants have faced in recovering on third-party beneficiary claims).
231. See Pear, Medicaid Proposal, supra note 23 (describing Medicaid block-grant
proposals); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and
Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 297, 301-06
(1996) (noting effects of block grants on beneficiaries' ability to obtain federal court
review of state administrative action). The Court's increased reluctance to allow
individuals to enforce spending program requirements through § 1983 further weakens
federal oversight of state administrative choices. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280-82 (noting
that since 1981 "only twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable
rights").
232. However, the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity
jurisprudence may create a counterincentive to keep programs in-house. Decisions such as
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and Board of Trnstees of University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), indicate that the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign
immunity may combine to make it difficult to collect damages from states when they
violate federal law. On the other hand, in Richardson v. McKnight the Court held that
private prison guards are not eligible for qualified immunity under § 1983. 521 U.S. 399,
412-14 (1997). The Eleventh Amendment decisions may weigh against privatization
because the Eleventh Amendment only applies to state government and to entities deemed
arms-of-the-state. See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & The
Caribbean Cardiovascular Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 61-68 (1st Cir. 2003) (setting out governing
analysis for determining if an entity is an arm-of-the-state). The incentive effects of
Richardson are harder to predict, because any liability under § 1983 rests on a court finding
that the defendant acted "under color of state law," which in regard to private actors is the
same as finding state action. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982). Hence, while Richardson might lead
governments to forego privatization, it could alternatively reinforce the incentive to
privatize without close supervision, since a finding of state action may mean not only that
the government's private partners are subject to suit for constitutional violations, but
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By creating such an incentive to privatize without close supervision-
and a corresponding disincentive for governments to adopt cooperative
models of privatization, where programs are jointly implemented by pri-
vate and public entities-current state action doctrine raises seemingly
indefensible obstacles to effective and accountable use of privatization.
Several scholars studying privatization emphasize the importance of close
government involvement and cooperation with private entities. Such in-
volvement allows the government to benefit from private expertise and
innovation, while preserving public control of government programs and
guarding against self-interested private decisionmaking. 233 Close over-
sight is particularly important when market failure or abuse of power is
most likely: where providers hold a monopoly on provision of particular
services; the services at issue are complex and difficult to specify ab initio;
competitive pressures are minimized by difficulties in exit or lack of infor-
mation; and recipients are relatively powerless. 23 4 Even more relevant to
the discussion here, close government involvement is the best means for
ensuring constitutional accountability. Agency officials are likely to be
more familiar with constitutional requirements than are private entities,
and they also may be more concerned with acting in accordance with
those requirements. 2 - 5 And perhaps most importantly, the presence of
further that such suits could result in costly verdicts whose burdens the government
ultimately may bear. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 865-68 (2000) (discussing monitoring
of treatment providers by drug courts); Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 608,
623-25, 634-36 (noting value of close government supervision through contract managers
and detailed contractual provisions as protections in privatization contexts); see also Sclar,
supra note 135, at 121-29 (emphasizing importance of government adopting collaborative
approach where goals of privatization are carefully specified); Kettl, supra note 135, at 39,
179-211 (stressing need for close government monitoring of its private partners but also
noting that too much interdependence undermines government's ability to control its
private partners). But see Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 135, at 1435-42 (arguing
that agent motivation problems and rent-seeking undermine public provision and
oversight).
234. See Kettl, supra note 135, at 39-40 ("Careful public management ... requires
zealous public oversight, particularly of the public-private relationships that are most likely
to be troublesome-the relationships with the greatest market imperfections."); Minow,
Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1248-51 (describing obstacles to
competition and informed parental choice in school context); Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms, supra note 10, at 1343-48 (arguing for imposition of public law norms on
private providers when services involved are highly discretionary, of fundamental
importance, and received by vulnerable populations); see also Trebilcock & lacobucci,
supra note 135, at 1443-51 (acknowledging that limited government intervention may be
appropriate in such contexts provided it ensures adequate room for private profit motives
to operate).
235. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
government officials do not qualify for immunity when their discretionary actions violate
"clearly established" rights); Feeley & Rubin, supra note 144, at 40-41 (noting that prison
systems and individual prisons hire attorneys to ensure compliance with detailed
constitutional requirements regarding prison conditions); Minow, Partners, supra note 2,
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agency officials working in partnership with private providers or regula-
tors minimizes the difficulty in enforcing constitutional obligations, since
then no need exists to invoke the state action doctrine against private
entities; instead, constitutional claims can be brought against the govern-
ment officials involved.
Thus, current state action doctrine may be fundamentally counter-
productive, to the extent that it is intended to preserve constitutional ac-
countability for private exercises of government power, as the incentives
the doctrine creates may have precisely the opposite effect. Hints of this
counterproductive aspect can be garnered from Grivalja. The federal
government carefully detailed the services MCOs must provide, and it
mandated internal and external appeals procedures precisely to protect
against the danger that the financial interests of MCOs might lead to im-
proper coverage denials. This detailed regulatory structure was then
used as a basis for holding the government responsible for the MCOs'
actions.2 36 While the government responded to the Gijalva decision by
expanding procedural protections for Medicare MCO participants rather
than by decreasing its involvement, 2 37 in other contexts the government
might instead repeal its regulations entirely-at a minimum, leaving ben-
eficiaries without their most effective remedial options, and perhaps set-
ting the stage for a retraction of constitutional protections as well.
C. The Road Not Taken: Private Delegation Doctrine
Private delegation doctrine takes over where state action leaves off.
Rather than asking whether ostensibly private actors should be consid-
ered public for constitutional purposes, it accepts their private status and
asks instead whether the Constitution prohibits governments from dele-
gating certain powers to private actors. These prohibitions vary some-
what according to the level of government involved. When it is state gov-
ernment, the constitutional textual basis is the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, 238 and the underlying concern is that public power
may be abused to achieve particular private aims instead of the public
interest. This same due process concern exists in the federal context, but
at 37-41 (describing how concerns of religious providers may conflict with
antidiscrimination norms).
236. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999). The Supreme Court's decision to remand Grivalja after its Sullivan decision may
suggest that mechanisms allowing appeal to government agencies at least will not trigger
state action. But the broader principle-that governments risk exposing themselves to
constitutional liability for the acts of their private delegates by trying to constrain those
delegates' discretion through close regulation-remains, and stands as a potentially major
impediment to guarding against private abuse through government oversight.
237. See Medicare Program, Improvements, supra note 213, at 16,652-54 (noting
procedures government provisionally agreed to require of MCOs as part of Grijalva
settlement).
238. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
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here separation of powers constitutes an additional potential barrier to
delegation of power to private actors.
The story of constitutional law's treatment of privatization is not
complete without discussion of private delegation doctrine, although the
most salient characteristic of current private delegation doctrine is its
dormant status. A variety of private delegations came before the Su-
preme Court in the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the
beginning of the twentieth.2 3"9 The New Deal gave sharp focus to the
private delegation doctrine, as reliance on private regulation and corpo-
ratism represented cornerstones of President Roosevelt's early efforts to
revive the national economy.2 4°1 At first, the Supreme Court responded
with hostility to the incorporation of private actors into public regulation.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court invalidated legislation making wage
and hour agreements entered into by a majority of miners and large coal
producers in a particular region binding on all miners and producers in
that area.2 4 1 According to the Court, "in the very nature of things, one
person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of
another," and allowing a majority of private participants in an industry to
do so therefore constituted "clearly arbitrary" interference with the mi-
nority's personal liberty and property in violation of due process. 242 But
239. Most of these were upheld, such as: an ordinance prohibiting billboards except
upon permission of a majority of neighboring property owners, see Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917); a statute authorizing a private railway association
to establish standard drawbar heights, see St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway
Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908); and a statute making rules developed by miners
binding on all mining claims, see Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 125-27
(1905), and Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1885). In two cases, both involving
zoning ordinances that allowed property owners to impose restrictions on neighboring
property, the delegations were struck down as violating due process. Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928); Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1912). In none of these cases did the Court articulate a
standard by which the constitutionality of private delegations would be judged. Early on
the Court also upheld using government-chartered corporations to perform critical policy
roles, such as stabilizing the U.S. money supply. See Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 860-70 (1824).
240. The prime example was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which
allowed trade and industry groups to develop codes of fair competition that, upon
approval by the President, would become binding on all engaged in that trade or industry.
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-23 & 525 n.4
(1935). For discussions of NIRA's enactment and the problematic tenure of the
administrative apparatus it created, see Donald R. Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of
Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration 81-124 (1988); 2 Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal 87-176 (1958).
241. 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
242. Id. In A.L.A. Schechter, the Court's hostility to private delegations took a
separation of powers form. 295 U.S. at 537 ("Such a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives ... of
Congress."); id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (emphasizing that under the statute
,anything that Congress may do within the limits of the commerce clause for the
betterment of business may be done by the President upon the recommendation of a trade
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the Court soon effectively reversed course. In Currin v. Wallace, it sus-
tained a regulatory scheme under which the Secretary of Agriculture was
authorized to impose uniform tobacco standards binding on all tobacco
sales in an area if two-thirds of the growers voted in favor of such regula-
tion.24"3 Similarly, in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, the Court up-
held a later incarnation of the Bituminous Coal Act which allowed local
coal producers sitting on local coal boards to set rules governing the sale
of coal, with these rules being subject to approval, disapproval, or modifi-
cation by the government's Bituminous Coal Commission.
244
In neither Currin nor Sunshine did the Court overrule Carter. In-
stead, it held that, unlike Carter, these cases did not involve delegation of
legislative power to private actors: in Currin, because public officials de-
termined the substantive content of the regulations and private individu-
als were limited to deciding only whether these regulations would go into
effect; and in Sunshine, because the statute required public officials to
review and place an official imprimatur upon the privately devised regula-
tions.24 5 The Court's distinguishing of Carter has empirical support;
rather than wholesale delegation of regulatory power to unsupervised pri-
vate actors, later New Deal measures embodied private involvement in
public regulatory structures.2 4 6 In subsequent decisions, the Court has
continued to emphasize the presence of government review of private
decisionmaking in upholding private delegations. 24 7 Moreover, several
lower courts have suggested that private delegations may violate due pro-
cess, at least absent government supervision, 248 and the Court itself has
association by calling it a code. This is delegation running riot.") The constitutionality of
private delegations was also raised but not addressed in Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
243. 306 U.S. 1, 19 (1939).
244. 310 U.S. 381, 393-401 (1940).
245. Currin, 306 U.S. at 15 ("[T]he required referendum does not involve any
delegation of legislative authority. Congress has merely placed a restriction upon its own
regulation by withholding its operation as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of the
growers voting favor it.'"). See Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 399 (holding private delegation valid
because "members of the code function subordinately to the Commission").
246. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 302 (1998); Alan
Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War 31-64 (1995)
(describing disagreements over regulatory strategies within Roosevelt administration and
tracing decline of corporatist or associationalist strategies after 1938 and World War 1I).
247. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 n.4
(2000) (holding civil penalty provision under which private individuals could instigate suit
for violations of Clean Water Act does not violate Article II or separation of powers because
of federal government's control over such private suits); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1985) (relying in part on provisions for judicial review,
including review of constitutional claims, in upholding statute delegating authority to
determine compensation of private arbitrators); see also Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d
1008, 1012-14 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasizing SEC oversight of national security exchanges'
enforcement of securities laws).
248. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1458-59 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding New York's prevailing wage law would constitute an unconstitutional
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occasionally echoed Carter's concern about the potential for abuse associ-
ated with private delegations.2
49
Yet while Carter's constitutional prohibition on private delegations
thus remains alive in theory, it is all but dead in practice. Almost all pri-
vate delegations are upheld. Courts are satisfied by formal provision for
government ratification, however perfunctory.250 The private delegations
private delegation if the state failed to investigate whether the collective bargaining
agreements from which wage rates were derived were collusive); Geo-Tech Reclamation
Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 664-66 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting possibility that
statute authorizing denial of landfill permit due to community opposition represents a
prohibited private delegation, but holding statute unconstitutional because of the absence
of standards to measure such opposition); see also City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341,
357-58 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that FCC rule allowing open video system providers to
discriminate among cable operators "is a delegation of regulatory authority to impose a
cost on another regulatory entity and, hence, violates general principles of administrative
law").
249. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 802-09
(1987) (concluding that prosecutor's duty to remain disinterested, combined with limited
scope of judicial oversight, meant private attorney who represented beneficiary of court
order could not prosecute violation of that order); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93
(1972) (holding that state law allowing creditor to obtain a writ of replevin based solely on
ex parte allegations "abdicate[d] effective state control over state power"); see also Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari) (arguing that California's system of false advertising regulation is likely
unconstitutional because it "delegat[es] . . . state authority to private individuals" in a
manner that "threatens to impose a serious burden on speech"); Bd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698-99 (1994) (Souter, J., plurality opinion)
(striking down legislation creating school district as unconstitutional delegation of political
power to a group on the basis of religion); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,
122-27 (1982) (avoiding question of whether power to veto liquor license applications can
be delegated to nongovernmental entities because delegation of such power to religious
entities violates Establishment Clause). But see Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590 ("Removing the
task of valuation from agency personnel to civilian arbitrators, selected by agreement of
the parties or appointed on a case-by-case basis by an independent federal agency, surely
does not diminish the likelihood of impartial decisionmaking, free from political
influence.").
250. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592 (sustaining requirement of private arbitration
of compensation claims notwithstanding that government limited to reviewing for fraud,
misconduct, misrepresentation, and constitutional error); Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 399-400
(emphasizing Secretary's power to review privately derived regulations but not inquiring
into whether meaningful review occurred); Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 88-89 (3d Cir.
1984) (emphasizing government's power to deem hospitals eligible to participate in
Medicare even if denied accreditation by private association but not inquiring into whether
government had ever done so); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.
1952) (noting simply that governing statute provides for government review of rules and
determinations of private associations in upholding delegation to the association of power
to enforce securities laws). For rare instances in which a court required the government to
exercise meaningful oversight of its private delegates, see Todd, 557 F.2d at 1014-15
(holding that government must independently review private securities associations'
determinations and ensure compliance with governing rules); Gen. Elec., 936 F.2d at
1458-59 (holding that government's acceptance without review of wages set by private




that have been sustained often involve substantial direct control over
third parties;251 even seemingly limited delegations that simply grant pri-
vate entities the power to trigger government action, such as the ability to
force an administrative hearing or commence a civil penalty action, can
be quite significant. 252 Interestingly, many decisions examining private
delegations at the federal level use essentially the same framework as is
applied to "public" delegations-that is, legislative grants of power to the
executive branch-thereby suggesting that the Court sees such private
delegations as presenting nothing beyond ordinary separation of powers
issues.
253
While the Court has been faulted for paying insufficient attention to
the separation of powers and due process concerns presented by private
delegations, 254 the cause of the desuetude of federal private delegation
251. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589-94 (upholding binding private arbitration
mechanism for pesticide manufacturers' compensation claims); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 17-19 (1979) (upholding Texas' law limiting membership on optometry board,
charged with enforcing restrictions on commercial optometry, to independent
optometrists); see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 670, 679 (1976)
(holding city charter provision requiring approval by referendum of land use changes
adopted by city council is not a private delegation).
252. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 209-10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that citizen suit provision authorizing private individuals to sue for civil penalties
on government's behalf "entirely deprived [elected officials] of their discretion to decide
that a given violation should not be the object of suit at all, or that the enforcement
decision should be postponed"); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96,
118-23 (1978) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (arguing that California law allowing franchisees to
force administrative hearing before auto manufacturers could establish or relocate
dealerships essentially gave private franchisees power to delay new dealerships for many
months).
253. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585-91 (analyzing statutory scheme requiring
private arbitration in same manner as a delegation of adjudicatory power to an
administrative agency); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16 (1939) (sustaining delegation to
private tobacco farmers by analogizing to delegation of power to alter tariffs to President).
254. See James 0. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 331 (1976) (arguing that the Court has failed to produce "a satisfactory
theory of the principles governing the delegation of power to private parties"); see also
Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their
Constitutionality, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 165, 192-94 (1989) (reaching same conclusion
on ground that the Supreme Court has failed to adequately consider different degrees of
public accountability of private and public regulators); George W. Liebmann, Delegation
to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 Ind. L.J. 650, 652-54 (1975) (stating
that while "it is tempting to conclude the doctrine [against private delegations] is
slumbering in largely deserved desuetude .. . indications [suggest] that the doctrine
remains with us, masquerading under various aliases"). Not all scholars agree that this
criticism is deserved. See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:
Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-
Federal Actors, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 331, 333-36 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has developed coherent separation of powers doctrine that allows delegations to states or
to private actors). For the claim that private delegations present separation of powers
problems, see Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 209-10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harold
J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 71-80, 99-101, 105-06,
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doctrine is not difficult to discern. The Court's new tolerance for private
delegations in Currin and Sunshine occurred simultaneously with its
greater acceptance of economic and social regulation. 2 55 It also coin-
cided with the Court's sanctioning of broad congressional delegations of
power to the Executive Branch. 256 Invalidating private delegations, par-
ticularly when such delegations are subject to some form of administra-
tive oversight, inevitably entails judicial second-guessing of legislative pol-
icy determinations concerning the appropriateness of different
regulatory structures. 95 7 In the post-Lochner era, this courts became quite
109-12 (1990); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 Const. Comment. 87,
114-16 (1998). For a discussion of the due process issues raised by private delegations,
focusing in particular on state court decisions where private delegation doctrine is more
rigorously enforced, see Lawrence, supra note 95, at 659-62, 672-95.
255. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 396-98 (1937) (holding
that minimum wage laws for women fall within state's police power); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1937) (holding that regulation of employers
engaged in production of goods falls within the federal commerce power). The traditional
view is that in 1937 the Court made "a switch in time to save nine," radically altering its
approach to government regulation in response to President Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan. Recent historical scholarship has questioned this view, arguing that although the
Court was significantly more accepting of regulation in 1937 than at the turn of the
century, its change in approach emerged gradually over the intervening decades and
resulted from doctrinal development rather than external political events. See, e.g., G.
Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 13-32 (2000) (describing current
debate). See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of
a Constitutional Revolution 33-105 (1998).
256. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-400 (1940)
(upholding delegation to the National Bituminous Coal Commission of power to set prices
for coal); Currin, 306 U.S. at 16-18 (upholding Congress' delegation of power to set
tobacco standards to Secretary of Agriculture); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 423-26 (1944) (upholding broad delegation to executive officials of power to fix
prices).
257. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 395-98 (1987) (arguing that whether
the potential for producing public goods associated with a delegation is outweighed by
production of private goods is inherently a value-laden question and that the government
may legitimately seek to produce private goods). The same point can be made regarding
the claim that private delegations at the federal level violate separation of powers
requirements. While the Court has retained a far more active role in the separation of
powers area than in enforcing most constitutional limits on economic regulation, it is
similarly deferential to congressional judgments where it concludes a measure does not
represent an effort by Congress to aggrandize its own powers. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 488-89 (1987); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1522-24 (1991) (describing the Court's variation
in approach to separation of powers questions). Unitary executive theorists, who believe
that the Court's current approach allows unconstitutional intrusions on the executive
power, tend to be the most critical of the Court's acceptance of private delegations. See,
e.g., Fiends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 209-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Yoo, supra note 254, at
105-16; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:




reluctant to do.25 8 Reinforcing this reluctance is acceptance of the con-
tention that almost every instance of economic and social legislation
could be seen as a private delegation of power. In the words of Louis
Jaffe:
[T]he great complexes of property and contract which consti-
tute our modern industrial machine, the monopolistic associa-
tions of capital, labor, and the professions which operate it, ex-
ert under the forms and sanctions of law enormous powers of
determining the substance of economic and social arrangement,
in large part irrespective of the will of particular individuals.
Participation in law-making by private groups under explicit stat-
utory "delegation" does not stand then in absolute contradiction
to the traditional process and conditions of law-making; it is not
incompatible with the conception of law. It exposes and brings
into the open, it institutionalizes a factor in law-making that we
have, eagerly in fact, attempted to obscure.
25 9
Legal Realists accompanied this point with the claim that it was impossi-
ble to draw a neutral or objective line between public and private for
constitutional purposes. 26° The Supreme Court has not gone so far, as
the continued vitality of state action doctrine demonstrates. However, its
private delegation cases signal the Court's acceptance of the difficulty in
singling out a category of private delegations for special constitutional
scrutiny. For instance, in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
26
1
the Court rejected a challenge to a regulatory scheme that allowed an
existing auto dealership to demand a hearing by the state motor vehicle
board before a manufacturer could open a new dealership within the ex-
isting dealer's market area. According to the Court, if this regulatory ar-
rangement were seen as an unconstitutional private delegation, "[a] lmost
any system of private or quasi-private law could be subject to the same
objection."
262
An additional cause of the Court's failure to develop private delega-
tion doctrine is the rise of the state action doctrine as the Court's pre-
ferred method of analyzing whether certain powers go beyond those that
258. This reluctance continues today. Noting that the strong citizen suit provision at
issue in Friends of the Earth represented Congress' belief that private enforcement would
serve the Clean Water Act's goals, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion stated that "[t]his
congressional determination warrants judicial attention and respect." 528 U.S. at 185; see
also United Farm Workers v. Ariz. Agric. Employment Relations Bd., 727 F.2d 1475,
1479-80 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (upholding statute creating agricultural board with
representatives of agricultural employers and agricultural employees as a "reasonable
experiment" by which the legislature could seek to gain benefit of industry participants'
knowledge).
259. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201,
220-21 (1937).
260. See, e.g., American Legal Realism 98-129 (William W. Fischer III et al.
eds., 1993).
261. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
262. Id. at 109.
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the Constitution allows truly private entities to exercise.2 6 3 Rather than
linking the possibility that a private delegation will lead to government
authority evading constitutional constraints to the delegation's constitu-
tionality, this concern is addressed separately by determining whether the
private entities involved should be considered state actors for constitu-
tional purposes. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks is a prime example. 264 The central
issue in Flagg Bros. was presented as whether a warehouser's sale of prop-
erty pursuant to a state statute authorizing such "self-help" for creditors
constituted state action. 265 If so, under the Court's jurisprudence on
creditor remedies, due process would require the government to review
the private warehouser's claims to property before it could be sold.
2 6 6
Another way of understanding this due process claim, however, is to ar-
gue that the power to resolve disputes on a nonconsensual basis, even
subject to later state court review, is one that government cannot delegate
to private actors without preserving some opportunity for prior review.
2 6 7
By holding that the private entity was not a state actor, the Court in es-
sence rejected both arguments, although it considered the latter private
delegation claim only implicitly, in assessing whether nonconsensual reso-
lution of disputes was a public function.
268
Of greatest importance, the Court has never considered how well
state action doctrine functions as a surrogate for direct private delegation
analysis. Indeed, whatever questions may exist about the contours of ex-
isting private delegation analysis, one seemingly indisputable point is that
the Court does not view the constitutionality of a private delegation as
turning on whether the private delegate is subject to constitutional con-
straints. In none of the cases is this question even raised.2 69 This failure
263. See Liebmann, supra note 254, at 653-54.
264. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
265. The majority, holding it did not, rejected the plaintiffs' claims, id. at 163, while
the dissent argued that the warehouser was a state actor because it performed the core
government function of nonconsensual transfer of property, id. at 171-76 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
266. See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1975);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
267. See Tribe, Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at 254 (noting that given
earlier cases holding that due process required the state to reserve greater "control over
the coercive use of force, it would be perverse for the Court... [to] allow ... deprivation
of property to happen purely in the private sphere").
268. See 436 U.S. at 159-60.
269. Interestingly, commentators largely have followed the Court and also ignored
this issue. A significant exception is Liebmann, supra note 254, at 653-54, 656-57 (noting
that several state action decisions could be viewed as nondelegation decisions); see also
Abramson, supra note 254, at 167, 203-08, 212-14 (noting danger that private agencies
may be free from constitutional restraints and discussing whether private regulators qualify
as state actors). The Court's failure to link private delegation and state action questions is
also notable because of substantive parallels in its approach to both. In particular, the
Court's private delegation decisions suggest it is particularly troubled by delegations that
allow private entities to control government institutions or exercise powers that formally
appear uniquely governmental. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
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to consider the essential dichotomy between public and private delegates
is more than passing strange. While some private delegations may appear
simply to be realignments of private parties' rights, thereby making pri-
vate delegates' constitutional exemption unproblematic, many clearly in-
volve grants of government power. Friends of the Earth, for example, in-
volved delegation of the power to decide to seek civil penalties on behalf
of the United States for violations of law.2 7°1 Private delegates' exemption
from constitutional constraints means that they can wield these govern-
ment powers in ways that raise serious abuse of power concerns. Imagine,
for example, an individual who commences a meritless suit for civil penal-
ties against a company out of spite or because its owners are African
American. 2 7' Given this danger, it is remarkable that the Court has never
seen fit to link the constitutionality of private delegations to the constitu-
tional status of the delegate.
I1. THE INADEQUACIES OF PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Existing scholarship offers two responses to the inadequacies in con-
stitutional law's approach to privatization. One consists of proposals to
improve state action doctrine; the other, proposals for regulatory reforms
that avoid the need to rely on constitutional protections to ensure ac-
countability. These proposals have considerable merit. But on close ex-
amination, both fail to confront the fundamental constitutional concerns
at stake. In both cases, moreover, they face substantial practical
problems: The doctrinal reforms fail to offer solutions that are judicially
administrable or that stand any chance of judicial adoption; the regula-
481 U.S. 787, 802 (1988) (prohibiting court from delegating power to prosecute for
contempt of court to private party involved in the litigation); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93, 96
(requiring state to exercise some review before allowing private individuals to invoke
state's power of replevin).
270. Qui tam statutes have the same effect. Although the Court held that federal qui
tam suits do not violate Article III of the Constitution, it expressly left open whether such
suits would raise separation of powers problems under Article II. See Vt. Agency of Natural
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000); see also United States ex
rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 804-07 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding federal
qui tam statute does not violate Article II); Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d
749, 753, 757 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (same).
271. While mechanisms exist to ensure individuals are not subjected to frivolous civil
penalty or qui tam litigation, such as summary disposition or imposition of sanctions, see
United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1091-92 (C.D.
Cal. 1989), these mechanisms do not protect individuals from having to defend against
claims that may have merit but are brought-in the name of the United States-for
unconstitutional reasons. Cf. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vt. Agency of Natural Res.,
162 F.3d 195, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (arguing that even where
government succeeds in intervening and settling a qui tam lawsuit, a defendant still bears
burden of having to defend itself in court up until that point), rev'd, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
Indeed, allowing the government to profit from actions brought out of "personal ill will"
was an avowed purpose of the False Claims Act. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex
rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (]997) (internal quotations omitted).
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tory proposals fail to take account of the role of constitutional principles
in forcing governments to adopt adequate accountability measures.
A. Prior Efforts to Reform State Action Doctrine
Over the years, numerous scholars have bemoaned the inadequacies
of current state action doctrine and proposed alternative approaches.
Two very different lines of criticism are evident in the literature. The first
argues that the concept of a distinction between state action and private
action is fundamentally flawed, and that courts should cast it aside as a
threshold inquiry in constitutional litigation. The second takes a more
moderate tack, seeking to reform the current doctrine from within by
targeting particular aspects of the way the Court determines if private
action should be deemed public for constitutional purposes.
1. Foregoing the Public-Private Divide in Constitutional Law. - The
claim that no principled distinction exists between government power
and private power follows logically from the Legal Realist insistence that
all property and contract rights are created and supported by the state.
As a result, what at first might superficially seem to be purely private ac-
tion-such as an employer's refusal to tolerate employee advocacy of un-
ions or a homeowner's refusal to sell her home to minorities-are in fact
also instances of state action because these private actors are exercising
state-granted rights. 2 72 Moreover, state involvement is always even more
immediately present, in thatjudicial sanction of private exercises of these
rights is plainly state action that can itself be subject to constitutional
challenge. 2 73 Many constitutional law scholars have therefore concluded
that the state action doctrine is theoretically indefensible-a "conceptual
disaster area."274 Worse, by treating determination of the public or pri-
vate character of challenged action as a threshold inquiry separate from
application of substantive constitutional norms, the doctrine operates to
illegitimately shield such instances of state action from constitutional re-
view. The better approach, according to these scholars, would be for
courts to do away with any threshold state action inquiry and instead take
272. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
273. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (holding that state courts'
application of state law in private lawsuit constitutes state action subject to First
Amendment requirements); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (holding state
courts' enforcement of private racially restrictive covenant on property constitutes state
action that violates equal protection); Tribe, Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at
264-65.
274. Black, supra note 147, at 95; see also Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory:
A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296, 1301, 1315-22 (1982);
Tushnet, supra note 146, at 385-86;Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex.
L. Rev. 347, 367 (1963). Contra Snyder, supra note 218, at 1061-62 (contending that
obligation of government officials to act in the public interest marks a significant
difference between public and private action).
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account of the values underlying the state action requirement in deter-
mining the substantive import of constitutional requirements.
2 75
These arguments are compelling in demonstrating the artifice and
theoretical incoherence of the constitutional public-private divide. But
the further step of dispensing with a threshold state action limitation
does not necessarily follow; that step requires consideration of additional
issues, the merits of which are more debatable. One core question con-
cerns the potential impact of casting aside a threshold state action inquiry
in favor of direct judicial balancing of constitutional values. 276 At first
glance, such a move seems well suited to address the constitutional chal-
lenges posed by privatization, with the flexibility inherent in balancing
allowing courts to better target the accountability dangers presented by
different public-private relationships. But, significantly, this requires
courts to balance incommensurable values against one another-for ex-
ample, weighing privacy and autonomy losses against due process gains.
The absence of a common metric makes such balancing particularly un-
constrained, and the result could just as easily be further erosion of indi-
viduals' ability to enforce constitutional rights against private actors, or a
narrowing of the substantive content of such rights, 2 7 7 rather than en-
hanced constitutional protections. Indeed, the retraction of state action
doctrine over the last three decades suggests that erosion and narrowing
are the more likely outcomes.
278
275. See, e.g., Black, supra note 147, at 95-107 (arguing that courts should recognize
that state failure to address racial discrimination constitutes state action and give weight to
individual privacy concerns in determining whether equal protection requirement has
been violated); Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 519-50 (arguing that state action doctrine
rests on outdated assumptions, is incompatible with existing theories of rights, and is
counterproductive to stated purposes); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 481, 492-93 (1962) (arguing for replacing state
action test with an inquiry into state responsibility, with individual privacy rights delimiting
the realm of state responsibility); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State
Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208, 208-09, 213-15, 221
(1957) (analyzing whether state involvement in various instances of private racial
discrimination should be considered a denial of equal protection); William W. Van Alstyne
& Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 5-17 (1962) (arguing that state action
analysis cannot be separated from interests at stake in particular Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment claims).
276. There is also the historical question as to whether the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant it to apply to these unavoidable forms of state involvement in private
action (and if not, the interpretive issue of whether that should matter). See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Commentary: The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
117, 121-25 (1978).
277. See William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking
State Action," 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 558, 562-67 (1985) (arguing that discarding state action
doctrine would lead to a retraction in the scope of individual rights); Seidman, State
Action, supra note 128, at 392-94 (arguing that part of the value of state action doctrine is
that it protects the possibility of individual rights).
278. In this regard, it is worth noting that calls for a dismantling of state action
doctrine were at their strongest in the decade from the late 1950s to late 1960s, when the
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Yet perhaps the most powerful argument for preserving an initial
threshold state action inquiry comes from considering the institutional
effect of the alternative. Doing away with the public-private divide, arti-
fice though it may be, would make every question of government policy a
potential constitutional issue and thus ultimately subject to judicial scru-
tiny and resolution. Judicial intrusiveness in the ordinary workings of the
political order would rise to the level of unbearability.2 79 This danger
provides a cogent descriptive and normative account of why the public-
private divide persists; in a democracy, even a constitutional democracy,
courts are and should be unwilling to assume so large a role. The federal-
ism concern that such policymaking powers would be exercised by fed-
eral courts at the expense of state and local governments only reinforces
the extent to which this approach is at odds with our system of
government.
For my purposes here, however, a far more prosaic and pragmatic
point will suffice. Despite academic attacks on the theoretical coherency
of current state action doctrine, "the Supreme Court persists in invoking
a state action doctrine that it purports to treat as prior to and indepen-
dent of substantive constitutional law. ' 28 1 The public-private divide is
here to stay; to have any chance ofjudicial adoption, an attempt at doctri-
nal reform must work within this fundamental constitutional construct.
Simply insisting on the divide's incoherence purchases theoretical purity
at the price of offering little practical assistance in addressing the very
real threat that increasing privatization poses to the fundamental require-
ments of constitutional accountability.
2. Reforming State Action Doctrine from Within. - Faced with the
Court's refusal to cast aside the state action inquiry, some scholars have
sought to reform current doctrine so that it better reflects the reality of
government privatization. One obvious candidate for such reform is ex-
panding the public function test. Daphne Barak-Erez, for example, advo-
cates finding private entities to be state actors when they are the sole
providers of public services, defining those services in terms of contempo-
Court was taking its most expansive approach to state action. See Black, supra note 147, at
84-91.
279. See Seidman, State Action, supra note 128, at 396-99 (describing simultaneous
expansion of federal government's regulatory powers and transformation of state action
doctrine into a limitation specifically on federal courts); see also Tushnet, supra note 146,
at 404-06 (describing state action doctrine as serving the institutional needs of the courts
by enabling a gradualist approach to constitutional interpretation).
280. Tushnet, supra note 146, at 383. Moreover, state action adherents include not
just those members of the Court who have been most hostile to attributions of state actor
status to private individuals, but also those Justices who were willing to make such
attributions far more frequently. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and
the Rehnquist Court, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587, 644-56 (1991) (describing different
Justices' approaches to state action).
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rary shared understandings of government responsibilities rather than
traditional practice.
28'
The Court seems uninterested in such an approach. That fact aside,
the difficulty with attempting to update the public function test in this
manner is the absence of such shared understandings regarding what
constitutes a government responsibility.28 2 Barak-Erez argues that provid-
ing health care, education, and welfare benefits are all now accepted as
part of the government's role. 283 Recent proposals for retraction in
Medicaid coverage, 284 however, suggest that many take a different view of
the government's role in providing health care. Moreover, what is the
effect of TANF's time limits, under which families are restricted to no
more than five years of federal income assistance? 285 Does this mean that
providing income assistance is now a public function simply for the pe-
riod during which a family is entitled to government-subsidized benefits?
To give yet another example, the federal government and many state gov-
ernments always have disclaimed responsibility to support impoverished
"able-bodied" single adults, while offering assistance to poor families. Is
providing income support to poor individuals therefore not a public
function, while providing such support to poor families is? Not surpris-
ingly, the Court has concluded that judicial appraisal of whether a given
activity represents a core government function is "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice," and has renounced such an inquiry in other
constitutional contexts.
28 6
281. See Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at 1190-91.
282. For a similar criticism of Barak-Erez, see Gilman, supra note 10, at 610 n.259; see
also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973) (refusing to find
fundamental right to education under th, Constitution); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
GAO/GGD-92-11, Government Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing
Inherently Governmental Functions? 4-5 (1991) (noting that "the concept of 'government
functions' is difficult to define"); Gilmour & Jensen, supra note 17, at 250, 254 (arguing
that political branches should develop lists of nondelegatable core government functions).
This claim that agreement does not exist over the government's proper
responsibilities is not at odds with the argument, made above in Part I.B, that control over
government resources and benefits is conventionally understood to be government power.
The critical difference is that finding such control to be government power has no
implications for the government's freedom to cease supplying benefits, whereas the option
of cessation is precluded if a particular government undertaking, such as providing
education or health care, is determined to be an inherent government responsibility.
283. Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at 1190.
284. See Pear, Medicaid Proposal, supra note 23 (describing Bush administration
proposal to give states "vast new powers" to reduce coverage for approximately one-third of
Medicaid recipients),
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (2000). Under federal law, states are allowed to
exempt 20% of their welfare caseload from the five-year cap. See id. § 607(a) (7) (C) (ii).
286. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985); see
also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2003) (quoting Garcia in refusing to
interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause as mandating inquiry into whether one state is
interfering with another's "core sovereign responsibilities"); New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 580, 583-84 (1946) (abandoning governmental-proprietary distinction as basis
for determining scope of state immunity from federal taxation); Michael Wells & Walter
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One attempt to give meaning to the public function test without ex-
ceeding appropriate judicial limits involves viewing the public function
test in positivistic terms. On this account, the measure of what constitutes
a public function should be those responsibilities the government itself
has affirmatively undertaken by statute or regulation. 287 Yet this ap-
proach is not as deferential to democratic decisionmaking as might ap-
pear at first blush; it allows governments to make a choice about whether
to undertake responsibility for a field of activity, but not to decide the
form that such government responsibility will take. More specifically,
government subsidization of private actors is ruled out, as the govern-
ment's assumption of responsibility for providing a service would mean
that its private partners were performing a public function and thus sub-
ject to constitutional requirements. While this approach would cure cur-
rent doctrine's underinclusiveness, it would do so at the price of dramati-
cally worsening its overinclusiveness. Indeed, this solution is oddly
subject to the same complaint lodged at the current public function test:
Both are too insensitive to the multiple roles that modern government
plays and the constitutional accountability issues that different public-pri-
vate partnerships present.
A seemingly more moderate proposal would be to hold that private
entities perform a public function when they make decisions affecting
eligibility for government benefits. This seems to be a relatively narrow
amendment to the current test, one that addresses the transfer of core
government responsibilities to private entities without significantly in-
truding on these entities' freedom to exercise professional judgment.
Suggestions of such an approach are found in Grijalva, which although
ultimately having rested on the presence of extensive government in-
volvement, stated that MCO decisions are more accurately described as
"coverage decisions-interpretations of the Medicare statute-rather
than merely medical judgments."2 8 8 Justice Brennan's Blum dissent sug-
Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 1073, 1136 (1980) (arguing that the governmental-proprietary distinction lacks fixed
content and can only be understood in reference to the purposes it serves in different
contexts).
287. Shades of such an account lie in Justice Marshall's dissent in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848-49 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting), although Justice Marshall
used performance of a state responsibility more as evidence of a close nexus to the state
than as suggesting performance of a public function. See also Strickland, supra note 280,
at 665-66 (advocating that the Court "recognize a separate 'delegation' variant of the
government function theory" that would look at whether activities "are performed
pursuant to an express governmental directive or delegation"). While Barak-Erez
emphasizes the importance of contemporary understandings of the government's role, her
limitation of state action to those providing services for the state suggests a similar
positivistic spin. See Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at 1191-92.
288. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999); see also Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[U]nlike in Blum,
the decisions made by [private certified home health care agencies] are not purely medical
judgments made according to professional standards. Instead .... decisions of the CHHAs
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gests caution, however. He argued that doctors treating patients under
Medicaid should not be considered state actors simply because their treat-
ment decisions determine how much and what kinds of benefits Medicaid
participants receive.2 8 9 In other words, almost any decision by a private
entity-whether to provide certain medical treatments, whether to rec-
ommend ajob training program or instead require a beneficiary to work
off her welfare benefits in community service, whether to require a child
to repeat a grade-in fact qualifies as determining eligibility for govern-
ment benefits when private entities are providing services on the govern,
ment's behalf.
A separate approach to reforming current state action doctrine
foregoes the effort to delineate a more contemporary understanding of
public function and instead focuses on techniques that foster more
nuanced assessments of government-private interactions. Ronald Krotos-
zynski argues that the current doctrine's inadequacies stem from the
Court's shift away from a careful sifting of the underlying facts in state
action cases and toward a seriatim application of the different state action
tests. His solution requires that courts conduct an overall assessment to
determine whether sufficient elements of these tests are satisfied, even
though none is met in full, to justify finding state action.2 90 This is very
close to Brentwood Academy, where the Court focused on the cumulative
connections between the Association and the state rather than on
whether the separate established tests for state action were satisfied.2 9'
To its credit, emphasis on cumulative assessment correctly identifies
the indeterminacy inherent in the state action inquiry. But history
teaches that an emphasis on cumulative ties and the need for fact-sensitiv-
ity is unlikely to cure the ills of state action doctrine. In the hands of
courts hostile to state action conclusions and wary of open-ended discre-
tion, simply requiring a cumulative assessment will have little effect on
state action's underinclusive character. Moreover, such an emphasis does
nothing to address the overinclusive character of current state action doc-
trine.292 On the contrary, a cumulative assessment approach worsens the
'effectively' deny or reduce care. In this way, the state has delegated its power to deny
services to the CHHAs...."); Healeyv. Thompson, 186 F. Supp. 2d 105,117-21 (D. Conn.
2001); Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that private
agencies are state actors in determining eligibility for home health services under
Medicare), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th
Cir. 1998).
289. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1014 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290. See Krotoszynski, supra note 151, at 335-47.
291. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-300
(2001) (describing "host of facts that can bear on the fairness" of attributing private
conduct to the state and finding "pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public
officials in [the Association's] composition and workings"); see also id. at 308-12 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that none of the established tests for state action were met).
292. By contrast, curing overinclusiveness is the goal of Barbara Rook Snyder's effort
to redirect state action doctrine to target government responsibility. See Snyder, supra
note 218, at 1063-65, 1076-81 (suggesting analysis that would distinguish between
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threat that current doctrine poses to the government's regulatory prerog-
atives, for it gives the political branches little guidance about how to struc-
ture relationships with private entities to avoid transforming those enti-
ties into state actors. 29 3 Or to put the point differently, the majority and
dissent in Brentwood Academy were both half right, and half wrong, in their
characterizations of the essential elements of a viable state action analysis.
To adequately balance constitutional accountability and government reg-
ulatory flexibility, both sensitivity to facts and a formal, structured inquiry
are required.
B. Targeting Privatization Through Regulatory Reforms
These efforts to rethink constitutional law's approach to privatization
and improve state action doctrine presuppose that constitutional rules
applicable to privatization actually matter. But is this presupposition
true? Lack of information, lack of resources-both financial and per-
sonal, such as confidence in dealing with government bureaucracy-and
dependence upon government agencies mean clients often do not assert
their rights even when programs are implemented by government. 294
Moreover, particularly in the context of government benefit programs,
the substance of individuals' constitutional rights may be so thin that they
offer little defense against abuse of power.2 95 Constitutional rights may
assure baseline protections-for example, against arbitrary termination
of benefits-but are far less useful in obtaining more effective programs.
From this perspective, nonconstitutional regulatory reforms represent
the better route for addressing the potential dangers of privatization than
critiquing or reforming constitutional law.2 9 6
situations where the state merely confers a benefit to a private party and when the state
encourages or compels further action by that party). Other scholars have articulated
similar approaches. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 133, at 342-49 (arguing that the
Constitution should be viewed as applying only to the lawmaking power of the state).
These approaches are subject, however, to the same criticisms as current state action
doctrine, in that they ignore the way that private actors may wield government power
pursuant to government delegations. While the delegation itself may not be
unconstitutional, that does not mean the private delegate should not be held to
constitutional constraints. See supra Part II.B.1.
293. See Brest, supra note 274, at 1325 (describing an earlier insistence on "sifting
facts and weighing circumstances" in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 722 (1961), as "differ[ing] from Justice Stewart's famous 'I know it when I see it'
standard for judging obscenity mainly in the comparative precision of the latter");
Strickland, supra note 280, at 662-63 ("Such an approach provides little more guidance
than saying that the private entity's conduct is state action because it ought to be deemed
state action.").
294. See Handler, Dependent People, supra note 92, at 1019-23.
295. See Farina, On Misusing Revolution, supra note 225, at 600-18 (arguing that
procedural due process protections are fairly minimal).
296. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 606-07, 666 (arguing that focusing
on constitutional concerns raised by privatized governance fails to address the real
accountability concern, which is achieving high quality services).
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Much of the recent academic scholarship on privatization has cen-
tered on identifying regulatory measures that will assure accountability
under systems of privatized governance. Commentators have advocated a
range of measures, such as expanding the scope of open government laws
to better cover privatized government programs, 29 7 imposing procedural
safeguards on privately run programs, 298 and requiring community par-
ticipation in oversight of private contractors. 299 Alternatively, some argue
for better use of private law remedies, such as expanding the availability
of third-party beneficiary suits against government contractors,3 00 or ex-
tending the categories of private actors who are subject to public law val-
ues under the common law. 30 1 Others have emphasized that public fund-
ing should come with substantial strings attached, and they have
advocated using government contracts with private entities as a means of
expanding those entities that are subject to public law values.3 02 In par-
ticular, Jody Freeman, who offers a detailed analysis of several instances
of privatization, argues that the availability of multiple methods for con-
trolling private actors means that beneficiaries may have greater ability to
297. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 10, at 1608 (arguing that basic documents relating
to contracted-out welfare services, including the underlying contracts and performance
evaluations, should be easily accessible); Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of
Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52
Fed. Comm. LJ. 21, 55-62 (1999) (advocating for expansion of FOIA's definitions of
"agencies" and "agency records" to include "private entities controlling information of
interest of the public").
298. See, e.g., Aman, supra note 10, at 1500-05 (proposing extension of
Administrative Procedure Act to cover "private entities exercising substantial power with
wide ranging social effects"); Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claiming, Contracting:
Enforcement in the Managed Care Era, 8 Annals Health L. 133, 138-41, 144-45 (1999)
(noting potential benefits from enhanced grievance procedures in the managed care
context and describing procedures required under Wisconsin's Managed Care Consumer
Protection Act).
299. See, e.g., Bedzek, supra note 10, at 1609 (arguing for "expand[ing] the
stakeholder table to include the citizens experienced with TANF and its work-related
programs" and in other ways involving affected communities in the procurement process);
Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strategies for Action, 60
Brook. L. Rev. 275, 282-85 (1994) (advocating greater community participation in the
bidding process, enhanced state-level oversight of local contracting, and better public
access to information).
300. See, e.g., Freeman, Contracting State, supra note 10, at 201-07; Gilman, supra
note 10, at 635-39.
301. See, e.g., Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined, in
Province of Administrative Law, supra note 6, at 1, 3-4, 6-17 (describing "public law
values" of "openness, fairness, participation, impartiality, accountability, honesty and
rationality" and their potential application to private actors by incorporation in common
law rules).
302. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 113-19, 142-50; Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms, supra note 10, at 1315-17.
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enforce accountability under privatization than when services are publicly
provided.
3 03
That reforms of these types are often a more effective defense
against abuse of power than constitutional law, whether such power is
exercised by the government directly or by private surrogates, is undenia-
ble. Measures such as HHS's regulations providing appeal and hearing
rights for Medicare beneficiaries in MCOs make a private party's state
actor status largely immaterial. More importantly, these measures can be
targeted to the accountability dangers presented in particular contexts
and provide protections that go beyond constitutional remedies. 3° 4 The
prevalence of private participation in governance also makes clear the
value of rethinking the public-private divide from the private law side, so
that private law doctrines are more sensitive to the "public" character and
responsibilities of many private entities.
Thus, such nonconstitutional reforms are extremely important.
However, their importance does not negate the need to address the dis-
connect between current constitutional doctrine and administrative real-
ity of government. Statutory, administrative, and private law solutions to
the dangers of privatization turn to a large extent on the government's
willingness to grant individuals rights against private service providers
and regulators. The same factors that may lead a government to privatize
without close government oversight militate against it granting such
rights: Doing so increases the costs of privatized programs, undermines
the flexibility and efficiency that governments hope to gain through
privatization, and deters private participation.3 0 5 To be sure, a govern-
ment might choose to provide program participants with enforceable
rights as a means of guarding against abuse and guaranteeing that private
contractors live up to their promises. But alternatively, a government
might opt to ensure accountability by undertaking periodic monitoring
itself, rather than by creating enforcement mechanisms it does not con-
trol.3° 6 Moreover, even when a government does provide enforceable
rights, it may decide that certain rights do not merit protection against
private violation. Widespread agreement exists on the importance of pro-
303. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 664-66 (advocating a focus ol
aggregate accountability and discussing how different oversight mechanisms and
constraints could be applied to a variety of programmatic contexts).
304. For example, application of constitutional constraints to nursing homes would
ensure that residents have pre-eviction and pre-termination hearing rights, but do little
directly to guard against substandard care. See id. at 599-610.
305. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
306. See Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 10, at 1329-35
(discussing incentives governments may have to adopt protective measures but
acknowledging that governments may be unwilling to do so); Gilman, supra note 10, at
635-37 (arguing that government has an incentive to provide for beneficiary enforcement
in contracts but acknowledging that whether beneficiaries are given enforcement rights
will depend in part on their bargaining power).
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tections against discrimination, 30 7 but an examination of recent state ac-
tion cases suggests that due process, First Amendment, and Fourth
Amendment rights are less likely to receive voluntary protection.30 8
What results is a situation in which the government has the power to
police its private partners, but those participating in government pro-
grams lack power either to hold private providers accountable for their
actions or to hold government accountable for insufficient oversight. In
one sense, this makes privatized programs no different from many gov-
ernment-administered programs in which private rights of action to en-
force statutory requirements are lacking. But the crucial difference is
that program-specific private rights of action are not needed to ensure
constitutional accountability where government itself is acting. In priva-
tized contexts, however, mechanisms by which individuals can assert
rights against private actors are essential to overcome the inadequacies of
current state action doctrine and to preserve constitutional
accountability.
Constitutional law can also affect the government's willingness to
adopt protective statutory or regulatory reforms, as well as the type of
reforms adopted. As discussed above, current constitutional doctrine
may in fact discourage adoption of certain protections, such as close gov-
ernment oversight, by holding that such measures trigger government lia-
bility that it otherwise could avoid. On the other hand, the expected ap-
plicability of constitutional norms may make the government more
willing to enact protective measures in the first place. For example, if
welfare clients can force private organizations to hold hearings on
mandatoryjob placements, then the government has an incentive to spec-
ify the nature and timing of hearings to challenge such placements be-
cause its judgment on this question is likely to trigger judicial
deference.
309
307. As a result, core federal antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII have been
described as "quasi-constitutional." See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216, 1237-42 (2001); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 Yale L.J. 441, 492-93, 502, 516-18 (2000) (arguing that "Americans now believe that a
core function of the federal government is to prohibit discrimination in the public and
private sectors").
308. 1 conducted an informal examination of all published federal appellate decisions
appearing in Westlaw from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003 and identified thirty-five
cases presenting constitutional claims that involved actions by private entities. These
thirty-five cases involved twelve substantive due process claims, seven First Amendment
claims, six procedural due process claims, four Fourth Amendment claims, and only one
equal protection claim. See also Post & Siegel, supra note 307, at 516-18 (stating that
federal antidiscrimination statutes reduced pressure on the Court to liberalize its state
action doctrine).
309. See Pierce, Due Process, supra note 225, at 1986-98; see also supra note 211
(describing courts' willingness to defer to government procedural choices by holding that
existing procedures satisfy due process).
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Beyond these instrumentalist rationales for examining and rethink-
ing constitutional doctrine, however, lies the role of the Constitution.
The concerns raised by privatization are not merely free-floating norma-
tive or policy concerns; they emanate from the basic constitutional ac-
countability premise that government is subject to certain constraints in
the way it operates. If, due to inadequacies in current analysis, the blur-
ring of public and private roles in government is increasingly leading to
unconstrained private exercises of government power, then it is essential
to rethink constitutional doctrine. Simply to accept the disconnect be-
tween existing constitutional law and administrative reality risks threaten-
ing the principle of constitutional supremacy and the legitimacy of our
constitutional system.
IV. A NEW PRIVATE DELEGATION ANALYSIS FOR AN ERA
OF PRIVATIZED GOVERNMENT
While few would dispute the need to ensure that constitutional doc-
trine reflects the reality of privatized government, the question remains
whether it is possible to achieve that goal without simultaneously destroy-
ing regulatory flexibility. The solution to this quandary, I suggest, is to
return to the road not taken and to rethink state action in private delega-
tion terms. Under a private delegation approach, the key issue becomes
not whether private entities wield government power, but rather whether
grants of government power to private entities are adequately structured
to preserve constitutional accountability. Provided that alternative mech-
anisms exist to ensure that government power ultimately stays within con-
stitutional limits, exercises of government power by constitutionally im-
mune private actors do not present constitutional concerns. This
approach secures constitutional accountability by ensuring that individu-
als are able to enforce constitutional limits on government power; but it
also grants government more flexibility by allowing choices of how best to
preserve constitutional limits to be made by the political branches in the
first instance.
This Part is devoted to justifying and constructing such a private del-
egation analysis. I argue that the central criterion for singling out partic-
ular private delegations for enhanced scrutiny is whether they authorize
private entities to act on the government's behalf, a factor usually estab-
lished by assessing whether the requirements of agency are met. Even
where agency relationships exist, however, mechanisms such as close gov-
ernment supervision or the presence of a meaningful choice among prov-
iders are often sufficient to preserve constitutional limits on government
power. After discussing how unconstitutional delegations should be rem-
edied, I then assess the extent to which this proposed private delegation
approach is compatible with existing constitutional law and the likeli-
hood of judicial adoption. Finally, in order to give a clearer illustration
of what it would mean in practice, I apply the proposed analysis to the
four recent examples of privatization described in Part I.
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A. The Case for Rethinking State Action in Private Delegation Terms
Privatization appears to force a stark, binary choice between constitu-
tional accountability, on the one hand, and political control and regula-
tory flexibility, on the other. Expanding state action analysis leads tojudi-
cial imposition of constitutionally-derived codes of behavior;
constitutional constraints on government power are thereby preserved,
but at the cost of significant intrusions on the political branches' regula-
tory role and on the opportunity for regulatory experimentation. But is
this conflict in fact so unavoidable?
Obviously, constitutional requirements operate to restrict the gov-
ernment's freedom of action, yet the relationship between these two need
not be a zero-sum game, as it is under current state action doctrine. To
avoid this result, however, it is necessary to cast aside state action's under-
standing of constitutional accountability as requiring that constitutional
constraints apply directly to every exercise of government power. This
understanding is excessively narrow. As propounded in Part I, constitu-
tional accountability demands only that individuals be able to ensure that
exercises of government power stay within constitutional limits. Direct
application of constitutional constraints to private actors wielding govern-
ment power is certainly the most common means of preserving such lim-
its. But no reason exists to conclude that this means is constitutionally
mandated; other nonconstitutional mechanisms that impose adequate
constraints on exercises of government power can also suffice.
The Court's private delegation decisions emphasizing the role of
government oversight provide a valuable lesson.310 True, the Court did
not link such oversight to the question of whether private delegates' ac-
tions should be subject to constitutional scrutiny, or probe beyodr1 the
formal structures applicable to a delegation to determine whether the
private delegate was in fact meaningfully constrained. Nonetheless, these
decisions contain the important insight that the structure of a private del-
egation should matter more in determining its constitutionality than the
mere fact that private actors are exercising government power. More spe-
cifically, they recognize that nonconstitutional accountability mecha-
nisms can adequately address the constitutional concerns that private
delegations might otherwise create.
This idea that alternative accountability mechanisms can satisfy con-
stitutional requirements is one that surfaces elsewhere in constitutional
law. 3 11 For example, the availability of ex post tort actions against the
310. See supra Part II.C.
311. It is also worth noting the parallel between this aspect of private delegation
doctrine and the emphasis on state supervision as a prerequisite for triggering the state
action exception of antitrust law; notably, however, the Court has required more evidence
of active government involvement in the antitrust context than in regard to private
delegations. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992)
(describing requirement of active state supervision as intended to ensure that "the State
has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates
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government to recover for injuries to property or liberty may satisfy pro-
cedural due process requirements, obviating the need for administrative
hearings.3 12 Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona the Court laid out specific
warnings that must be given prior to custodial interrogations, but indi-
cated that these warnings were not required if "other fully effective means
are devised" to protect suspects' Fifth Amendment rights against self-in-
crimination.3 13 More recently, the Zelman decision underscored the im-
portance of "genuine and independent choices of private individuals" in
concluding that the use of public funds to pay tuition at religious schools
did not violate the Establishment Clause.
3 14
A focus on alternative accountability mechanisms also accords with
modern separation of powers jurisprudence, where the Court generally
eschews insistence on formal restrictions for a more flexible inquiry into
whether sufficient checks exist in practice to prevent excessive accumula-
tion of power in one branch.3 15 Indeed, the separation of powers parallel
runs even deeper. The Court's functionalist bent in the separation of
powers arena reflects in part its recognition of modern administrative re-
alities; regulatory complexity and uncertainty (not to mention the institu-
tional constraints of Congress) mean that much of the content of gov-
or prices have been established as a product of deliberative state intervention, not simply
by agreement among private parties").
312. See Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196-97 (2001) (holding
that availability of ordinary breach-of-contract suit satisfied due process demands where
government contractor alleged government wrongly deprived it of full payment under
contrac ,, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-43 (1981) (holding that postdeprivation tort
action for negligent loss of prisoner's property sufficient to meet due process
requirements), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-82 (1977) (holding that due process was satisfied by
liability of teachers and principals for excessive use of corporal punishment in subsequent
legal action); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 551-52 (arguing that ending the
state action requirement would not make every crime or tort a constitutional violation
because due process is satisfied by adequate state criminal and tort law remedies).
313. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61, 82 ("[T]he best way to understand
Miranda is not as mandating specific procedures, but as laying down a right and creating a
safe harbor for those charged with respecting it."); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-23
(1975) (describing Miranda warnings as a form of "constitutional common law," rules that
implement constitutional rights but are not themselves an integral part of the rights
involved); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436-39 (2000) (holding that
Congress is required to provide at least as protective procedures when supplanting
Miranda's requirements).
314. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). For arguments
emphasizing the importance of the structure of government funding programs in meeting
Establishment Clause concerns, see Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 83; Cole, supra note
7, at 564; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at
Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18J.L. & Pol. 539, 575-84 (2002).
315. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381, 384 (1989).
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erning rules must inevitably be set by administrative agencies.3 1 6 In like
vein, focusing on alternative mechanisms as a means of ensuring constitu-
tional accountability recognizes of the reality of privatization, and the
need to develop a constitutional analysis that better addresses the consti-
tutional challenges that privatization poses.
3 17
The private delegation decisions are additionally instructive in sug-
gesting that express grants of power to private hands merit special scru-
tiny. Not all private delegations involve grants of government power, and
evasion of constitutional constraints can occur through tacit authoriza-
tions as well as express ones. Moreover, some of the most vexing state
action cases are poorly described in private delegation terms.318 Yet the
recent privatization examples and prior state action cases demonstrate
the importance of express private delegations in statutes, contracts, and
the like as means of transferring government power to private hands. In-
deed, the frequent presence of express delegations of power to private
entities is no accident, and instead indicates that most instances of priva-
tization in this country represent moves to private implementation of gov-
ernment programs rather than government disengagement from an activ-
ity altogether. 1 9 As a result, focusing on private delegations is an
appropriate method for identifying situations that may present significant
threats to constitutional accountability.
Existing private delegation decisions thus provide the seeds for a new
constitutional analysis of privatization. Like these decisions, the pro-
posed analysis is structural in focus, in that it targets the inquiry on dele-
gations of power to private actors and on the overall system of constraints
to which these delegations are subject. Unlike the prior decisions, how-
316. See, e.g., id. at 371-73. Scholars disagree as to whether this functionalist
approach violates the constitutional scheme. Compare Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1248-49 (1994) (arguing that modern
administrative state is fundamentally inconsistent with separation of powers structure set
out in the Constitution), with Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 667 (1984) (arguing
that, below the apex of government, the Constitution requires only adequate checks and
balances to guard against one branch becoming too dominant and sufficient separation of
functions within administrative agencies to satisfy due process).
317. An even further parallel is that,just as the Court takes a formalistic stance when a
measure appears to aggrandize Congress' powers, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-84, putting
ultimate primacy on ensuring constitutional accountability addresses the aggrandizement
concerns associated with privatization-the dangers that government power will escape
constitutional limits and governments will exploit such delegations as a means of
constitutional evasion.
318. The Jaybird Association's de facto control over elections, addressed in Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953), is the prime example of a government power existing
absent an express delegation, while cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21
(1948), or Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967), at best fit awkwardly under the
private delegation label; their underlying concern instead appears to be with the state
sanctioning or giving affirmative support to private racial discrimination. See, e.g., Tribe,
Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at 259-64; Black, supra note 147, at 80-83.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 and 84-86.
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ever, this analysis generally accepts that private actors can exercise the
type of power at issue; it focuses on assessing the impact the private dele-
gation has on the constitutional imperative of accountability. The central
concern is determining whether a private delegation is structured so as to
ensure that private exercises of government power do not violate consti-
tutional requirements. Constitutional accountability thus has primacy, as
the government is prohibited from delegating government power in ways
that are not sufficiently constrained. But the government also has flexi-
bility in structuring its relationships with its private partners because vari-
ous mechanisms exist by which constitutional constraints can be
enforced.
Notwithstanding its emphasis on adequate regulatory protections,
two central features make this analysis at its core a constitutional inquiry.
First, the requirement that adequate protections be extended to priva-
tized programs rests ultimately not on political will, but instead on the
Constitution itself, which imposes fundamental limits on how govern-
ment can act. Second, the Constitution provides the specific substantive
content of the protections that regulatory mechanisms must afford, as
well as the procedural requirement that these mechanisms must allow for
individual enforcement. Even when involvement of private entities af-
fects the substance of constitutional rights, 320 the determination of what
protections must be afforded remains a constitutional one: It turns on
assessing specifically the constitutional interests at stake, as opposed to
simply determining which protections will yield the best policy outcome,
"all-things-considered., 3 2'
Yet under this approach constitutional law will function differently
from the standard court-centered image of constitutional adjudication,
where the courts bear primary responsibility for enforcing constitutional
requirements. 322 Here the courts provide the constitutional baseline, but
the task of translating that baseline into practice falls to the elected
branches of government.3 23 Moreover, this approach transforms the con-
stitutional right being asserted. The fundamental claim at issue becomes
320. See infra text accompanying notes 375-378.
321. Hills, supra note 131, at 154.
322. See, e.g., Bd. ofTrs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("[I]t is
the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees.").
323. In this sense, the proposed analysis is akin to the "structural" approach Susan
Sturm has identified the Court as taking in the employment discrimination context, which
creates incentives for employers to adopt measures to prevent and redress harassment or
bias problems. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 479-89 (2001). According to William Simon
and Charles Sabel, courts increasingly are taking a similar approach in public law litigation,
eschewing detailed judicial oversight of public institutions and instead holding
administrators responsible for achieving specified performance goals. See Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 107




not that the private delegate exercised its powers in ways that violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, but rather that the private delegation itself
violates the Constitution because it fails to ensure a sufficient level of con-
stitutional accountability. This latter constitutional claim finds a textual
home in the Due Process Clauses because allowing exercises of govern-
ment power outside of constitutional constraints is a violation of the
clauses' prohibition on arbitrary government action. But it also can be
seen as rooted not in a particular constitutional text, but in the structural
Constitution, because-like separation of powers or federalism-the
principle of constitutional accountability that this claim embodies is one
of the basic structural postulates of our constitutional system.
3 24
Adopting a constitutional analysis that focuses on the overall system
of constraints applicable to an exercise of government power offers sev-
eral advantages. A central benefit is, of course, the potential for better
safeguarding of both government regulatory prerogatives and constitu-
tional accountability. In addition, adopting this focus avoids the all-or-
nothing character of current state action doctrine. Rather than reducing
the inquiry to a single question-whether a particular private entity is a
state actor-it pursues a multi-step approach that neither starts nor stops
with identifying private exercises of government power. Private delega-
tions are singled out for enhanced constitutional scrutiny because of the
possibility, not the actuality, that they involve grants of government
power; even if they do, a private delegate's constitutional immunity is not
problematic provided that constitutional constraints on government
power are otherwise preserved. A third, and particularly important, ad-
vantage is that this analysis aligns the government's interests with the goal
of preserving constitutional accountability. Instead of creating perverse
incentives for government to delegate power without strings attached or
to control private actors at one step removed, this approach gives govern-
ment an incentive to ensure that its private delegations are adequately
constrained.
B. Sketching the Contours of a Private Delegation Analysis
Such a private delegation analysis holds promise in theory as a rem-
edy for the flaws of current state action doctrine. But as the Supreme
Court's prior failure to develop a coherent private delegation doctrine
indicates, the real question is whether this program can work in practice.
Three elements of the proposed analysis are central to its success: (1)
identifying constitutionally troublesome private delegations; (2) assessing
whether such delegations are adequately structured to ensure constitu-
tional accountability; and (3) remedying unconstitutional delegations. A
fourth important issue concerns the relationship between the proposed
324. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("Behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.").
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analysis and current state action doctrine and the likelihood of the for-
mer's adoption.
1. Identifying Which Private Delegations Matter: The Centrality of Acting
on the Government's Behalf and Agency. - One major obstacle to develop-
ing the proposed private delegation inquiry is the extremely broad scope
of what could qualify as a private delegation, even limiting the field to
express delegations. Licenses, corporate charters, and rights of property
and contract, such as the warehouser's self-help remedy at issue in
Fagg,325 are "delegations" of state power to private actors as much as gov-
ernment contracts with private service providers or statutes authorizing
private regulation. But if all law is understood to represent a private dele-
gation of government power, the effect of targeting private delegations
for special scrutiny would be the same as casting aside any constitutional
distinction between public and private-something, again, the Court is
plainly unwilling to do.
Yet it is a mistake to conclude that for constitutional purposes no
meaningful or legitimate basis exists upon which to differentiate among
private delegations. A central characteristic of much government priva-
tization is that private delegates are granted powers not simply for their
own advantage, but rather to enable them to act-and more specifically,
to interact with third parties-on the government's behalf.326 As dis-
cussed in Part I, this characteristic of acting on behalf of government is
what makes these private delegations particularly threatening to the prin-
ciple of constitutionally-constrained government. By effectively stepping
into the government's shoes in its dealings with third parties, private enti-
ties are more likely to have access to powers that are distinctly govern-
mental. These include not simply the ability to exert coercive powers on
a nonconsensual basis, but also control over access to government re-
sources and government programs. Particularly when privatization oc-
curs in contexts where program participants or applicants have a great
need for the government benefits and services at issue, private entities'
roles in implementing government programs may significantly augment
their powers over others and enhance their ability to cause harm. Moreo-
ver, this enhancement of private powers is often undertaken in lieu of
direct government involvement, which suggests that governments may be
evading constitutional requirements simply by changes in form rather
325. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
326. This is not to deny that other delegations, such as private property or contract
rights can, as a practical matter, transfer substantial coercive powers to private hands. See
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 11-14 (1927) (arguing that
private property is a form of sovereignty because of the power it gives over the lives of
others); Jaffe, supra note 259, at 214 (noting "the power that men exercise over others
through the protection given by the law to property and contract"). But accepting the
public-private divide in constitutional law means that de facto power over others ordinarily
is not enough to trigger application of constitutional constraints. There must be some
additional basis for tying the power at issue to government.
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than substance.3 27 Finally, private entities are often the face of govern-
ment for participants in government programs, 328 and thus such private
actors' freedom from constitutional controls risks eroding popular belief
in constitutionally-constrained government.
Notwithstanding the clear importance to constitutional accountabil-
ity of a private entity acting on the government's behalf, the Court's state
action cases have largely ignored this feature. 329 Private law, however, has
long recognized the special dangers of relationships in which one party is
empowered to act on another's behalf and addressed these relationships
under the law of agency. "Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises
when one person ('a principal') manifests assent to another person ('an
agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise con-
sents so to act."330 Agency law makes clear that individuals can be acting
on another's behalf even when their actions also advance their own inter-
ests; indeed, such dual motives are endemic to agency relationships.
33 1
But the bare fact that an individual's pursuit of her own interest benefits
another is insufficient to create an agency relationship; instead, both
principal and agent must assent to the agent's acting on the principal's
behalf.3 3 2 A further essential element of agency is ongoing principal con-
327. See Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1267-68.
328. See Smith & Lipsky, supra note 13, at 13-14.
329. One exception is Polk County v. Dodson, where the Court held that a public
defender was not a state actor in her representation of indigent defendants because in that
role she assumed an adversarial position towards the state. 454 U.S. 312, 321-24 (1981);
see also id. at 324-25 (noting that public defender is a state actor "when making hiring and
firing decisions on behalf of the State"). Frank Goodman has also emphasized the
importance of authorizing private individuals to act on behalf of government, as opposed
to granting them permission to act on their own behalf, in state action analysis. See Frank
I. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to
Professor Stone, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1331, 1338 (1982); see also Barak-Erez, supra note 8, at
1190 (including consideration of whether private actor is operating a public service on
behalf of the state in public function test).
330. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) [hereinafter
Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft)]; see also Meyer v. Holley, 123 S. Ct. 824,
829 (2003) (stating elements of agency); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)
[hereinafter Restatement (Second) Agency] (same). Agency law further defines acting on
the government's behalf as signaling that the agent has "power to affect the legal rights
and duties of the other person." Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra,
§ 1.01 cmt. c; accord Restatement (Second) Agency, supra, § 12 ("An agent ... holds a
power to alter the legal relations between the principal and third persons and between the
principal and himself.").
331. As a result, policing against self-serving agent behavior is at the core of many
discussions of the principal-agent problem. See Donahue, supra note 16, at 38-56; John
W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in Principals and
Agents: The Structure of Business 1, 12-15 (John W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985).
332. See Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 329, § 1.01 cmt. d
(describing creation of agency); id. § 1.03 (explaining manifestations of assent); id. § 2.03
(noting that doctrine of apparent authority allows agent's acts to be attributed to principal
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trol: "A relationship is not one of agency within the common-law defini-
tion unless.., the principal has the right throughout the duration of the
relationship to control the agent's acts.
'333
Agency offers a useful means for identifying private delegations that
are especially threatening to constitutional accountability and therefore
merit greater scrutiny.33 4 With its focus on identifying acts on another's
behalf, agency targets precisely the characteristic of private delegations
that makes them constitutionally troublesome. Moreover, like the consti-
tutional inquiry into the status of private delegates, a central concern of
agency is balancing interests of third parties with those of principals and
agents, and much of agency law is similarly focused on determining when
it is fair to attribute responsibility for the actions of an agent to a princi-
pal.3 35 Agency law's requirements of principal control and manifesta-
tions of assent also resonate from a constitutional accountability perspec-
tive. The dangers of constitutional evasion are particularly great when
the government retains ability to control its delegates; in addition, the
presence of assent eases concerns regarding unfairly intruding on regula-
tory choices or individual autonomy, because both the government and
the delegate are able to foresee the likely constitutional repercussions of
their relationship.
Of particular importance is agency law's approach to principal con-
trol. At first glance, agency's insistence on principal control appears
problematically akin to current doctrine's insistence on identifying gov-
ernment involvement-either participation in specific private acts or
more general pervasive entwinement in the private entity-before find-
ing state action. Significantly, however, agency law has adopted fairly
broad tests for determining when the triggering condition of principal
control is met.3 36 What matters from an agency perspective is that a prin-
even absent principal assent "when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority
to act on behalf of principal and that belief is traceable to principal's manifestations"); see
also Restatement (Second) Agency, supra note 330, § 15 (requiring manifestations of
consent to agency relationship by principal and agent for relationship to exist).
333. Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c; see
also id. cmt. f(l) ("The power to give interim instructions distinguishes principals in
agency relationships from those who contract to receive services provided by persons who
are not agents."); Restatement (Second) Agency, supra note 330, § 14 (describing
principal control).
334. For prior discussions of privatization in terms of agency, see Donahue, supra
note 16, at 38-39; S. Kennedy, Private Public, supra note 8, at 219-23; see also Gilmour &
Jensen, supra note 17, at 253 ("Accountability for governmental action can be ensured
only when the agents of the government, in all of their manifestations, can be
recognized.").
335. See Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c
("It has been said that a relationship of agency always 'contemplates three parties-the
principal, the agent, and the third party with whom the agent is to deal."' (quoting Floyd
Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency § 27 (1914))); S. Kennedy, Private Public, supra
note 8, at 221.
336. See Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c
(describing principal's "right to control" as well as agent's consent to act on behalf of
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cipal has the power to control an agent's actions, not that it actually con-
trols a specific act.337 Moreover, principal control is compatible with in-
dependent decisonmaking and discretion, and agents may enjoy
extraordinarily wide authority to make decisions on a principal's be-
half.33 8 In contrast to current state action doctrine, governments are not
able to escape findings of agency simply by avoiding involvement in day-
to-day decisionmaking; instead, they would have to largely cede any right
to control a private entity's actions. Of course, it remains possible that a
government would cede such right of control or would restructure its
programs-for example by repealing statutory provisions requiring the
government to provide certain benefits-in order to prevent a court from
finding that private entities were acting as agents on its behalf. But signif-
icant political (and legal) obstacles will likely exist to the government's
giving out funds or regulatory power to private actors with so few strings
attached.
339
As a result, focusing on agency offers a means of identifying at least
some constitutionally troubling private delegations while still satisfying
the demand for a constitutional distinction between public and private.
Blum and Rendell-Baker are instructive on the difference resulting from an
agency analysis compared to current state action doctrine. While in both
decisions the Court held that state action was lacking, the underlying
facts plainly support finding that the nursing home and school were gov-
ernment agents: Both provided services to third-party beneficiaries that
the government was statutorily required to make available; moreover, the
principal as core elements of agency, but noting that "the content or specific meaning of
the right [to control] is variable," and "f'ilure to exercise the right of control does not
eliminate it"); id. cmt. f(1) (describing control as "a concept that embraces a wide
spectrum of meanings"); Restatement (Second) Agency, supra note 329, § 14 cmt. a
(noting that principal control exists "even though the principal agreed that he would not
exercise it" and that "control of the principal does not . . . include control at every
moment; its exercise may be very attenuated").
337. See Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c.
338. See id. § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (noting that principal must "initially state[ ] what the
agent shall and shall not do" but can do so in "specific or general terms"). Moreover,
under agency law the fact that a contract specifies an agent's responsibilities does not
mean the principal lacks power to add to or alter those responsibilities; doing so may
simply give the agent a breach of contract action against the principal. See id. § 1.01
cmt. f(1).
339. This is true even in regard to politically unpopular programs. While the TANF
legislation did away with the federal entitlement to welfare benefits and allowed the states
great discretion in structuring their welfare programs, it still imposed some significant
obligations on the states. For example, states are required to meet specified work
participation goals, restrict the uses to which they put TANF funds, and substantially
reduce federally-funded assistance to certain individuals, such as a woman who refuses to
identify the father of her child. HHS is authorized to sanction noncompliant states by
reducing their federal TANF grants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 604, 607, 608(a) (2), 609 (2000). On the
legal front, existing private delegation doctrine would prohibit grants of a private
regulatory role without at least formal provision for government oversight. See supra
Part II.C.
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provision of these services was subsidized by the government and under-
taken pursuant to express government authorization. Perhaps most im-
portantly, while not mandating the specific decisions in question, in both
cases the government exercised ongoing control over provision of these
services through regulations and extensive agency oversight.- 40 Like the
doctor providing medical services to prisoners in West, the nursing home
and school were, in essence, independent contractors.- 4 1 Notably, inde-
pendent contractors can qualify as "agents" for many purposes, even
though they enjoy greater freedom from principal control than do em-
ployees.3 4 2 State action doctrine, with its emphasis on actual exercises of
control, ends up privileging the independent contractor relationship for
constitutional purposes compared to the employee relationship, but from
340. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005-10 (1982) (describing detailed
requirements applicable to nursing homes in caring for Medicaid beneficiaries, including
regulations specifying forms homes must use in making assessments of beneficiaries' care
needs and stating that homes are required to ensure that beneficiaries receive appropriate
level of care); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 833-34 (1982) (noting that local
school committees were required to develop individual educational programs for students
placed at the school and to include specific service requirements in contracts with the
school); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that
"the school's dependence on state funds, in itself, demonstrates only that the state has the
potential to control the school's operations, not that it actually does so" and holding that
actual control is a requirement for applying constitutional requirements to a private
institution), afl'd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
341. See, e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815-16 (1976) (holding
federally-funded private nonprofit organization operating as community action agency was
independent contractor because organization's day-to-day operations were not supervised
by federal government). But see Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 490-99 (1984)
(holding employees of private community organization which administered federal block-
grant funds were public officials for purposes of federal bribery statute).
342. Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c
(indicating that independent contractors can be agents notwithstanding limits on
employer's power of control over how independent contractor performs); Restatement
(Second) Agency, supra note 330, § 2(3) ("An independent contractor is a person who...
is not... subject to the [principal's] right to control with respect to his physical conduct in
the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent."); see also
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1677-79 & 1678 n.5 (2003)
(noting several factors serve to distinguish employees and independent contractors, a
central one being extent of principal control).
In some situations, limits on a principal's control do preclude an independent
contractor from being an agent. See Restatement (Second) Agency, supra note 330, § 2
cmt. b. Interestingly, however, agency law also responds to limits on principal control not
by denying that agency exists, but rather by restricting the extent to which principals are
liable for the actions of independent contractors. See id. (noting "principal is not liable to
third persons for tangible harm resulting from [an independent contractor's]
unauthorized physical conduct within the scope of the employment"); Restatement
(Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 2.04 cmt. b (noting that respondeat
superior is not applicable where agents are not employees); see also Deborah A. DeMott,
The Mechanisms of Control, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 233, 238-39 (1999) (noting distinction
between right of control required for agency and type of domination required to pierce
corporate veil).
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an agency perspective little reason exists for drawing such a categorical
line.
3 4 3
Indeed, many instances of privatization are fairly clear-cut instances
of agency relationships. Private intermediaries processing claims for
Medicare, for example, are statutorily designated government agents and
have been so recognized. 344 In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
the Court indicated that when "the [g]overnment creates a corporation
by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains
for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the [corpora-
tion's] directors," the corporation is an agency of government for consti-
tutional purposes. 345 Brentwood Academy could have been decided on a
similar basis, with public school officials' dominance of the Association
(particularly given the State's express delegation of oversight responsibil-
ity for interscholastic athletics in the past and the Association's assump-
tion of such responsibility) demonstrating that the Association was acting
on behalf of the state and subject to its control.
There are also instances of privatization in which no basis exists to
conclude that private delegates are acting on the government's behalf
and therefore agency is lacking. Assent to act on the principal's behalf
appears generally absent in contexts when the government does no more
than purchase goods and services for its own use from a private entity;
here, the private provider is not interacting with third parties, even its
employees, as the government's representative or on the government's
behalf.3 46 Sullivan suggests another example. There, the private insur-
ance companies challenging workers' claims for benefits cannot be de-
scribed as acting on the government's behalf, except in the attenuated
sense that having private employers provide such insurance served the
government's policy goals of ensuring compensation for all work-related
343. Others have similarly criticized current doctrine's distinction between
government employees and other government contractual relationships. See, e.g., Barak-
Erez, supra note 8, at 1187; see also David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights
Era, 10 Const. Comment. 409, 411 (1993) (arguing that current doctrine errs in its
automatic treatment of acts of government employees as state action, even when the acts
bears many attributes of private action).
344. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (2000).
345. 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
346. See Restatement (Third) Agency (Tentative Draft), supra note 330, § 1.01 cmt. c
("[I]f a service provider simply furnishes advice and does not interact with third parties as
the representative of the recipient of the advice, the service provider is not acting as an
agent."). Lack of principal control may also preclude agency in this context. See S.
Kennedy, Private Public, supra note 8, at 221 ("Where government.., purchase involves a
product or service that is generally available and relatively standardized, production of the
good or performance is substantially, if not entirely, controlled by the vendor."). Instances
exist, however, where providing goods for the government transforms private entities into
government agents for some purposes, due to the scope of government control over
contractors' operations. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-13
(1988) (recognizing federal contractor immunity from design defect liability when
products designed according to government specifications).
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injuries.34 7 Except in its role as employer, the government bore no statu-
tory responsibility to provide medical services and gained no financial
benefit when medical services were ruled unnecessary. Particularly
viewed against the history of workers' compensation systems, Penn-
sylvania's authorizing insurers to deny claim payment until medical ne-
cessity is determined seems more a realignment of the respective rights of
workers and employers in the employers' favor than a delegation creating
an agency relationship.3 48 To the extent that the private insurers were
functioning as agents at all, they were serving as agents of employers (who
bore statutory liability for workers' compensation benefits) and not of the
government.
3 49
In a number of privatized contexts, however, the presence or lack of
an agency relationship will be harder to determine. Is a corporation al-
ways a government agent when the government appoints a majority of its
directors, even if the government makes no effort to exercise control over
the corporation's operations? 350 What if such board and operational
control is lacking, but the government charters the corporation and
grants it sole regulatory authority over a sphere of activity with the aim of
347. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 44-46 (1999).
348. On the development of workers' compensation statutes, see generally Witt, supra
note 37.
349. For the same reason, labor unions are also not government agents,
notwithstanding the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)'s authorization of union shop
agreements, which delegates to unions (and employers) the power to compel all
employees in the bargaining unit to join the union. It is difficult to see why union
decisions made pursuant to this authorization should be seen as action on behalf of the
government any more than any other private assertion of a legally provided power, such as
an employer's assertion of the right to fire employees at will. Plainly, union shop
arrangements give unions power over dissenting employees, but employee coercion is
equally likely as a result of an employer's control over the workplace. See Hale, supra note
99, at 472-74.
This marks an instance where the proposed private delegation analysis leads to a
narrower application of constitutional requirements than under current law. Although it
has not reached the question in the NLRA context, the Court has held that the
authorization of union shops in the Railway Labor Act (RLA) meant that union decisions
regarding the use of union dues collected pursuant to such an agreement constitute state
action because the RLA's authorization preempts conflicting state laws. See Ry. Employees
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232, 238 (1956); see also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 455-57 (1984) (reaffirming Hanson's holding that First Amendment applies
to union use of funds). Hanson's reasoning is hard to square with recent state action cases
rejecting claims that simply exercising statutorily delegated rights creates state action. See
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52-53; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978). But see
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (holding statutory
preemption of legal barriers that would otherwise prohibit private conduct in question is
sufficient government encouragement to create state action).
350. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (suggesting that formal government control is less
relevant in determining constitutional status of private corporation where control is
temporary and is not used to advance specific policy objectives). See generally A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. I11. L. Rev. 543 (discussing
accountability concerns raised by federally-chartered corporations).
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advancing the national interest?3 5' Does a statutory provision mandating
employee drug testing for public safety purposes transform an employer
who engages in such drug testing into a government agent vis-a-vis its
employees?35 2 Government grants often may create agency relationships,
because the government frequently conditions award of the grant on per-
formance of a specific project and closely regulates grantee behavior.
Where this is the case, use of grants rather than direct reimbursement for
services is an administrative detail that seems to lack wider import. But
grants can also represent government efforts to foster independent pri-
vate action, and distinguishing between the two contexts no doubt will
prove difficult.
Moreover, while a useful starting point, agency cannot be an exclu-
sive test for identifying all constitutionally troublesome private delega-
tions. The ultimate issue from a constitutional perspective is whether pri-
vate entities wield government power, not whether they qualify as
government agents. Instances will exist where private actors are dele-
gated what appear to be government powers, but the conditions of
agency will be lacking. Georgia v. McCollum is a case on point.35 3 There,
the Court held that a private defendant's use of peremptory challenges in
juror selection constituted state action, in part because the defendant was
helping to select the members of an official government body. In this
sense, the defendant could be seen as acting on the government's behalf;
plainly, however, the defendant used the peremptories for his own advan-
tage and his actions were constitutionally protected against prosecutorial
control, negating an agency relationship.3 54 In other contexts, agency's
requirement of ongoing principal control may preclude finding an
agency relationship, even though private entities are acting on the gov-
ernment's behalf and exercising government powers.
355
351. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 543-45 (1987).
352. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-15 (holding that statutory encouragement of
drug testing of railroad employees transforms such testing into state action, subject to
Fourth Amendment's requirements), with Mathis v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 891 F.2d 1429,
1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying that proposed rule requiring nuclear power plant
licensees to undertake psychological testing of employees transformed such testing into
state action when performed subject to independent professional standards).
353. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
354. See id. at 53-55; see also id. at 64-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
defense counsel's immunity from prosecutorial control precluded a finding of state
action). Another example comes from Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1938). The statute at
issue there allowed tobacco growers to decide whether government standards would apply
to a given tobacco market. A decision to subject an activity to government regulation
seems clearly an exercise of government power, yet no agency relationship existed between
the growers and the government; the government imposed no restrictions on how these
decisions were made and the growers were seeking their own pecuniary gain. See id.
at 6-8.
355. An example is when the government provides that accreditation by private
organizations suffices to establish eligibility to participate in government programs, but
exercises little control over the accreditation process. For instance, accreditation by the
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Thus, the existence of an agency relationship should be a sufficient
but not a necessary condition for subjecting private delegations to greater
scrutiny. It will always remain necessary to investigate whether the delega-
tion represents such a clear grant of government power or power to act
on the government's behalf that further scrutiny is warranted. Yet even
though some or many hard cases will remain and it cannot be an exclu-
sive test, agency is an important criterion in singling out which delega-
tions merit special scrutiny. Over time greater clarity will likely develop,
and focusing on agency relationships serves to narrow the range of hard
cases. In addition, room exists to err on the side of finding agency be-
cause, unlike state action determinations, such a finding does not inexo-
rably result in direct application of constitutional constraints on the dele-
gates' actions. Instead, it triggers an investigation into whether
constitutional accountability concerns are adequately addressed.
2. Structuring Private Delegations to Ensure Constitutional Accountability.
- Determining when private delegations are adequately structured to en-
sure constitutional accountability represents the second key element in
the proposed private delegation analysis. Private delegations that do not
create agency relationships or involve clear grants of government power
do not require further scrutiny. Such delegations may provide private
entities with significant powers, but given the constitutional public-private
divide, they do not raise constitutional accountability concerns.
This leaves, however, the many private delegations that do have these
characteristics, creating the danger that private delegates are stepping
into the shoes of government and wielding government power. When
are such private delegations adequately structured to preserve constitu-
tional accountability notwithstanding that the private delegates involved
are exempt from the Constitution's purview? One central requirement,
derived from the definition of constitutional accountability, is that a
mechanism must exist by which individuals can enforce constitutional
constraints on government power, ultimately in court, even if they cannot
assert constitutional rights directly against private delegates. 35 6 This re-
quirement, in turn, suggests two ways in which private delegations can be
structured to meet constitutional accountability concerns. Under the
first, alternative mechanisms exist through which individuals can assert
constitutional constraints (or adequate surrogates) on exercises of gov-
ernment power even though private delegates wielding government
power are immune from direct constitutional scrutiny. Under the sec-
JCAHO means that a health care institution is deemed eligible to participate in Medicare,
yet the federal government exercises little direct control over specificJCAHO accreditation
decisions. Instead, it relies on indirect measures of oversight, such as annual assessments
as to whether JCAHO accreditation standards comply with Medicare conditions of
participation. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 610-12; Timothy StoltzfusJost,
Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations: A
Healthy Relationship?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1994, at 15, 18-22.
356. See supra Part I.C.
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ond, private delegations are significantly limited, so that the private dele-
gates do not in fact wield government power-or if they do, their exer-
cises of this power are constitutionally insignificant.3 5 7 Both of these
approaches allow room for a court to conclude that the content of consti-
tutional protections may differ in the context of private delegations in
comparison to when government officials act alone.
a. Alternative Mechanisms to Enforce Constitutional Constraints. - The
most obvious alternative mechanism for enforcing constitutional con-
straints is government supervision of private decisionmaking. Govern-
ment supervision is, of course, the structural mechanism emphasized in
existing private delegation decisions that reject claims that private delega-
tions contravene separation of powers and due process requirements.
35 8
Government supervision also prefigured in two of the Supreme Court's
recent encounters with privatization, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko
and Richardson v. McKnight, both of which involved private prisons. In
Malesko, the Court emphasized that inmates in private facilities could ac-
cess the Bureau of Prisons' administrative complaint system and from
there obtain judicial review in denying a Bivens action for constitutional
violations against the private prison operators. 35 9 Meanwhile, in Richard-
son the Court held that individual guards at private prisons generally do
not enjoy qualified immunity against constitutional claims under § 1983,
but the Court expressly reserved the question of whether qualified immu-
nity would be available to private individuals "acting under close official
supervision.
3 60
Government supervision is a particularly important mechanism for
ensuring accountability in privatization contexts. The government's reg-
ulatory and contractual powers, as well as its administrative resources and
357. For a similar suggestion as to how private decisionmaking in government
programs should be constrained, although not argued for as constitutionally required, see
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, supra note 12, at 1261.
358. See supra Part I.C.
359. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 74 (2001).
360. 521 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1997). The reasoning of these two decisions is hard to
square, in that Malesko presumed that the private status of the prison operator was
essentially irrelevant in assessing the deterrent value of a suit against it, whereas in
Richardson the Court emphasized that private corporations have greater flexibility than
public agencies in structuring their operations to ensure that private prison guards act with
the appropriate balance of vigor and caution. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69-71
(analogizing to denial of Bivens actions against federal agencies in similarly denying Bivens
action against private corporation managing federal prison facility), with Richardson, 521
U.S. at 409-12 (holding that factors against counseling for grants of qualified immunity to
public prison guards are not present in private prison context). An important distinction
that explains the two cases' differing results, even if it fails to justify their contrasting
reasoning, is the fact that Richardson arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) while Maesko
involved an implied damage action under Bivens; the rejection of liability in Malesko thus
largely reflected the Rehnquist Court's hostility to Bivens actions and implied rights of
action generally. For a discussion of the conflict between Malesko and Richardson, see
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization, Accountability, and Judicial Review 5-27 (Mar. 21, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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expertise, put it in the best position to control private delegates' behav-
ior. In order to meet the demands of constitutional accountability, how-
ever, government supervision must take the form of a complaint or ap-
peals system akin to that in Grijalva or Malesko, through which affected
individuals can challenge specific private decisions, policies, and proce-
dures. Such a review system not only provides a direct administrative
check against private delegate abuses, but also provides the requisite basis
for a subsequent constitutional challenge in court. If the government
denies relief, individuals then can bring constitutional challenges to the
government's own decisions-for example, alleging that the government
violated due process by sanctioning inadequate private decisionmaking
procedures or by affirming a private decision made on racially discrimina-
tory grounds.3 6' On occasion, preserving constitutional accountability
may require additional safeguards, such as a means for immediate review
where urgently needed assistance is at stake,362 or de novo review where
the government delegates enforcement of regulatory requirements to pri-
vate hands.
363
One advantage of using government oversight to ensure constitu-
tional accountability is that government officials are not limited to rectify-
ing constitutional violations, but can also use their oversight to enforce
regulatory requirements and contractual promises, and in other ways im-
prove the effectiveness and quality of privatized programs. While govern-
ments rarely can be required to undertake such enforcement,3 6 4 the ne-
cessity of providing an individual appeals mechanism gives them an
361. One point to note is that this approach in essence requires administrative
exhaustion of constitutional claims, and thus is somewhat at odds with cases holding such
exhaustion unnecessary. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149 (1992). Given
that many suits against state and local officials will be premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
conflict between this approach and the rule of Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516
(1982), that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required under § 1983,
appears particularly stark. In fact, however, the proposed approach can be made to accord
doctrinally with the rule of Patsy, on the grounds that, if an adequate administrative
appeals mechanism exists, private acts only become acts taken "under color of state law"
and thus are subject to § 1983 once that mechanism is exhausted. See Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) (holding that private conduct found to be
state action for constitutional purposes also constitutes § 1983's "under color of state law"
requirement); infra note 404 and accompanying text.
362. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that due
process requires means for obtaining speedy predeprivation review of MCOs' denials of
medical coverage), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970) (emphasizing importance of welfare benefits in requiring oral hearing before
benefits are terminated).
363. See Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasizing
importance of full government review in upholding constitutionality of delegating
responsibility for enforcing securities laws to private association).
364. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-35 (1985) (concluding that
government agency's decision not to take enforcement action is presumed immune from




incentive to do so. This mechanism supplies governments with needed
information about the performance of their private delegates, and also
allows governments to review the quality of services in individual cases
without significant administrative cost. Moreover, enforcing regulatory
and contractual requirements regarding delegates' behavior will lessen
the danger that private delegates will act in constitutionally prohibited
ways, for which the government might subsequently be found liable. On
the flip side, however, governments are not left with much flexibility re-
garding how they conduct oversight of their private delegates. Since a
large part of the motivation behind privatization is the government's de-
sire to avoid involvement in implementation decisions, holding that pri-
vate delegations can be rendered constitutional by such involvement
seems to offer little solace.
365
Here, an important point to emphasize is that unlike government
proper, not all actions by private government agents trigger constitu-
tional consequences; instead, constitutional requirements attach only
when private entities are wielding powers derived from their agency rela-
tionship with the government. As a result, where a private delegate's ac-
tions are ones that it otherwise had authority to undertake and which
relate tangentially to the responsibilities it performs for the government,
more minimal government oversight should suffice. Rendell-Baker is illus-
trative. There, the private school fired teachers who had criticized as-
pects of the school's operations, and the teachers challenged their termi-
nations on constitutional grounds. 366 While the school qualified as a
government agent, given its responsibility to provide special needs educa-
tion on behalf of the local school committees, it would have had the same
power over its teachers absent the committees' delegation of this respon-
sibility.3 6 7 What makes the teachers' firing nonetheless seem constitu-
tionally troubling is the importance of the teachers' ability to criticize the
school as a protection against the school abusing its delegated powers
over students. Yet this constitutional concern seems adequately ad-
dressed if some means exists by which teachers and parents can bring
issues regarding the school's operation to the government's attention. In
Rendell-Baker, such a means was present in the guise of informal oversight
by the state.
3 68
365. However, the government still enjoys more flexibility than if its private delegates
are found to be state actors; it avoids the danger of being found liable for private delegates'
actions that it did not sanction, and does not have to compensate such delegates for their
potential constitutional liability, through indemnification or higher contracting costs.
366. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 834-35 (1982).
367. Cf. Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 29 (lst Cir. 2002) ("A school
teacher dismissed by a private school without due process is likely to have other options for
employment; a student wrongly expelled from the only free secondary education in town is
in far more trouble, unless his parents are rich or mobile."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107
(2003).




A second point is that close government supervision of private dele-
gates is not the only alternative mechanism by which to ensure constitu-
tional accountability. The government instead could create separate
decisionmaking tracks, so that affected individuals obtain a completely
independent decision from the government in place of the private dele-
gate's ruling.369 Another option is for the government to forego being
involved in oversight and instead to make private delegates directly sub-
ject to substantive and procedural requirements that represent adequate
surrogates for constitutional protections.3 70 Such requirements could be
based in federal or state law (depending on the level of government
where they originate) and imposed by statute, regulation, or contract.
Title VI's prohibition on recipients of federal funds engaging in race dis-
crimination is a statutory example of this approach.37 ' A third variation
is for the government to impose a general requirement that private dele-
gates assume constitutional responsibilities, rather than detail the sub-
stantive and procedural constraints to which delegates must adhere. In
order for these latter two approaches to satisfy constitutional accountabil-
ity concerns, a means by which individuals could enforce these require-
ments against private delegates, such as an express right of action, must
exist.
Finally, state law rights not specific to privatization contexts may suf-
fice to meet constitutional accountability requirements. In some situa-
tions, private remedies, such as a tort action for negligence or a suit
under generally applicable civil rights statutes, may provide equal or
greater protection than is available through constitutional litigation.3 72
369. The procedure for certifying psychiatric hospitals as eligible for participating in
Medicare at issue in Cospito (and since repealed) provides an instance of this approach; as
construed by the Third Circuit, the Medicare statute allowed psychiatric hospitals the
alternatives of being accredited by the JCAHO, a private association, or of obtaining a
determination of eligibility directly from HHS. Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 87-89 (3d
Cir. 1984).
370. See, e.g., Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 586-88 (suggesting Congress
could extend requirements of procedural due process to private entities); see also Aman,
supra note 10, at 1500-05 (arguing for expansion of Administrative Procedure Act to
private actors).
371. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Another example is the detailed procedures and
hearing requirements imposed when individuals are involuntarily committed in private or
public facilities. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 965-68 (2d Cir. 1983)
(describing requirements of New York's Mental Hygiene Law). Yet a third is the statute at
issue in Todd, which mandated that in performing their self-regulatory duties, private
securities associations must adopt disciplinary rules that provided for "specific charges, a
hearing of record, and a statement of the findings," thereby affording minimal due process
protections. Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012 (3d Cir. 1977).
372. See supra note 312 (noting cases holding that ordinary tort or contract actions
provide all the process due in particular contexts); see also Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81, 88 (1980) (upholding state constitutional requirement that
private shopping centers allow access to individuals seeking to exercise free speech rights).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits employment practices that
have an unjustified disparate impact on statutorily-protected groups, whereas to succeed
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State law may also provide a basis for public law actions that force the
government to remedy abuses by its private partners. In Logiodice, the
First Circuit concluded that under Maine law, school districts are statuto-
rily obligated to provide students with a free education. That a school
district contracted with a private school to perform this function did not
relieve the district of its statutory duty, and thus a student wrongly ex-
pelled could sue in state court to compel the district to provide the free
education to which she was entitled.3 73 One point to note here is that the
emphasis on acting on the government's behalf and agency may limit the
availability of some private remedies, as this emphasis may expand the
scope of private actors entitled to government contractor immunity.
374
In assessing the adequacy of these alternative mechanisms, courts
will by necessity have to address the question of whether the involvement
of private delegates changes the substance of constitutional protec-
tions.3 75 The principle of constitutional accountability might at first sug-
on a constitutional equal protection claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate discriminatory
intent as well. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976) (holding that
intentional discrimination is required for constitutional equal protection violation), with
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits
employment practices that are "discriminatory in operation" even if neutrally motivated
and not facially discriminatory). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (2000) (codifying
disparate impact standard of Griggs). As noted earlier, actions seeking to enforce the terms
of government contracts on general third-party beneficiary principles may also be
available, see Logiodice, 296 F.3d at 30 (suggesting that students in private schools operating
under contracts with school district may be able to enforce contractual terms through such
a suit), but judicial reluctance to interfere with government enforcement discretion may
limit the practical impact of this approach. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
373. 296 F.3d at 30. Indeed, with its investigation into whether alternative means of
redress made application of constitutional constraints unnecessary, the analysis employed
by the majority in Logiodice is a close parallel to the approach advocated here. But a critical
distinction between the two is that the Logiodice majority expressly refused to find that the
school district had any constitutional obligation to ensure that adequate protections
existed as a condition of delegating its responsibility to provide free education to a private
school. Id. at 31.
374. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-13 (1988) (recognizing
federal contractor immunity from design defect liability when products designed
according to government specifications); see also Butters v. Vance Int'l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462,
466 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that private company serving as agent of foreign state
qualifies for immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)). Cf. Abigail
Hing Wen, Note, Suing the Sovereign's Servant: The Implications of Privatization for the
Scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunities, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1548-56 (2003)
(arguing against granting private entities immunity under the FSIA based on their agency
relationships with foreign governments). But see Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ru-Val Elec.
Corp., 918 F. Supp. 647, 654-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that private organization
authorized to perform electrical inspections for municipalities is not entitled to
government contractor immunity).
375. Some have tried to explain seeming inconsistencies among the Court's state
action decisions by arguing that less government involvement and control are required to
trigger application of equal protection guarantees than are needed in regard to due
process protections. See Henry]. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-
Private Penumbra 18-24 (1969); Jody Young Jakosa, Parsing Public from Private: The
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gest that the presence of a private delegation should have no such effect,
so as not to create an incentive to delegate government power. Under
such an approach, to be deemed constitutionally adequate, an alternative
accountability mechanism would have to impose constraints at least as
great as those the Constitution imposes on government. Weighing
against this conclusion are the constitutional protections for private asso-
ciational autonomy and other freedoms that may be unduly infringed if
private delegates are found to be subject to the identical constitutional
prohibitions as the government.376 Thus, taking full account of constitu-
tional concerns requires courts to balance the conflicting constitutional
values at stake.
Importantly, however, the question of whether private delegates' in-
volvement affects the substance of asserted constitutional constraints
comes framed by a court's antecedent determination that the private
delegate is in an agency relationship with the government, and therefore
is likely to be wielding government power. This means that such judicial
balancing of constitutional rights and private autonomy concerns is nec-
essarily interstitial: It does not extend to activities that fall on the private
side of the public-private divide; moreover, the content of constitutional
constraints on government represents the baseline from which any devia-
tions must be justified. As a result, it is less threatening to the political
branches' regulatory prerogatives than the wholesale balancing associ-
ated with casting aside the state action doctrine altogether.177 Indeed,
balancing in this form is a common feature of ordinary constitutional
adjudication, where the specific substance of constitutional rights fre-
quently varies by context.
378
Failure of Differential State Action Analysis, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 193, 195-206 (1984)
(describing this approach, adopted in particular by the Second Circuit); see also Yeo v.
Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 249 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("The analytic model used
must take account of the specific constitutional claim being asserted."). This explanation
may well reflect reality, but it is fundamentally at odds with the analytic paradigm of state
action as a threshold determination preliminary to assessment on the merits. See Jakosa,
supra, at 206-31.
376. Albeit arising in the unique context of political parties, California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), illustrates the way that private autonomy concerns may
affect the content of constitutional rights. There, while acknowledging that California's
use of a primary election system constituted a delegation of public power to private
associations, the Court held that California's blanket primary system violated the First
Amendment associational rights of political parties because it required parties to allow
voters who were not party members to participate in their primary elections. Id. at 573 n.4,
586. Yet the Court also reaffirmed earlier precedent holding that equal protection
prohibited private associations from excluding voters on racial grounds. Id. at 573 n.5.
377. See supra notes 277-278. Indeed, against this background of public power, the
likely effect of balancing is to enhance the political branches' regulatory authority by
minimizing constitutional demands in privatized contexts.
378. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 321-27 (2002); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 943-45
(1987) (arguing that balancing is ubiquitous in constitutional law); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
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b. Limits on Private Delegations. - Governments can also ensure con-
stitutional accountability by limiting the powers they delegate. While an
agency relationship between private delegates and the government in-
creases the risk that private delegates are exercising government power,
this result is not inevitable. On some occasions, acting on the govern-
ment's behalf does not give private delegates enhanced power over
others. One such situation is where there is a large pool of private dele-
gates who compete with one another and wield the same authority on the
government's behalf, with the result that no delegate exercises monopoly
or even quasi-monopoly control over program participants or access to
government benefits..3 79 This renders it unlikely that any particular dele-
gate's powers will be enhanced significantly by the delegations in ques-
tion, or that the government will be able to exert control over privatized
programs without actively intervening in specific decisions. Medicare's
fee-for-service program, under which every physician licensed by the state
is eligible to provide government-subsidized care, represents one exam-
ple. 38 0 The Food Stamp and Section 8 housing voucher programs are
others.
3 8 1
Part of what minimizes accountability concerns in these contexts is
the role played by individual choice. The authority to make decisions on
behalf of government is exercised by beneficiaries who are directly af-
fected by the decisions and who, in principle at least, can protect them-
selves against abuse by choosing different providers. If anything, the pri-
vate delegates most empowered by this type of delegation are the
beneficiaries themselves; and the fact that beneficiaries make decisions
primarily for themselves rather than for others minimizes the danger that
the delegates' expanded powers represent an exercise of government au-
thority.382 Seen in this light, this structural device is not limited to broad
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 22, 56-95 (1992) (describing different Justices' stances on balancing as form
of constitutional adjudication).
379. This focus on monopoly powers also appears in state action analysis, where the
presence of a monopoly is one factor courts examine in deciding whether state action
exists. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974) (ruling utility is not a
state actor notwithstanding its monopoly over electricity provision); see also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946) (emphasizing total control over information and
speech that company could exercise over residents in company town unless subject to First
Amendment).
380. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (2000) ("The term 'physician', when used in
connection with the performance of any function or action, means (1) a doctor of
medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery by the State in
which he performs such function or action .... ").
381. See Moffitt, supra note 37, at 125-26; Peterson, supra note 37, at 147-51.
382. Arguably, such delegations of power to beneficiaries do not trigger heightened
scrutiny, for the beneficiaries are acting in their own interests and any manifestation of
consent to an agency relationship seems lacking. Yet, as their decisions affect the shape of
government programs or regulation-for example, housing choices by Section 8 voucher
recipients determine what housing will be subsidized under that program-these
delegations could represent instances where delegates are acting on behalf of government,
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delegations, but is also present in some self-regulation contexts where af-
fected individuals directly participate in setting the content of binding
norms.
A key requirement, however, is that individual choice and right of
participation must be real. 383 Thus, if the nature of the services at issue
makes it difficult to switch providers once services have begun, then a
broad pool of delegates' and beneficiaries' power of choice may not pro-
tect against private delegates wielding government power. Given their
relatively closed environments and the trauma that the elderly and vul-
nerable experience when forced to transfer, nursing homes can exercise
tremendous power over residents.3 84 Hence, the fact that Medicaid bene-
ficiaries can choose from a broad array of private homes in deciding
where to reside does not remove the constitutional accountability prob-
lem in Blum, where homes were authorized to determine residents' eligi-
bility for different types of care. In addition, form meaningful choice,
individuals must be informed of the availability of alternative providers
and the procedures by which they can switch providers.3 8 5 The outer
range of constitutionally-required information is unclear. Arguably,
where the services involved are of particular importance and difficult to
assess, ensuring a meaningful choice requires that the government pro-
vide detailed information on the services provided by different providers
and perhaps offer additional assistance to beneficiaries in making their
selections.3 8 6 Yet such a requirement is at least superficially hard to
although not qualifying as government agents. In the end, however, this classification issue
is irrelevant, other than to show how the availability of the second step of the private
delegation analysis allows a broader approach in identifying which delegations merit
scrutiny.
383. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 97-99, 102 ("[G]enuine individual choice
... requires both sufficient autonomy to choose and sufficient options for the choice to be
meaningful.").
384. See, e.g., Handler, Down from Bureaucracy, supra note 13, at 149-51; Freeman,
Private Role, supra note 2, at 602-10.
385. Cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-69 (2002) (holding that due
process requires government to provide notice that is reasonably calculated under all
circumstances to apprise individual of threatened deprivation of protected interest). Some
programs already require such information be provided. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2864(d) (2)
(2000) (requiring one-stop centers under WIA to provide detailed information on types of
services available, local job market conditions, and performance of eligible training
providers); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (d) (describing Medicare MCO information that must be
provided to Medicare beneficiaries). The charitable choice provision of TANF has been
criticized for not requiring that beneficiaries be informed of their statutory right to receive
services from a nonreligious provider. See Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 99; see also 42
U.S.C. § 604a(a) (setting out requirements for use of religious providers under TANF).
386. Cf. Minow, Partners, supra note 2, at 97 ("Autonomous choice is in jeopardy
when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is offered these necessities .... ");
Nan Ellis, Individual Training Accounts Under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998: Is
Choice A Good Thing?, 8 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 235, 246-55 (2001) (describing
measures such as consumer education and assistance programs that could improve quality




square with the Court's refusal to impose affirmative assistance obliga-
tions in many instances where the government is acting directly against
an individual's interests.
387
A final alternative is to design the delegation in such a way that pri-
vate entities' exercise of their delegated authority necessarily comports
with substantive constitutional requirements. Currin provides an example
of this approach. 388 There, tobacco growers had the sole power to deter-
mine whether tobacco standards promulgated by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture would apply in a particular area. Thus, the delegation was not one
where government retained the power to review private decisionmaking,
nor one where all affected individuals participated. Yet the growers could
determine only whether the standards would become effective; they
could determine neither the content of the standards, nor how the stan-
dards would apply in particular cases. In rejecting the claim that the stat-
ute was a private delegation of legislative power, the Court emphasized
the growers' limited role,38 9 but the point applies more broadly. The
tobacco growers' power was so circumscribed that its exercise, even for
purely biased and self-interested ends, would not violate the Constitution.
Indeed, self-interested exercise was the very point. This was simply an
example of Congress regulating to improve the growers' economic posi-
tion, as it had power to do, but letting the growers determine whether
such regulation really was to their advantage.
How far this final option extends is unclear, and existing precedent
seems to suggest a narrow scope. Although Sunshine did not expressly
hold that government oversight is a constitutional imperative when some
private actors are delegated power to promulgate regulatory standards
binding on others, this conclusion follows from the Court's reasoning.
390
Similarly, professional norms impose standards often exceeding the
scope of constitutional prohibitions. Yet, in West, the Court rejected the
claim that delegating government power to professionals obviated the
need for individuals to be able to assert constitutional constraints. 39 1 On
the other hand, these decisions focused on the question of whether the
private actors involved were wielding legislative power or were state ac-
tors, not whether the move to privatized contexts altered the applicable
substantive content of constitutional guarantees. Once the fact that pri-
387. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the
Constitution does not require government to provide counsel to indigent defendants in
nonfelony trials if no term of imprisonment is actually imposed); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (concluding no constitutional right exists to waiver of fees in
challenging reduction of welfare benefits). But see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110-16
(1996) (describing instances where government is constitutionally compelled to waive fee
requirements and provide access to services free of charge).
388. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
389. Id. at 15-16.
390. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940) (upholding
statutory scheme on grounds that "law-making is not entrusted to the industry").
391. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51-52 & 52 n.10 (1988).
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vate delegates are wielding government power is acknowledged, this lat-
ter question moves to the fore.
3. Remedying Unconstitutional Private Delegations. - The discussion so
far has sketched most of the contours of the proposed private delegation
analysis. An additional important question that remains, however, con-
cerns how courts should remedy delegations held unconstitutional.
a. Invalidation - In prior private delegation cases and analogous
contexts, the court employed a remedy of granting declaratory or injunc-
tive relief in holding a delegation valid.392 The government would then
be responsible for adding the required accountability or otherwise refash-
ioning the delegation to be constitutional. It would then be up to the
government to add the required accountability mechanisms or otherwise
refashion the delegation to be constitutional. Not only is this remedial
route the most logical response to an unconstitutional delegation, but
more importantly, it accords with the basic claim underlying the pro-
posed analysis: that the political branches of government bear primary
responsibility for structuring private delegations to ensure constitutional
accountability. It is, however, subject to two potentially significant criti-
cisms. First, invalidating unconstitutional private delegations could be
very disruptive, particularly given the heavy reliance on private actors in
social welfare programs, where beneficiaries are often in urgent need for
services and continuous care relationships are particularly important.
39 3
Second, this remedy would fail to rectify the harm an individual suffers as
a result of an inadequately constrained private delegation; for example,
simply invalidating a welfare program's reliance on private case managers
does not make whole a welfare recipient who was dropped from the rolls
or denied an opportunity to participate in a job training program be-
cause of her race.
394
b. Direct Application of Constitutional Constraints to Private Delegates. -
An alternative approach would be for a court to remedy an unconstitu-
tional private delegation by applying constitutional constraints directly to
the private delegates at issue. Governments then could continue to rely
on their private delegates, and courts could ensure full relief by proceed-
ing to consider the merits of an individual's constitutional claims if they
find a private delegation to be inadequately structured. This option has
392. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936); Geo-Tech
Reclamation Indus. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1989).
393. This potential for disruption is not a concern in all cases. For example, in Blum,
invalidating the delegation authorizing nursing homes to assess Medicaid beneficiaries'
care needs would not force changes in the care beneficiaries received; it would simply
mean that the state Medicaid agency would have to provide beneficiaries an opportunity to
challenge the nursing homes' level-of-care assessments. But where the government does
not have a substantial agency oversight mechanism already in place, invalidation could be
more problematic.
394. Cf. Susan Tinsley Gooden, Race and Welfare: Examining Employment
Outcomes of White and Black Welfare Recipients, 4J. Pov. 21, 31-39 (2000) (discussing
different treatment of white and African American TANF recipients in Virginia).
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the further advantage of being most in keeping with current practice.
Indeed, the effect of this remedial option would be to transform the pri-
vate delegation approach into a version of state action analysis, one
that-unlike current doctrine-allows for contingent ascriptions of state
action. On this account, a private delegate's state actor status would de-
pend upon the absence of adequate alternative accountability mecha-
nisms.3 95 Such greater compatibility with existing law is important, be-
cause it may dramatically increase the likelihood that the proposed
private delegation analysis will be judicially adopted.
These benefits come at a significant cost, however. Such a state ac-
tion remedy once again collapses the problem of how to constrain gov-
ernment power into the question of whether private actors should be sub-
ject to constitutional requirements, thereby undermining the proposed
analysis' structural focus on grants of power and overall constraints.
Moreover, this approach would erode the government's incentives to
structure its private delegations adequately from the outset. Equally
problematic are the potential effects on judicial review. Courts are more
likely to insist on exact surrogates for applicable constitutional con-
straints when imposing such constraints on private actors represents the
immediate alternative; as a result, they will be less willing to accept ac-
countability mechanisms that are different in structure as constitutionally
adequate alternatives. At the same time, the opposite danger also exists:
that courts will adopt an excessively narrow account of when private dele-
gations trigger heightened scrutiny to avoid subjecting private individuals
and entities to constitutional requirements. Perhaps the latter result is
likely regardless, given the extent to which the current Court seems will-
ing to ignore the reality of privatized government in state action cases.
But its probability is only enhanced by relying on a remedy that requires
courts to impose liability for constitutional defects on private actors
rather than on government.
c. Invalidation with Direct Application if No Adequate Alternative
Exists. - On balance, the route of invalidation in a suit against the gov-
ernment appears generally the better remedial option. The remedial
stage is where the equitable powers of the courts are at their broadest and
thus courts should not have difficulty fashioning interim relief that mini-
mizes disruption or ensures that injured individuals are made whole.
Courts should be able to hold the government responsible to rectify
harms caused by unconstitutional actions of private delegates, not be-
395. Such a contingent ascription might seem incompatible with what it means to be
a state actor. That is, if what makes a private delegate into a state actor is its exercise of
government power, then why should the presence of alternative accountability
mechanisms make a difference? This objection loses its force, however, under a
functionalist conception that views application of constitutional constraints to private
actors as simply one means of ensuring that government power is exercised subject to
constitutional constraints, rather than as an inevitable conclusion of finding private actors
to be wielding government authority.
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cause those delegates are state actors, but rather because the government
itself violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by delegating govern-
ment power without adequate safeguards. Courts also could respond to a
delegation's potential unconstitutionality by reading the grant of dele-
gated powers narrowly, a remedy much more commonly used to address
delegation concerns than outright invalidation.39 6 Courts also can invoke
separability doctrine..
3 97
On the other hand, the rejection of direct application of constitu-
tional constraints to private actors should not be absolute. The barrier is
prudential only, assuming that the private delegates are defendants in the
case. Once a court has found an agency relationship indicating private
exercise of government power, no substantive constitutional barrier pro-
hibits subjecting private actors to constitutional requirements. In some
contexts, an adequate alternative to direct constitutional application will
not exist, whether because of the pervasiveness and potency of the dele-
gate's powers or because other means of ensuring accountability are not
readily available. One example of the latter situation is a defendant's ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges, which the Sixth Amendment protects
from government supervision other than by a court. 398 The choice then
becomes whether to apply constitutional constraints directly to private
delegates in such contexts, or to prohibit these private delegations en-
tirely. While either of these options would satisfy constitutional accounta-
bility concerns, the proposed analysis' emphasis on respecting the politi-
cal branches' regulatory freedom counsels for direct constitutional
application rather than prohibition.
In other contexts, the government may signal its willingness to have
its delegates bound by constitutional requirements, for example, by stat-
ute or in its contracts with private entities. Where the government has so
provided, the regulatory prerogatives argument against direct application
of constitutional norms is once again quite weak. The real question is
instead one of forum: Should plaintiffs be forced to sue under these stip-
ulations, which often would be based in state law and thus would limit
396. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 303, 357-59 (1999). But see David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction
and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 23-37 (2002) (arguing that the
Court rarely adopts narrow statutory constructions on nondelegation grounds). Cospito is
an example of this approach in the private delegation context, with the court of appeals
there reading the Medicare statute as not giving the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (now JCAHO) exclusive control over accreditation. This reading conflicted
directly with the statute's text which required that hospitals must be accredited byJCAHO
or satisfy government-promulgated standards that were equivalent to JCAHO's standards.
See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1984); see also id. at 89-91 (Becker,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that majority's reading did not accord with the text of Medicare
statute).
397. On separability doctrine, see Hart & Wechsler's, supra note 115, at 180-84.
398. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
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them to state court?399 Or should plaintiffs also have access to federal
courts based on direct constitutional claims, even though these stipula-
tions arguably cure any constitutional accountability problem with the
underlying delegation? Given that the federal Constitution is the ulti-
mate measure of the rights being asserted, requiring plaintiffs to sue
again in state court appears hard to justify. Hence, here too, the appro-
priate course will often be to hold that constitutional rights apply directly
to the private entities involved, thereby ensuring access to federal courts
under existing jurisdictional statutes.
40°
4. The Effect of the Proposed Analysis on Existing State Action and Private
Delegation Doctrine. - A final issue concerns how the proposed private
delegation analysis would interact with existing constitutional approaches
to privatization. This analysis is derived from existing private delegation
decisions and requires little alteration of that doctrine. But it would force
a marked departure from how courts address what are now seen as state
action problems.
Most notably, under the proposed analysis, the government's sub-
stantial involvement in specific private acts or more general "pervasive
entwinement" with a private delegate would not subject the delegate to
direct constitutional liability. On the contrary, close government involve-
ment will often serve to defeat constitutional objections. While such in-
volvement supports finding that the private delegate is a government
agent and is exercising government power, it increases the probability
that suits against the government alone are available as alternative means
to ensure constitutional accountability. The private delegation approach
is more compatible with the present public function test; in fact, the cate-
gory of private delegations found to represent clear grants of government
power could be defined alternatively as cases where a private delegate is
exercising powers that traditionally and exclusively were reserved for the
state. 40  But here as well the logic of the proposed analysis would force
alterations. No reason exists for subjecting private delegates to constitu-
tional constraints simply because they are performing a public function if
constitutional accountability is otherwise achievable. Often, however, ap-
plication of the proposed analysis would not change the result in public
function cases, because the types of power at issue in those contexts tend
to be such that no other mechanism adequately ensures constitutional
accountability.
399. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-10, 817 (1986)
(noting general rule that "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action" and
refusing to find federal question jurisdiction not withstanding that violation of federal
statute was element of state cause of action (internal quotations omitted)).
400. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
401. I have not defined it in those terms, however, to preserve the distinctness of the
two analyses; moreover, the backwards focus of the current public function test ill
comports with the private delegation analysis' concern with preserving constitutional
accountability under new forms of governance.
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The inconsistency of the proposed private delegation analysis and
current state action doctrine, of course, makes it unlikely that the Court
will adopt the proposed approach. From a realist perspective, the odds of
judicial adoption are further diminished by the fact that the proposed
analysis will subject many public-private relationships assumed to be un-
problematic under state action doctrine to a much more searching re-
view, with some no doubt being invalidated. Yet as privatization expands,
courts increasingly must confront the transparent inadequacies of cur-
rent state action doctrine. Judges will be in the uncomfortable position
of choosing between constitutionalizing private action and thus displac-
ing the political branches' regulation of government-private relation-
ships, or allowing substantial exercises of government power to evade
constitutional scrutiny. Faced with such an unpalatable choice, courts
may become more accepting of efforts to fundamentally rework state ac-
tion analysis, and more willing to impose obligations to preserve constitu-
tional accountability on governments as the price of privatization.
If so, the private delegation approach has notable advantages com-
pared to the proposals for reforming state action doctrine considered in
Part III. Determining whether an agency relationship exists may at times
be difficult, but, even so, agency law provides more principled and inde-
pendent guidance for courts than amorphous tests such as "public func-
tion" or "pervasive entwinement." While offering a more formalized in-
quiry, the proposed analysis still allows courts to take account of the
realities of government-private relationships; these realities will factor
into a court's determinations of whether agency is present and whether
the private delegations at issue are adequately structured to preserve con-
stitutional accountability. Unlike prior reform proposals, the private del-
egation approach avoids unnecessary restrictions of the political
branches' regulatory role by emphasizing alternative accountability mech-
anisms and foregoing direct application of constitutional constraints to
private actors.
Perhaps most significantly, notwithstanding its inconsistency with
current state action doctrine, the proposed analysis accords with the basic
constitutional propositions on which that doctrine is based. One such
proposition is acceptance of a public-private divide for constitutional pur-
poses. True, the proposed private delegation approach draws this line
differently from current doctrine. But the waxing and waning of state
action doctrine over the second half of the twentieth century makes clear
that there is more than one way of construing the meaning of govern-
ment power. What the public-private divide requires is simply a recogni-
tion that the sphere of the Constitution's application is limited, so that
certain actions are not subject to constitutional scrutiny. But it does not
prohibit drawing the appropriate dividing line based upon a measured
assessment of how best to balance constitutional accountability and gov-
1484 [Vol. 103:1367
PRIVATIZATION AS DELEGATION
ernment regulatory freedom. 40 2 Similarly, no conflict exists between the
proposed analysis and the principle that the Constitution applies to all
state action, even though private exercises of government power are im-
mune from direct constitutional scrutiny.403 Under the proposed analy-
sis, constitutional constraints on government power are preserved, albeit
through a different means. Private delegates' general immunity from di-
rect constitutional scrutiny can also be justified on the grounds that when
the state has imposed adequate constraints on its private delegates' exer-
cises of government power, such exercises should not be deemed to con-
stitute state action for constitutional purposes.
40 4
The proposed analysis is also compatible with the principle that, ab-
sent exceptional circumstances, government owes no duty to protect indi-
viduals from independent private harm. True, the effect will often be to
require the government to provide protections against private abuse; in-
deed, one central advantage of the private delegation approach is that it
encourages the government to undertake greater supervision of its pri-
vate delegates. Critically, however, private delegations do not represent
situations in which the government has failed to intervene to address
harms caused by private actors, but rather ones where the government
has affirmatively acted by delegating decisionmaking authority over gov-
ernment programs to private hands.40 5 Thus, holding that government
bears responsibility for ensuring private delegations are adequately con-
strained is simply demanding that the government itself act in accor-
dance with constitutional requirements-in this case, with the principle
of constitutional accountability.40 6 Here again, the structural emphasis of
the proposed inquiry is useful because it directs attention to the govern-
402. See Seidman, Public Principle, supra note 131, at 1019-29 (advancing view of
public-private divide as socially constructed boundary that balances conflicting values).
403. It is, however, at odds with current state action doctrine, which treats all actions
of the government as state action for constitutional purposes. See Strauss et al., supra note
187, at 414-19 (criticizing this feature of current doctrine and advocating systemic or
functionalist approach that looks at effect of government entity's actions on individual
freedoms generally).
404. Notably, support for this proposition can be found in the Civil Rights Cases, the
seminal decision setting forth the state action doctrine. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). One reading of
that decision views it as holding that private harm cannot be state action when the state
stands ready to rectify private harm through other means. See id. at 25 ("Innkeepers and
public carriers, by the laws of all the states . . . are bound . . . to furnish proper
accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them. If the
laws themselves make any unjust discrimination . . . Congress has full power to afford a
remedy .... "); Seidman, State Action, supra note 128, at 395.
405. Even DeShaney acknowledged that the government can be liable for failing to
protect individuals where it makes them vulnerable to private harm, although it suggested
that only a state's assuming custodial control can lead to ascription of such affirmative
duties. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.9 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
subsequent lower court decisions on when government is subject to duty to protect).
406. Contra Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 31 (lst Cir. 2002)
(holding that failure to include adequate protections in contract with private school
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ment's own decisions regarding the design of private delegations, con-




C. Application of the Proposed Private Delegation Analysis
To summarize, the proposed private delegation analysis would pro-
ceed as follows: An individual injured or likely to be injured by a private
delegate's action would bring suit against the government (and perhaps
the private delegate itself), arguing that the delegation authorizing the
private action is unconstitutional because it is inadequately structured to
ensure that private exercises of government power adhere to constitu-
tional requirements. In assessing the merits of this claim, the court would
first determine whether the delegation creates an agency relationship be-
tween the private actor and the government. If not, and if the private
delegation does not otherwise involve a clear grant of government power
or power to act on the government's behalf, the plaintiff would lose on
the merits.
Where the court finds such an agency relationship, it would then
proceed to assess whether the delegation is adequately structured to pre-
serve constitutional accountability. This requirement is met where some
mechanism exists by which the individual can enforce constitutional lim-
its on private exercises of government power, such as a statutory surro-
gate for a constitutional claim or the ability to assert actual constitutional
claims against the government. The government becomes a potential tar-
get for constitutional challenge when it either sanctions the private dele-
gate's specific actions on administrative review or makes an independent
determination as an alternative to private decisionmaking. Other means
of satisfying constitutional accountability demands would be to structure
the delegation so that no private delegate exercises monopolistic or
quasi-monopolistic control over access to government benefits, or to dele-
gate only very limited powers. A court may also conclude that a private
delegation meets constitutional requirements, even without limitations
on private delegates equivalent to those that apply to government, be-
cause in a particular context the Constitution imposes lesser substantive
constraints on private entities wielding government authority.
As this description suggests, the claim that a private delegation is in-
adequately structured to preserve constitutional accountability can take
the form of a facial challenge. In some cases, however, the inadequacy of
represents government inaction for which DeShaney precludes constitutional liability), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003).
407. See Tribe, Constitutional Choices, supra note 148, at 253, 265. That the
government is so responsible is clear from private delegation decisions such as Currin and
Sunshine, which never questioned the propriety of the government's status as a defendant.
Indeed, the presence of state action in such design choices is so clear that it often goes
unstated. For the rare case where this issue was discussed, see Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737-39 (1996) (noting that
congressional statute "by definition" is congressional action subject to First Amendment).
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alternative accountability mechanisms will only become apparent
through practical application; for example, it may not be clear from the
face of governing regulations that certain types of claims are excluded
from an administrative complaint system. In such as-applied contexts,
plaintiffs would combine their claims for relief under existing accounta-
bility mechanisms with the alternative argument that if such relief is un-
available, the delegation is unconstitutional.
If a private delegation creates an agency relationship or involves del-
egation of power to act on the government's behalf, and is inadequately
structured to ensure that government power is ultimately kept within con-
stitutional bounds, the delegation would be unconstitutional. The usual
remedy will be for a court to invalidate the delegation and hold the gov-
ernment responsible for the delegate's unconstitutional acts. But in rare
situations, courts may instead apply constitutional constraints directly to
the private delegates involved, because doing so represents the only
means of ensuring constitutional accountability.
The major question remaining is what difference the proposed pri-
vate delegation analysis will make in practice. Some sense of an answer
comes from examining the different results in past state action cases,
summarized below in Table I. Further indications about the practical ef-
fect of the proposed analysis become apparent when applying it to the
recent government privatization efforts in the health care, welfare, public
education, and prison contexts discussed in Part I.
1. Privatization in Health Care: Medicare and Medicaid Managed Care.
- The statutes, regulations, and contracts authorizing the use of man-
aged care under Medicare and Medicaid represent private delegations
that create agency relationships between MCOs and the government.
While desirous of making a profit for themselves, the MCOs also plainly
act on the government's behalf: In exchange for a set per-beneficiary
payment, the MCOs determine eligibility for and provide medical services
that federal and state governments are required to make available to ben-
eficiaries in these programs. The contracts between the government and
MCOs, as well as the obvious connection of the MCOs' services to Medi-
care and Medicaid, offer ample evidence of principal and agent assent to
an agency relationship. Principal control, in turn, is manifested by the
government's stipulations regarding which services must be provided and
regulation of MCOs' operations.
40 8
408. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[Medicare MCOs]
... are not making decisions to which the government merely responds. [MCOs] are
following congressional and regulatory orders and are making [coverage] decisions as a
governmental proxy."), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1998); see also J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F.
Supp. 694, 699-700 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding agency where private organization given
authority to determine eligibility for and arrange provision of behavioral health services).
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Thus, under the proposed private delegation analysis, these delega-
tions merit enhanced scrutiny to determine if they are adequately struc-
tured to ensure constitutional accountability. Regulations limit when
beneficiaries can leave an MCO, so that the options of enrolling in a dif-
ferent MCO or returning to fee-for-service (options that may only exist
under Medicare) do not satisfy concerns about the MCOs' powers over
beneficiaries. 40 9 Accreditation requirements are significant protections
against poor quality services and denials of medically needed services;
410
however, they are not adequate safeguards from a constitutional account-
ability perspective because accrediting organizations do not provide over-
sight of MCO decisions in particular cases and often lack mechanisms by
which individuals can challenge accreditation decisions. 4 1 Private rights
of action and rights to independent review of coverage denials may be
available under state law, 412 but such rights may not extend to the Medi-
care and Medicaid contexts given the federal nature of the programs and
the presence of administrative systems for review of denials.
41 3
As a result, whether these private delegations to MCOs are constitu-
tional turns on the adequacy of these systems and their respective provi-
sions for administrative review. In Grijalva, the court concluded that the
existing system for administrative appeals, which closely paralleled the ap-
peals procedures used to challenge denials of coverage under Medicare
fee-for-service, 41 4 failed to satisfy due process in the MCO context where
such a denial prevents access to health care, not just access to reimburse-
ment. In particular, the court concluded that the period within which
administrative review had to occur was excessively long and that notices
of appeal rights provided by MCOs were inadequate. 415 The due process
concerns raised by the court appear quite real, 4 16 and the conclusion that
409. See, e.g., Election of Coverage Under an M+C Plan, 42 C.F.R. § 422.62(a)
(2002). Moreover, in some regions of the country, very few MCOs participate in Medicare.
Outside of central urban areas, beneficiaries commonly have only one choice of managed
care plan; indeed the vast majority of beneficiaries in rural areas have no choice of
managed care at all. See Gold & McCoy, supra note 24, at 1-2.
410. Several commentators have emphasized the importance of accrediting
institutions in ensuring accountability of the services and activities of MCOs. See, e.g.,
Furrow, supra note 22, at 396-406; Gladieux, supra note 22, at 107-17. For a discussion of
the role of accreditation in public health programs, see Kinney, Private Accreditation,
supra note 26, at 47; see also Clark Havighurst, Foreword: The Place of Private Accrediting
Among the Instruments of Government, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1994, at 1, 5-14
(discussing arguments for and against government reliance on private accreditors).
411. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 2, at 613-15.
412. See supra sources cited in note 35.
413. See Medicare Program, Improvements, supra note 213, at 16,661 (noting that
federal rules preempt state grievance requirements relating to coverage decisions).
414. See Gladieux, supra note 22, at 66-68.
415. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 757-60 (D. Ariz. 1996).
416. See Bonnyman &Johnson, supra note 27, at 376-79 (arguing that due process
requires better notice and more expedited review than was provided tinder Medicare
managed care prior to Grijalva, as well as impartial review and maintenance of services
pending appeal); Morrison, supra note 22, at 741-42 (detailing inadequacies in Medicare
[Vol. 103:13671490
20031 PRVATIZATION AS DELEGATION 1491
a system of government review fails to ensure due process would also
mean that the system is inadequate as a constraint on a private
delegation.
Until this point, therefore, the proposed analysis deviates little from
that in Grijalva.4 17 The difference between the two lies instead at the
remedial stage. Grijalva's state action finding would support suits directly
against the MCOs on constitutional claims, had it not been vacated post-
Sullivan. Under the proposed analysis, however, such suits would not be
authorized and instead claims of unconstitutional delegations would lead
only to relief from claims against the government. Moreover, the content
of such relief would be different from that in Grijalva. Rather than speci-
fying the substance of the procedures MCOs must follow in detail (in-
cluding the size of font to be used in notices), courts would simply re-
quire the government to adopt adequate constraints or rescind the
delegation. It would be up to the government to determine whether to
improve its oversight of MCOs or adopt another approach, such as ex-
press rights to independent review. In addition, the regulations that the
government issued while Grijalva was on appeal might well satisfy consti-
tutional accountability requirements, even though they did not comply
with the specifications in the district court's order.41 8 Hence, their pro-
mulgation would have ended the government's liability and mooted the
case. 4
19
MCO appeal procedures); Wright, supra note 34, at 174, 177-78 (arguing that due process
requires right to appeal every MCO coverage determination and concluding that
constitutionally adequate managed care is thus infeasible under Medicare and Medicaid).
417. Given its emphasis on preserving regulatory flexibility, the proposed analysis
would give government claims of administrative burden and negative regulatory trade-offs
more serious consideration than they were accorded by the district and appeals courts in
Orijalva. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S.
1096 (1999). In the end, however, courts might still find these concerns outweighed by the
other factors in the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part due process balance. 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
418. These regulations required MCOs to provide notice of appeals procedures and
complete coverage determinations generally within fourteen calendar days (or within
seventy-two hours when expedited review was medically warranted), and authorized
independent review of coverage denials. By contrast, Grijalva required MCOs to complete
determinations within five working days, imposed more extensive notice obligations,
required appeal rights for service reductions as well as terminations, and mandated
continuation of benefits pending appeal in a broader range of cases. See Morrison, supra
note 22, at 755-57; see also Gladieux, supra note 22, at 89-90 (arguing that regulations
basically accorded with Grijalva requirements and approving of both their provision for
accelerated expedited review as well as their different timelines for payment-related and
service-related appeals); Gegwich, supra note 33, at 223-24 (arguing that Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, provides adequate improvements to appeals
process).
419. See, e.g., Healey v. Thompson, 186 F. Supp. 2d 105, 121, 127 (D. Conn. 2001)
(emphasizing that "a court should be loathe [to] intervene and usurp the reform process
already running its course" and refusing to require notices before home health services are
reduced or terminated). The court of appeals' refusal to consider the new regulations in
Grijalva stemmed from its perhaps justified annoyance that the government had not
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Implicit in the foregoing is that the delegations to MCOs raise consti-
tutional accountability concerns only with respect to their treatment of
enrolled beneficiaries. MCOs also exercise control over other third par-
ties-specifically beneficiaries seeking to enroll, employees, and partici-
pating medical providers. But with respect to these individuals, the dele-
gations are adequately structured to preserve constitutional
accountability. Governing statutes and regulations expressly protect the
rights of Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in a participating MCO, 4 2 0 and
the option of fee-for-service in the interim plays a more curative role.
Similarly, medical providers' ability to affiliate with another MCO or offer
services through fee-for-service means that no single MCO exercises mo-
nopolistic or quasi-monopolistic power over providers' ability to partici-
pate in Medicare. Accordingly, MCOs do not appear to be in an agency
relationship with the federal government regarding their other
employees.
4 2 1
2. Privatization in Welfare: Wisconsin's W-2 and Contracted-Out Welfare
Services. - Little doubt exists that Wisconsin's delegation to private orga-
nizations of responsibility for operating the W-2 welfare program in Mil-
waukee creates agency relationships between the organizations and the
State. Indeed, the W-2 statute makes this clear by defining the entities
implementing W-2 as "agenc [ies]. 422 Unlike the workers' compensation
system in Sullivan, here the obligation to provide benefits lies by statute
with the government, which in turn contracted out this responsibility to
private agencies, with the state welfare department exercising over-
sought such relief from the district court. Under the proposed analysis, however,
responsibility would lie in the first instance with the government to design new regulations
to address constitutional accountability concerns once the district court found the existing
regulations inadequate.
420. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 (a) (1), 22(b) (2000). Under Medicaid, the concern is
not an MCO's refusal to enroll beneficiaries so much as beneficiaries being automatically
enrolled in MCOs not of their choosing. See Marsha Gold et al., Medicaid Managed Care:
Lessons from Five States, in Contemporary Managed Care, supra note 31, at 191, 195-97;
Eric Lipton, State Extends Program to Enroll the Poor in Managed Care Plans, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 2000, at B4 (noting problems with enrollment in Medicaid managed care in New
York); Jennifer Steinhauer, 73% Enroll in First Drive to Shift City's Medicaid Patients to
Health Plans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1999, at B5 (noting initial data on mandatory Medicaid
MCO enrollment suggest over 25% of beneficiaries may end up being automatically
assigned to managed care plan).
421. Cf. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 212, at 228 (contending that concerns
regarding governments' ability to evade constitutional limitations by delegating statutory
responsibilities to private entities are inapplicable to Medicaid MCOs' relationships with
providers and suppliers). In any event, federal law grants providers procedural rights to
challenge Medicare MCO participation decisions and prohibits Medicare MCOs from
limiting providers' ability to recommend services. See § 1395w-22(j); see also §§ 1395w-
22(b), 1396u-2(b)(7) (protecting providers against discrimination by Medicare and
Medicaid MCOs on the basis of their licenses or certifications).




sight.423 The W-2 statute sets out the basic features of the W-2 program
that the W-2 agencies are responsible for implementing-including the
program's eligibility and participation requirements, levels of benefits,
and types of services available to beneficiaries. 424 Nor can there be much
doubt that this delegation is inadequately structured to preserve constitu-
tional accountability. Although four private W-2 agencies now operate in
Milwaukee, each has a monopoly over implementing the program and
providing welfare benefits in the particular geographic regions it
serves. 4 2 5 The W-2 statute imposes few procedural restrictions on the W-2
agencies, and the government's contracts with W-2 agencies also impose
very few restrictions on how their programs operate. 42 6 The oversight
undertaken by the state's welfare department, while sufficient to support
a finding of agency, is insufficient for constitutional purposes; individuals
are allowed to petition the department for review of adverse W-2 agency
decisions, but the department need grant such review only where the de-
cision found an applicant financially ineligible for aid. 42 7 A provision in
Wisconsin's public assistance law states that public assistance agencies
shall respect the rights of public assistance recipients, including constitu-
tional rights, but it provides no express mechanisms by which recipients
can enforce this requirement.
428
Hence, the delegation in its current form would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, adequately restructuring the program to ensure sufficient ac-
countability would appear to require that the government either imple-
ment a broader administrative appeals system, or dramatically alter the
performance incentive structure of the W-2 program. The current struc-
423. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.141(1) (p) (defining Wisconsin Works as "the assistance
program for families with dependent children"); id. § 49.143(1) (authorizing contracting
out of W-2 administration and requiring the department to administer W-2 in a geographic
area if no other provider is selected); Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 12.04 (granting
department of workforce development oversight responsibility for administration of
Wisconsin Works by contract agencies).
424. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 49.143-49.161; Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 12.05(1)
(requiring W-2 agency to comply with governing statutes, regulations, and program
procedures).
425. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.143(6); McConnell et al., supra note 42, appx. at A24.
426. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.143(2) (listing W-2 contract requirements, which almost
entirely address substance of services); id. § 49.152 (requiring W-2 agencies to provide
review of certain decisions if timely requested to do so); Wis. Admin. Code DWD
§ 12.06(4) (imposing time limits on processing of applications for W-2); Dodenhoff, supra
note 42, at 19-21 (describing initial W-2 contracts as "say[ing] next to nothing about how
W-2 agencies are to run their programs on a day-to-day basis," although including sanctions
for private agencies that fail to provide procedural due process).
427. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.152; Wis. Admin. Code DWD §§ 3.01-3.12, 12.22; see
also Rotker et al., supra note 54, at 536-39 (detailing inadequacies in appeals procedures).
428. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.81; see also State of Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev.,
Wisconsin Works (W-2) and Related Programs Contract for the Period January 1, 2002
through December 31, 2003, at 1 30 (2001), available at http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/dws/
w2/contracts/20022003/pdf/w2contract.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(imposing nondiscrimination requirements on W-2 agencies).
2003] 1493
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ture gives the W-2 agencies a financial interest in the decisions they make
regarding program participants, 429 such that allowing the agencies to
make these decisions, at least absent access to independent review, ap-
pears to violate due process.
430
These problems notwithstanding, the W-2 case illustrates how a pri-
vate delegation inquiry can invest the government with more regulatory
freedom than does a state action analysis. It seems likely that the private
W-2 agencies would be found to be state actors on the basis of govern-
ment involvement; as in Grivalja, the W-2 agencies not only provide state-
subsidized services, but also implement state-specified welfare eligibility
and participation requirements. There is also a solid chance that whole-
sale administration of a state's income assistance program would qualify
as a public function, particularly given that in most of Wisconsin, the
functions of the private W-2 agencies are performed by county social ser-
vices departments. 43 1 Accordingly, under current doctrine the W-2 agen-
cies are subject to direct constitutional scrutiny. While the government's
regulatory flexibility is also limited under the private delegation analysis,
it at least gives the government the choice of avoiding this result by insti-
tuting more comprehensive review.
The opposite situation holds with respect to contracted-out job
placement and case management services. Blum and Rendell-Baker indi-
cate that these situations will rarely trigger a state action conclusion. Yet
these forms of privatization are instances of private delegations that cre-
ate agency relationships with the government and that would provoke
enhanced scrutiny under the private delegation analysis. Some of these
delegations may end up being unconstitutional, but such a result is not
preordained. While governments exercise little case-by-case oversight
over the actions of such contracted service providers, even a minimal op-
portunity for review of job placement decisions will likely satisfy constitu-
tional concerns, at least as long as providers have no financial interest in
limiting placements and particularly if placement decisions are given to
professionals. But under the proposed analysis, courts would be able to
429. Each agency is allocated a set amount to cover program costs during a period
and is allowed to retain a portion of any surplus not paid for services. In addition, agencies
are eligible for performance bonuses based on placements and job retention rates of
participants. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.143(3g); Wis. Legislative Audit Bureau, supra note
44, at 40-43.
430. See D. Kennedy, Due Process, supra note 7, at 301-05; see also Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("[I]t certainly.., deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due
process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him.").
431. See, e.g., Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
private home health agencies to be state actors where their decisions regarding eligibility
for nursing care are not subject to further review); Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 212, at
228-30 (arguing that case law "strongly suggests that a total and final decisionmaking
delegation to a private entity regarding eligibility for a public benefits program would be
considered state action, even when there is no tradition of public provision of services").
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assess whether additional procedural safeguards are needed to ensure
private providers' decisions regarding services comport with constitu-
tional requirements, whereas under current doctrine such private deci-
sionmaking is constitutionally exempt. As a result, courts are able to as-
sess whether additional protections may be required in particular
contexts-for example, when a private provider's determination that a
beneficiary has been absent from a placement without good cause results
in sanctions or terminations of benefits where constitutional concerns
may be more acute.
A more interesting alternative is suggested by the Workforce Invest-
ment Act of 1998 (WIA) .432 Included in the WIA is a requirement that
states provide individual training accounts as part of their workforce de-
velopment programs, which allow program participants eligible for train-
ing services to choose their providers rather than be assigned.43 3 The
WIA provides little detail on how these accounts will operate in prac-
tice. 434 But assuming the WIA board has contracted with a variety of
providers and beneficiaries can truly choose among programs, use of this
approach would adequately address constitutional accountability con-
cerns otherwise presented by private providers' control over government-
subsidized employment services.
3. Privatization in Public Education: Charters, EMOs, and Vouchers. -
A useful starting point for assessing the impact of the proposed analysis
on the three moves to greater privatization in public education detailed
above-development of charter schools, reliance on private EMOs to
manage public schools, and subsidization of private school tuition
through vouchers-is to examine how these three initiatives fare under
current state action doctrine. Charter schools most likely would be found
part of the government for constitutional purposes, given that they are
officially denominated public schools, often are created by the state, and
operate subject to the state's direct oversight.435 At a minimum, these
features present a very strong case for a conclusion of state action, either
on the basis of extensive government involvement as in Brentwood Acad-
emy, or on the theory that managing a public school (although not pro-
viding educational services) is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
432. 29 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).
433. Id. § 2864(d)(4)(F)(iii); see also 42 U.S.C. § 607(h) (2000) (discussing
individual development accounts under TANF). Hennepin County, Minnesota, has
adopted a similar approach in regard to TANF case management and allows beneficiaries
to choose between public and private case management services. See McConnell et al.,
supra note 42, at 7, appx. at A7-A8.
434. See Ellis, supra note 386, at 242, 253.
435. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397-99 (1995) (finding
Amtrak to be part of government for constitutional purposes where government chartered




the state.4 36 A similar conclusion applies to privately managed public
schools and the decisions of EMOs in operating them.43 7 On the other
hand, Rendell-Baker strongly suggests that state action will not exist with
regard to private schools participating in a voucher program unless there
is evidence the state compelled or encouraged the specific decision at
issue.
4 3 8
All three, however, represent delegations where private entities are
authorized to act on the government's behalf, even if not instances of
agency relationships. EMOs are perhaps the clearest case for agency:
They not only operate acknowledged public institutions and provide edu-
cation services in exchange for payment from the government, but are
most clearly subject to government control through school board supervi-
sion and oversight. Charter schools' frequent exemption from state edu-
cational regulations in exchange for performance promises renders gov-
ernment control more limited. But the combination of requirements
that the government does impose on charter operation (such as open
access mandates) with provisions for chartering agency oversight and
charter revocation, 4 39 may suffice to establish agency; their official de-
nomination as public schools adds an additional basis for finding agency
status. On the other hand, while the private schools involved in voucher
programs are providing educational services subsidized by the govern-
ment and are subject to some government regulation, the relationship
between the government and the private schools appears too attenuated
to support a finding of agency. Nonetheless, private schools participating
in voucher programs are fairly described as acting on the government's
behalf, in that they provide educational services in exchange forpayment
by the government, services that the government would otherwise have to
provide directly. Moreover, the schools clearly exercise some control
over enrolled students' access to a government benefit: a subsidized
education.
As a result, the constitutionality of all three private delegations again
reduces to the question of whether the delegations are adequately con-
strained. Where the government provides an administrative process
436. See id. (distinguishing between finding a private entity to be part of government
for constitutional purposes and finding it to be a state actor); see also Robert M. O'Neil,
School Choice and State Action, in School Choice and Social Controversy: Politics, Policy,
and Law 215, 220-22 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (noting that
charter schools are an easy case for state action); Frank R. Kemerer & Catherine Maloney,
The Legal Framework for Educational Privatization and Accountability, 150 West's Educ.
L. Rptr. 589, 593 (2001) (arguing that charter schools are indisputably state actors).
437. See Kemerer, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 43-44.
438. Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in School Choice and Social
Controversy, supra note 436, at 235, 252-53; Kemerer & Maloney, supra note 436, at 593.
But see O'Neil, supra note 436, at 225-32 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment
prohibition on racial discrimination applies to private schools participating in voucher
program).
439. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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under which students and teachers can file complaints and obtain expedi-
tious independent review of particular actions, such as suspensions or em-
ployment terminations, adequate constraints appear present. But such a
complaint mechanism is unlikely to be available; in the case of EMOs
operating public schools, access to government review mechanisms will
likely depend on the terms of the contract between the EMO and the
district,440 while charter school laws and voucher programs provide at
best for periodic oversight by government agencies. 44 1 Independently
enforceable statutory or regulatory controls are also unlikely, as states
generally impose few substantive requirements on charter schools or
schools participating in voucher programs. 4 42 Similarly, the state law
remedy relied upon in Logiodice-an action against the school district for
failing to meet its statutory duty to provide a free education-will have
less traction where public school alternatives are provided.
443
This raises the interesting question of whether adequate constraints
are provided by the very system of school choice itself. In principle, such
systems of choice should adequately ensure constitutional accountability
because the schools' powers are dependent on parent, student, and
teacher decisions. A central difficulty with relying on school choice to
preserve constitutional accountability, however, comes from the fact that
all three moves to privatization are much more common in urban school
districts marked by failing public schools. 444 Realistically, therefore, the
option of remaining in the public school system is not available, and os-
440. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 834-35, 841-42 (1982) (detailing
lack of mechanisms for government to review employment decision of school providing
services under contract to local school district and state agency); Logiodice v. Trs. of Me.
Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting whether private school obligated to
follow state law on student suspension turns on its contract with school district), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003); Kemerer, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 46-48 (detailing
effects of privatization on collective bargaining agreements with teachers).
441. For discussions of government oversight, see Hill & Lake, supra note 72, at 48-49
(detailing problems with oversight of charter schools); Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note
59, at 917-29 (noting chartering agency oversight focuses on student performance and
fiscal accountability).
442. For requirements applied to charter schools and voucher schools, Frank P.
Kemerer, Legal Issues Involving Educational Privatization and Accountability 38-40 (Nat'l
Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., Occasional
Paper No. 6, Aug. 2000), available at http://ncspe.org/publicationsjfiles/400_.OP06.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Kemerer, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 53-54
(noting initial requirement, later dropped, in Wisconsin voucher program that schools
must protect a wide variety of constitutional rights); see supra note 60. See also Jay P.
Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the
Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 313-40 (1997) (describing the
applicability of federal disability laws to charter schools).
443. Logiodice also suggests that this form of redress is unlikely to apply to private
school actions short of expulsion, but notes that the specific rights available would turn on
the content of the state law in question. 296 F.3d at 30.
444. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 65, at 2073-85 (discussing urban-suburban
differences in charter schools and voucher programs).
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tensible school choice may offer little protection against private abuse of
government power. Yet, Zelman indicates, that the Court views "private
choice" in the public education context as meaning formal rather than
actual choice. The Court sustained Cleveland's voucher program against
an Establishment Clause challenge in part because the program allowed
students to attend Cleveland's public schools, out-of-district public
schools, or private non-sectarian schools-even while simultaneously ac-
knowledging the abysmal education available through the first alterna-
tive, and notwithstanding that low tuition subsidies made the other two
nearly nonexistent in practice. 445 Holding that constitutional accounta-
bility demands use of vouchers only when the public schools are healthy
is also at odds with Zelman's suggestion that in such contexts a better case
can be made that the voucher program is unconstitutionally motivated by
a desire to foster religion.446 And as a practical matter, that approach
seems to deny the government flexibility to explore privatization precisely
when such flexibility is most needed.
Looking at these instances of public education privatization through
a private delegation analysis thus could have varying effects. It would
forestall finding charter schools and EMOs directly subject to constitu-
tional constraints as state actors. But, more importantly, it would require
states to expand their systems of oversight or impose independently en-
forceable requirements on charters, EMOs, and private schools partici-
pating in voucher programs. On the other hand, the reliance on individ-
ual choice to structure these programs suggests that the level of close
government supervision required in the Medicare/Medicaid MCO and
W-2 contexts should not be required here.
Charter schools and voucher programs are also good examples of
how constitutional rights may change with the move to more private con-
texts. In part, this results from changes in the factual underpinnings that
support certain claims; teachers who are hired by charter schools or pri-
vate schools do not have the same expectation of continued tenure as
those hired by public schools governed by civil service or collective bar-
gaining rules and thus may have no procedural due process right to a
hearing if fired.447 Further, it may be that the substance of some consti-
445. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644-45, 653-56 (2002). See also
Vincent Blasi, Vouchers and Steering, 18J.L. & Pol. 607, 615 (2002) (noting that Zelman
does not impose obligation on government to provide range of realistic nonreligious
educational options as requirement of avoiding Establishment Clause violation); Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 314, at 595-605 (arguing that government should have to demonstrate
that voucher recipients have sufficient nonreligious choices within voucher program for
the program to withstand Establishment Clause challenge).
446. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
447. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-69 (1972) (holding due process
does not protect untenured professor's interest in continued employment where hired to
teach for one year only); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972)
(holding due process required hearing on untenured professor's claim that practice and
expectations were that employment contracts would be renewed). Even if teacher
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tutional rights changes in order to accommodate the legitimate auton-
omy and associational interests at stake. To take a contentious example,
perhaps religious schools participating in voucher programs should be
able to prohibit advocacy of other faiths on school grounds without violat-
ing the First Amendment, although no public school could do so. 448
Under current doctrine, this conclusion follows from the lack of state
action, but it could also result under the private delegation analysis from
recognition of the school's strong interest in preserving its religious iden-
tity.4 4 9 Alternatively, given the government's interest in preserving pri-
vate flexibility, perhaps private schools should not be subject to the same
due process requirements as public schools, even when similar benefit
entitlements are at stake. Indeed, the refusal to find state action in Logi-
odice appears motivated in part by the Court's conclusion that the private
school's failure to hold a hearing on the student's suspension-which the
majority describes as one of "the small arguable unfairnesses that are part
of life"-should not constitute a due process violation.4 50
4. Private Prisons. - This leaves application of the proposed analysis
to privately operated prisons. Currently, private prisons are a fairly
straightforward case for finding state action on public function grounds.
Notwithstanding the lengthy historical pedigree of private involvement in
incarceration, today punishment and the legitimate use of physical coer-
cion are seen as exclusive state prerogatives. 451 Similarly, under the pro-
posed analysis, the use of private prisons easily constitutes a delegation of
government power, whether because of the agency relationship created
by contracts between governments and prison operators or because incar-
ceration is inherently an exercise of government power.
employment relationships in the charter and voucher contexts were framed as
entitlements, application of the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
might lead to a similar result, in that the government's interest in preserving charter
schools' flexibility and the willingness of private schools to participate in voucher programs
may tip the balance against pretermination hearings and militate for very minimal
procedural protections generally.
448. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390-97
(1993); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (SouterJ., dissenting) (arguing that one danger of
voucher programs is that they will lead to political efforts to limit what is taught in religious
voucher schools). For contrasting views on the acceptability of such religious
discrimination, compare O'Neil, supra note 436, at 225-26 (supporting), with Minow,
Partners, supra note 2, at 118 (opposing).
449. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1397, 1397-1402 (2003) (discussing threat to religious autonomy posed by
prohibitions on religious and other forms of discrimination); see also Eule & Varat, supra
note 132, at 1605-33 (discussing associational and autonomy harms of transporting First
Amendment free speech requirements to private contexts).
450. Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1107 (2003).
451. Although the Court has not addressed the question, its holding in West that a
doctor treating prison inmates was a state actor supports this conclusion, and several lower
courts have found private prisons to be state actors in suits by prisoners because
incarceration represents a public function. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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The more interesting issue is whether alternative mechanisms exist
that would adequately preserve constitutional accountability without di-
rect application of constitutional constraints to private prison operators.
The most obvious candidate is an administrative complaint system under
which inmates would have extensive ability to challenge private prisons'
decisions and actions. But the powers wielded by prison operators and
guards are too pervasive and the interactions between prison staff and
inmates too inherently discretionary to be adequately policed solely by a
system of indirect controls.45 2 This conclusion draws support from the
Court's decision in Malesko. There, in refusing to imply a private right of
action for damages for constitutional violations against the private prison
operator, the Court underscored the availability of alternative means for
enforcing constitutional requirements-direct injunctive relief and ac-
tions against individual prison guards-in addition to the availability of
administrative review.
453
An alternative mechanism would be regulatory or contractual provi-
sions requiring private prisons to respect the constitutional rights of in-
mates and authorizing inmates to bring suit against private prisons to
challenge alleged violations. Here, direct protections against private
abuse are provided. However, this route often would preclude suits
against private prisons in federal court, as unless the prisons were operat-
ing on the behalf of the federal government, actions based on these pro-
visions would be rooted solely in state law. Absent a basis in federal statu-
tory law, ensuring access to federal courts in this context requires finding
private prisons to be state actors directly subject to constitutional con-
straints. 454 Given the historical importance of federal courts in improv-
ing conditions in public prisons,455 the prudential case for direct applica-
tion of constitutional constraints is particularly strong.
456
Thus, privately operated prisons represent one of the instances
where under the proposed analysis private entities might still be deemed
state actors. Yet the proposed analysis could lead to different results in
regard to other forms of prison privatization. For example, in West, the
Court found that a private doctor providing medical care to inmates pur-
suant to a contract with a public prison was a state actor. This contractual
arrangement clearly qualifies as a private delegation that created an
agency relationship. Moreover, on the facts of West, that delegation was
not adequately structured to preserve constitutional accountability: In-
mates could obtain medical care only through the doctor selected by the
452. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (describing discretionary nature
of incarceration and resultant difficulty in policing against abuse).
453. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
454. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
455. See Feeley & Rubin, supra note 144, at 13-17, 34-50.
456. On the other hand, the significant restrictions in prisoners' access to the federal
courts under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) means that prisoners may well find
state courts more receptive to their claims. On the effect of PLRA, see Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1557, 1633-91 (2003).
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prison, and the government did not provide an administrative or statu-
tory means for challenging the doctor's decisions.457 However, under the
proposed analysis, the result would be invalidation of the delegation
rather than authorization of a constitutional suit against the private doc-
tor, with the government being liable for any inadequate care the doctor
had provided. The proposed analysis and current state action doctrine
would have diverged even further if North Carolina had instead subsi-
dized medical treatment by a doctor of a prisoner's choosing and allowed
prisoners a meaningful choice among providers. In that case, no doctor
would exercise a monopoly over access to medical care and the individual




The vision of clearly distinct public and private realms embodied in
current state action doctrine bears little resemblance to the modern ad-
ministrative state, with its endless and varied reliance upon private actors
to perform the tasks of government. The result of this disjuncture is a
profound challenge to the principle of constitutional accountability.
Current doctrine targets government involvement, either involvement in
specific private acts or pervasive entwinement with the private entity more
generally, for constitutional condemnation. But such government in-
volvement is rarely present, and also is not the real constitutional con-
cern. Far more threatening is the potential that private actors wield
broad discretion over government programs with insufficient govern-
ment oversight and also (as a result) outside of constitutional controls.
Reforming existing doctrine to reflect current administrative reality is
critical, particularly given recent moves to increase public-private partner-
ships and expand the authority delegated to private entities. At the same
time, however, simply targeting existing doctrine as underinclusive is too
facile, for it fails to take account of why contemporary constitutional law
is so accepting of private delegations, notwithstanding the obvious consti-
tutional dangers. A major reason for that phenomenon is the perception
that gains in constitutional accountability come at the expense of govern-
ment regulatory freedom.
This Article argues not only that current state action doctrine is sin-
gularly deficient, but further that it is possible to secure constitutional
accountability without destroying regulatory flexibility. The key to so do-
ing lies in accepting private exercises of government power as a reality of
457. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 44 & n.2 (1988).
458. The presence of a meaningful choice among providers might offer adequate
protection even in some contexts involving privately operated and owned custodial
facilities, such as private drug or alcohol treatment centers. See, e.g., Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 881-84 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding state did
not violate Establishment Clause by offering parolees option of religious halfway house
when secular halfway house was provided as alternative).
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modern government and then replacing state action's focus on whether
constitutional requirements should apply to private actors. The real con-
stitutional concern should be instead whether private delegations of gov-
ernment power are adequately structured to preserve constitutional ac-
countability. No reason exists to hold private entities directly subject to
constitutional constraints when alternative mechanisms exist by which in-
dividuals can enforce constitutional limits on government power. Moreo-
ver, direct constitutional scrutiny of private entities is also generally inap-
propriate when such mechanisms are lacking. The fundamental
constitutional flaw in this context lies in the nature of the delegation in-
volved-the government's decision to delegate government power to pri-
vate entities without ensuring that constitutional controls will be pre-
served. Responsibility to rectify such an unconstitutional delegation
should lie with the political branches, not the courts.
